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This dissertation will focus on the history of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. It 
looks at how the process of dealing with issues thrown up in the aftermath of partition shaped 
relations between the two countries. I focus on the debates around the immediate aftermath of 
partition, evacuee property disputes, border and water disputes, minorities and migration, 
trade between the two countries, which shaped the canvas in which the India-Pakistan 
relationship took shape. This is an institution- focussed history to some extent, although I 
shall also argue that the foreign policy establishments of both countries were also responding 
to the compulsions of internal politics; and the policies they advocated were also shaped by 
domestic political positions of the day.   
 
In the immediate months and years following partition, the suggestions of a lastingly 
adversarial relationship were already visible. This could be seen from not only in the eruption 
of the Kashmir dispute, but also in often bitter wrangling over the division of assets, over 
water, numerous border disputes, as well as in accusations exchanged over migration of 
minorities. Much of the discussion on Indo- Pakistan relations was couched in adversarial and 
often vitriolic terms, both within the structures of government and in the press. Yet, given this 
context, there was also a substantial amount of space for cooperation between the two 
governments, and a closer scrutiny reveals that this space was explored by both sides. The 
logic of this cooperation was to find means of trying to ‘finalise’ the partition of India, and 
avoid prolonging its consequences. This deep seated drive to establish the legitimacy of both 
new state structures compelled a substantial degree of bilateral cooperation even in the face of 
daunting odds which favoured a violently hostile relationship. Thus, I argue that bilateral 
responses and mutually adversarial positions, were not inevitable or even unavoidable, but 
were in fact more contingent, and often taken despite the presence and articulation of a viable 
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Much of the scholarship on the India-Pakistan relationship characterises it as an 
implacable, and unrelenting, enmity. The literature on this issue is often couched in 
the metaphors of a bitter family feud, and described through the terms of two ‘blood 
brothers’1, caught in a ‘deadly embrace’2, in pursuit of a suicidal ‘sibling rivalry’, 
which dates from when both were born in difficult circumstances, under the aegis of 
a misguided ‘midwife’.3 This relationship, so the argument goes, was doomed to 
violent showdowns and hostile acrimony from the very beginning, because of the 
bitterness left on both sides by the traumas of partition, and the continuing conflict 
in Kashmir.4 
There are a number of reasons to support such a depiction. India and Pakistan have 
entered into three full scale wars, border skirmishes take place almost daily, and 
both pursue their diplomatic spats thoroughly and with zeal. They point out each 
others’ shortcomings at the United Nations, and they spend vast sums of money on 
maintaining armies on the border in preparedness of an attack. A slice of land, 
approximately 90,000 square miles in size, has been contested between the two for 
more than six decades. A state of ‘thaw’ between the two countries is the exception, 
rather than the rule, and, in general, the two countries are held to be in a situation of 
a powder keg close to an accidental match.  
                                                
1 Akbar, M. J., Blood Brothers: A Family Saga, New Delhi, 2006 
2 Talbot, Ian, The Deadly Embrace: Religion, Violence and Politics in India and Pakistan, Karachi, 
2007 
3 Talbot, Ian, Pakistan: A Modern History, London, 1998 
4 For a discussion of the chronology of India Pakistan relations of this period, see for example: 
Dasgupta, Jyoti Bhusan, Indo- Pakistan Relations, 1947- 1955, Djambatan, 1960; Blinkenberg, Lars, 
India- Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts, Odensk, 1999; Chaudhry, G. W., Pakistan’s 
Relations with India, 1947- 1966, London 1968.  
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So it is not surprising that bilateral relations in the subcontinent are believed to be 
doomed to a dangerous volatility, and seized periodically by violent outbursts,  
because of the numbers of factors, including a bitter partition, deeply seated 
religious rivalry and, as well as the continuing conflict in Kashmir, which predispose 
the two towards war. These factors are believed to have exercised a vice like grip in 
subsequent dealings between India and Pakistan, and ensured that bilateral relations 
could not be freed from a mutual suspicion and jealousy. In such circumstances, a 
bitter rivalry was deemed inescapable; and the choices made with regard to bilateral 
relations seemed too entangled with these emotions, which led to both sides 
compulsively taking action that would be to the detriment of the other. 
This is a wide-ranging literature, and has the same conclusion arrived at via a variety 
of approaches. One set of assessments is premised on the understanding of India- 
Pakistan relations being essentially an extension of an older Hindu-Muslim rivalry; 
or, in more nuanced explanations, of the old rivalry between the Congress and the 
Muslim League. For example, In S. M. Burke’s analysis of the India-Pakistan 
relationship, the religious complexion of India and Pakistan proves to be the decisive 
factor: ‘It is difficult to think of any two religions more antithetical to each other than 
Hinduism and Islam...’, and this, Burke argues, has prevented any lasting solution to 
the Indo-Pakistani hostility. A reconciliation between Hindus and Muslims in the 
subcontinent, difficult to begin with, was made impossible in the context of the 
politics in the subcontinent in the first half of the twentieth century. Finally, Burke 
suggests that these tendencies came to the fore in the making of bilateral relations 
between India and Pakistan, when ‘this deep seated reluctance on the part of Hindu 
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
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leaders to accept the separate existence of Pakistan has been a principal factor in 
hindering reconciliation between India and Pakistan’.5  
Similarly, in his analysis of the dynamics at play in the Indo- Pakistani relationship, 
Duncan Mcleod argues:  
‘India and Pakistan were founded on two very different ideological and 
theological foundations. India, a constituted secular state whereby religion 
would play no part in the body politic; Pakistan founded as a Muslim state, a 
home for the Muslims of South Asia who would have been subordinated by 
Hindu majoritarianism without the creation of Pakistan. The crux of these 
antagonisms has manifested itself in a conflict of Self and Other with both 
states questioning the legitimacy of the other.’6  
In Mcleod’s argument, therefore, the ideological differences between the two states 
caused their tense relationship; and were, moreover, responsible for the nature of 
tension between India and Pakistan. Such an assessment, is, however necessary to 
pull apart. The nature of the bilateral relationship, as well as the extent of 
cooperation that does take place within it, is often carried out regardless of the 
ideology of the government in power. Moreover, the mechanisms for cooperation 
which did exist in the relationship, sprang from an imperative that was deeply 
seated in the logic of both nation states: in order to carve out an independent and 
viable existence, it was necessary for the two to come to agreements on the fallouts 
from partition 
A closer scrutiny of the Indo-Pakistani relationship shows that there was nothing 
particularly ‘emotional’ or irrational about the choices made by both governments in 
handling their bilateral relationship. In fact, decision-making on bilateral relations 
was, as this thesis will show, a more pragmatic process on both sides. Moreover, a 
                                                
5 Burke S. M. and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Oxford, 1990 
6 McLeod, Duncan, India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals or Enemies?, Hampshire, 2008 
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mechanism towards a peaceful coexistence was also built into the India Pakistan 
relationship from the beginning. The chronology of this period is littered with events 
which suggest that the relationship was not necessarily inevitably predisposed 
towards conflict, and that the leadership of both sides repeatedly, and carefully 
considered avenues that could enable a stable coexistence. In the period that 
followed the partition, it will be demonstrated that both governments actively 
sought out means by which lingering uncertainties over the process of partition 
could be settled. Both governments quickly recognised that the process of separation 
needed to be speedy, and as complete, as possible. This mutual aim led to 
cooperation between the two governments on a variety of levels.  
A great deal of inter-governmental dialogue was thus carried out over the logistics of 
implementing -- and finalising -- the partition, such as such as the ways in which the 
two governments could handle inter-dominion migration, control over the 
ownership of evacuee property, and the means by which inter-dominion trade 
should be carried out. In fact, the leadership on both sides, rather than seeking 
vengeance from the other was also looking for means to give closure to the process 
of partition, and fashion states which that were self-contained, and completely 
independent of each other. All this meant that the governments of both countries, 
even in the midst of serious potentialities for war, worked out between them a fairly 
substantial extent of cooperation, negotiation and exchange. Underneath the causes 
of conflict in the bilateral relationship, therefore, there also underlay a strong basis 
for agreement: of the need to in fact uphold the fact of the partition as completely as 
possible.  
Such cooperation was, moreover, critical in establishing the sovereignty of both new 
nation states. It was undertaken in order for both to disentangle themselves from one 
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
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another, and to be able to assert the finality of their separation. While it was in fact 
impossible for either to completely sever the many linkages between the two 
dominions, such as inter-dominion trading, and the questions about claiming 
compensation for evacuee property, what both did was to insert the infrastructure of 
their separate state apparatus in areas where the clarity of the division could be 
questioned. The infrastructure for such cooperation, moreover, remained in place 
even when tensions between the two countries were at their highest, since it was in 
fact impossible for either to withdraw these from the bilateral framework. The India-
Pakistan relationship, thus is more complex than a series of violent conflicts, and in 
order to have a complete understanding of its nature, it is important to examine the 
nature of cooperation between them. The basis of agreement that drew forth bilateral 
cooperation was as critical an ingredient in the making of the bilateral dynamic, as 
the motivations for going to war.  
This dissertation argues that India-Pakistan relations need not only be viewed 
through a prism of a series of hostilities -- that alongside their well known tension, 
there was substantial cooperation, and constructive dialogue, based on deeply seated 
areas of agreement. For example, when events in the subcontinent threatened to 
descend into war in 1950 both governments actively sought out means of diffusing 
this, and tried to set in place mechanisms that could reduce the possibilities of 
violence. It is possible, thus, to chart an alternative history of the India-Pakistan 
relationship: one which examines the nature and extent of cooperation between both 
governments; and which is as integral to the India-Pakistan story as the warfare 
between them. It is relevant, indeed necessary, to offer a historicised account of the 
India-Pakistan relationship, which contextualises the development of the state, 
government formation, as well as the changes in the international arena as relevant 
factors in the bilateral relationship. I will argue here for a dynamic understanding of 
Introduction 
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the India-Pakistan relationship, which moves away from a static analysis of an 
inevitable and ‘unending’ conflict.  
This thesis thus draws on the insights of Joya Chatterji in her recent work, which 
shows how the two states cooperated over relief and rehabilitation, evacuee 
property, while helping each other seal the border.7 But it goes beyond it by insisting 
that such acts of cooperation were based on the need for both dominions to establish 
themselves two sovereign—and separate—states. Such a deep-seated need for 
cooperation moreover, meant that the cooperation in the bilateral relationship was as 
integral as the violence. Both India and Pakistan needed to assert their complete 
independence from the other in order to function as viable entities in their own right, 
in their respective foreign policies in the changing international context. In order to 
be able to pursue their separate agendas, therefore, the two governments 
consistently undertook acts of cooperation and compromise, which would allow 
them to get disentangled from each other.    
This is a rather different argument from the widely held position that the hostility 
between India and Pakistan is an expression of their inherently different personalities. 
In many analysis of the India-Pakistan relationship, the identities of the two states: of 
secular vs. religious, authoritarian vs. democratic, are held to be important. Nor is it 
the same as saying that the fallout of partition shaped the relationship between the 
two countries. It is distinct from Stephen Cohen’s argument, that the state of 
Pakistan came to be defined almost exclusively in terms of the aftermath of partition, 
and, relatedly with its relations with India. He argues, ‘Pakistanis considered India’s 
failure to adhere to the terms of partition—such as the defaulting on the division of 
assets, manipulation of the international boundary, and over the accession of 
                                                
7 Chatterji, J., An Alternative History of India Pakistan Relations, Talk at the Royal Asiatic Society, 8 
March 2012, url: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/03/joya-chatterji-an-alternative-history-of-
india-pakistan-relations/  
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princely states-- as the supreme betrayal’. Moreover, he continues, over the decades 
that followed partition, the continuing India Pakistan tension led to ‘the vision of 
Pakistan as a homeland had been supplanted by that of Pakistan as a fortress- an 
armed redoubt guarded by the Pakistan army, safe from predatory India.’8 Nor does 
it adopt the view that Pakistan’s foreign policy, stems from it being an ‘insecurity 
state… that perceived itself not only as small and disadvantaged, but as on the 
defensive against a real and present threat, with its survival at stake’9 It is necessary 
to understand that Pakistan’s foreign policy, as, indeed, India’s were carried out on 
the basis of establishing the finality of the partition. While both countries 
undoubtedly pursued mutually hostile agendas in their relationships with the wider 
world, it was nonetheless critical for both to have the infrastructure through which 
the partition was finalised, in place. This imperative, thus brought forth acts of 
cooperation in the bilateral relationship, which were as significant in nature as the 
conflict between them. In his analysis of the Kashmir dispute, Sumantra Bose points 
out that the avenues of possibility for solution lie within the state structures of India 
and Pakistan, and that such solutions need to work with the parameters of both 
states, rather than do away with them.10 While this dissertation does not focus on the 
dimensions of the Kashmir dispute – that has been carried out in other important 
studies – what it does highlight, is that both India and Pakistan put in place 
infrastructure of their states quite quickly, even in places where their clarity could be 
questioned.     
Another trend in the literature of the bilateral relationship underline this ‘search for 
security’. In what Sumit Ganguly calls an ‘irredentist and anti irredentist’ 
                                                
8 Cohen, Stephen P., The Idea of Pakistan, Washington, 2004 
9 Thornton, Thomas Perry, ‘Pakistan: Fifty Years of Insecurity’, in Kux, D. et. al (eds.), India and 
Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, Cambridge, 1999 
10 Bose, Sumantra, ‘Kashmir: Sourced of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 13 (March 27- April 2, 1999), pp 762- 768 
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relationship between the two states, he has argued that the factor of Kashmir always 
predisposed India and Pakistan towards mutual hostility, and, at various junctures, 
led both to try and take advantage of the perceived weaknesses of the other. In 
Ganguly’s view, war resulted from a misreading by the respective military elites of 
the likely capabilities of the other.11 In a similar vien, Srinath Raghavan has also 
argued that India’s relations with Pakistan, and with China, were based on the threat 
of the use of war. He argues that this allowed them greater room for manoeuvre for 
the pursuit of peace.12 But what these security driven analyses miss is that many 
policies in the bilateral relationship were crafted without the prospect of violence 
looming. The inter state relationship was also critically impacted by a process of 
dialogue at various levels in both countries, which had been undertaken simply by 
the need to set in place the logistics of finalising the partition. Furthermore the 
security interests of the state were not self-evident from the beginning. Indeed, there 
was a great deal of dissent and critique about bilateral negotiations at a variety of 
levels within both governments. An irate despatch from the Indian High 
Commission in Karachi in 1948, for instance, concluded that: ‘There are no parallels 
anywhere to the nature of the diplomatic relations subsisting between India and 
Pakistan, or to the type of system evolved for conducting these relations.’13 The 
requirements for security were not arrived at clinically, and then consistently 
pursued, in the foreign ministries of both countries; they remained very contingent, 
and contested throughout, both within and outside each government. This is 
relevant, for what emerges from these discussions are in fact not the contours of a 
policy of the paramountcy of self preservation against the other; which was 
immediately grasped and implacably pursued by statesmen for the benefit of their 
                                                
11 Ganguly, Sumit, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947, New York, 2002 
12 Raghavan, S., War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years, Ranikhet, 
2010  
13 Fortnightly report from M. K. Kirpalani, Deputy High Commissioner for India in Lahore, 17 
September,1948, File No. 8-15/48-Pak I, MEA File, National Archives of India (Henceforth NAI)  
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
 
 16 
countries, but rather a more uncertain, tenuous and fragmented set of policies, often 
flexible, and sometimes discarded.   
Although the temptation to resort to war was certainly present in both countries, 
there were also long-standing structures to ensure continuing dialogue and stable 
coexistence, designed to limit the potential for conflict between the two countries. I 
argue that although calls for resorting to outright war were repeatedly made in the 
subcontinent, such rhetoric was often only surface deep. The concrete actions of 
either government with regard to one another did not always follow suit. In fact 
decisions taken with regard to what sort of relations to have with each other were 
made quite carefully; and also with the knowledge that in fact, this was not 
necessarily an uncontrollably combustible and volatile situation. This particular kind 
of cautiousness, was moreover, recognised by other countries at the time, who 
factored it into their calculations on India and Pakistan. Thus, a historically 
grounded account of the bilateral relationship is important, since it highlights the 
fluidity in the nature of the concerns of the states of India and Pakistan, as well as of 
the international players involved in it.  
The literature on India Pakistan relations predominantly focuses on the Kashmir 
dispute. Yet, it is important to look at the other range of problems in the relationship- 
and how they were encompassed. It is worth noting that the Indo- Pakistan 
relationship has not been theorised to the same extent as other major disputes after 
the Second World War. This thesis suggests that the crafting of foreign policy was 
not carried out on a plane removed from the more mundane concerns of a nation 
state. It was not based solely on considerations of security. In this, the dissertation 
will differ from many other analysis of the Indo- Pak relationship, which view it in 
static, and innately oppositional terms. This analysis of the India-Pakistani 
Introduction 
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relationship will show that the skin and bone of making foreign policy is not an 
abstract exercise in locating intangible ‘strategic’ goals, but was, in fact, heaved up 
through the mundane process of governing in both countries.  
Opportunities for cooperation moreover arose out of the compulsions of the need in 
both states to clear the political uncertainties arising from partition. The landmark 
agreement between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, for instance, signed in April 1950, 
was an instance of both governments realising that the migration of minorities in 
unpredictable and continuing numbers could not be allowed to continue for the 
welfare of both governments. Similarly, agreements, and the lack thereof, on evacuee 
property were pursued by both governments needing to give clear answers to their 
populations on their proactiveness on taking measures for the rehabilitation of 
refugees. Both governments recognised that this process needed to be carried out 
through a bilateral dialogue, since both needed to acquire the property with 
legitimacy. Thus, the need to legitimise and formalise the process of partition and to 
stabilize governance on both sides on both sides enabled a bilateral cooperation, 
which was equally integral to the India-Pakistan relationship.  
The India-Pakistan relationship has elided categorisation into a particular mould of 
states’ behaviour. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the emergence of the 
initial principles of the realist school of thought in International Relations put forth 
an argument that a successful foreign policy was one that would protect a set of 
criterion identified as being necessary for the security of the state.14 The role of 
diplomacy was to protect the preconditions for these criterion, while promoting 
peaceful relations between various states. It is important to note, that the bilateral 
relationship between India and Pakistan has not been theorised in the same way, 
                                                
14 See, for example, Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, 
New York 1948
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partially due its tangled history.15 Duncan Mcleod has pointed out the paucity of 
such theorisation and has argued that reliance on a single theoretical approach in 
International Relations theory would be insufficient. Mcleod argues that too much 
emphasis on the nature of the international system is insufficient to explain the 
causes of conflict in the India-Pakistan relationship; and that a focus on their specific 
nature as states ought to be included in any analysis of their behaviour.  
In contrast, this thesis suggests that the fashioning the international identities of 
India and Pakistan was particularly complicated. The leadership of both sides had 
witnessed the steady ascent of the state as becoming the critical unit of consideration 
in international relations, over the inter war years. In 1947, the two countries entered 
a world order which was evolving, and being reconfigured in the aftermath of two 
world wars; and one in which, moreover, London was acquiring a different, and 
diminished, political capacity. Such identities were also critically impacted in what 
Erez Manela has called the ‘Wilsonian Moment’, during which the articulation of an 
anti-colonial, and anti-empire based frame of reference gained credence. Such 
moments were, however, complex and also contained within them impulses towards 
preserving the existent status quo.16 As Mark Mazower has shown, the framing of 
the United Nations Charter was prompted by two oppositional impulses. While the 
framework of the Charter was also designed to contain challenges to the power of 
older European nation states, this was also potentially undermined by the need to 
incorporate newer, post colonial states into this framework.17 What India and 
Pakistan were also working with, therefore, was an international system in the 
                                                
15 Mcleod, India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals or Enemies?, Hampshire, 2008, p.6 
16 Manela, Erez, The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the Ideological Origins of Anti 
Colonial Nationalism, New York, 2006 
17 Mazower, Mark, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United 
Nations, Princeton, 2009 
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process of reconfiguration; and one moreover that recognised the integrity of the 
state as a fundamental premise.   
It was necessary, moreover, for the leadership on both sides to maintain that 
recourse to violence was not an option of their own choosing; that the options for 
peace had been carefully and thoroughly considered. At an interview with Phillip 
Noel Baker, the British Secretary of State, in October 1949, Zafrullah Khan, who was 
at the time the leader of the Pakistani delegation at the United Nations, and who 
would subsequently serve as a member at the International Court of Justice, 
maintained that he thought it crucial for Pakistan to have friendly relations with 
India. He pointed out, for instance, that his own delegation had made no protest at 
the recent debate on having India as a non permanent member at the Security 
Council in 1950. Moreover, he continued to Baker, once the question of Kashmir was 
out of the way, he was optimistic that the present difficulties between the two 
nations, including the refugee property question, could be settled amicably. In 
shaping the international faces of India and Pakistan, therefore, it was important to 
establish and assert a separated and possibly amicable coexistence. Although the 
bilateral relationship was certainly prone to tension and hostility, it was also 
important to acknowledge that the possibilities—even if they were only possibilities-- 
for resolving the tension were present in the agendas of both sides.  
Whether it was the case of a territorial dispute, or property or people, the approach 
that both governments took in forming their bilateral positions, were very consistent.  
What both the two governments agreed to do was to conduct relations on an edgy 
precipice, where the possibility of compromises of various kinds were always 
present, and tangible; while also going ahead with policies which were detrimental 
to this. This was manifested by the injection of the infrastructure of both states, into 
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areas where the uncertainties over the process of partition lingered. Thus, the issue 
of how the movement of minorities was to be handled was actively entered into by 
both governments, although in ways which allowed for both governments to 
articulate their differences on the question. If it was impossible to have a relationship 
in which war could not erupt, the spaces for compromise and dialogue within this 
were also carefully examined, occasionally expanded, and were deeply entrenched.    
The literature assumes that the relationship was based on two states reeling from the 
effects of partition- while this is true; neither wished to undo it; and in fact embarked 
from the beginning on viable foreign policies. It has also been recognised in the 
literature on this topic, that the conflict between the two countries is of a limited 
kind. India and Pakistan do not seek the total destruction of each other. Their wars 
are directed towards specific goals: establishing control over Kashmir; in 1971, it was 
with the intention of enabling a split in the two flanks of Pakistan. Enabling this 
framework of relations, however, there is also a tacit basis of agreement between the 
two countries: they have to uphold the fact of the partition.  
Note on Sources 
This dissertation is based on archival sources in the United Kingdom, India, and 
Bangladesh. Although I have consulted widely a range of published sources from 
Pakistan, including newspapers and autobiographies, I have been unable to consult 
archives in Islamabad. The interpretation of positions taken by the government of 
Pakistan, therefore, has been gleaned by reading against the grain: from letters 
appended in files of the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi; from the National 
Archives in Dhaka for files relating to the period when it was East Pakistan, as well 
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as from autobiographical sources of a number of prominent individuals involved in 
crafting of the bilateral relationship at this time.  
This thesis is constructed from multi- archival sources, as well as from publications 
produced by the foreign ministries of India and Pakistan. It is based on hitherto 
unseen archival material at the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, which has only 
recently been released into the National Archives of India collections. Although the 
discussion of events from the perspective of officials in the government of Pakistan is 
not based on information from the National Documentation Centre, it has attempted 
to bridge these gaps from autobiographical information, newspapers and 
correspondence flowing out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Karachi. It is also 
based on archival material in the Public Records Office, Kew, and at the British 
Library.  
The memoirs and autobiographies of key officials and politicians involved in 
constructing the bilateral relationship, have also been extensively cited. Although it 
is obviously important to treat these sources carefully—they were frequently 
published as part of different agendas—it is nonetheless a valuable source of 
information for getting a sense of the keen rivalry and differences within each 
government, and the factionalism which was obviously an inescapable part of the 
occupations of those within both governments. 
Finally, the archival material from the National Archives in Dhaka also offered a 
glimpse of the clashes between the various levels of administration, and between the 
setting of a particular policy direction, and the vagaries with which it was 
implemented. Much of the archival material I have used from East Pakistan concerns 
the implementation of directives regarding the closure of the border, means of 
controlling ‘smuggling’ and illegal trade across the border, and the concerns about 
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the influx of migrants. This is relevant, for what it highlights again are the 
differences and ambiguities which were as much a part of the India Pakistan 
relationship, as a sense of implacable hostility. Despite these shortcomings, the 
thesis, by historicising the early relationship between India and Pakistan, throws 
novel light on how it developed. The archival material from the ministry of external 
affairs also testifies to the fact that decision making with regard to Pakistan was the 
subject of a great deal of debate, dissent, and was in fact, surprisingly flexible. 
Chapterisation 
Each chapter focuses on specific instances of dialogue between India and Pakistan in 
the first decade of their relations. Although some events overlap partially across the 
chapters, they address separate issues in the making of the bilateral relationship. 
Each deals with issues in which there was a substantial extent of cooperation and 
dialogue between the two governments, and in which there was -- contrary to what 
might be expected -- a fairly flexible position on both sides on how it could be 
handled bilaterally. These are thus case studies of cooperation between the two 
countries; and the extents to which they succeeded or failed. What is common to all 
these issued, however, are the bilateral decisions to create structures for cooperation, 
based on the assumption that the uncertainties presented by the question of partition 
needed to be settled.  
Chapter 1 deals with the immediate aftermath of partition. It studies the 
disintegration of various agencies put in place to deal with the repercussions of 
partition, which were jointly handled by both the Dominions. I argue here that rather 
than prolong the interim measures for retaining order in the subcontinent, which 
relied on joint systems of administration of the two Dominions, both governments 
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chose early on to disband these units, and replace them with systems which were 
controlled exclusively by each government. Moreover the governments of India and 
Pakistan embarked on setting and then pursuing distinct foreign policy agendas 
from the beginning, and the events in the weeks and months following partition 
dictated these agendas. Thus, the pursuit of goals in the foreign policy were not 
shaped by two governments removed from the concerns of the impact of partition, 
but in fact brought into its fold; the international identities of India and Pakistan 
were integrally connected to the events around the partition. At the same time, the 
fact of the partition itself was not questioned or challenged by either government, 
but rather, its ramifications of creating two distinct nation states was actively 
embraced in the foreign policy pursuits of both states. 
The second chapter deals with the making of policy about the movement of minority 
populations across the new borders of the two countries. Neither state could 
effectively curb all movement between the two dominions. What emerged instead, 
were a series of infrastructures set up by which both states which permitted contacts 
and travel between minority populations to be monitored. That enormous and 
unpredictable numbers of migrants could not freely cross the boundary was a critical 
basis of agreement between the two governments. This formed a basis of 
cooperation, through which a series of mechanisms were evolved, which allowed the 
two states to clearly establish their positions with regard to minority populations, 
and their movement.  
Chapter 3 examines the making of the India-Pakistan boundary line. This boundary 
line took a surprisingly long time to clearly delineate, and even longer to firmly 
impose on the ground. Moreover, what is remarkable about this boundary line is 
how its firmness varied from place to place -- while it was imposed in some areas 
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with grim precision, in others, it was simply notional. For example, long stretches of 
the boundary, particularly along the provinces of Bengal, Assam and Tripura, lay 
undemarcated until the early 1950s. The negotiations around this process reveal the 
ways in which both governments were surprisingly willing to compromise with the 
notions of territorial fixity.  
Chapter 4 looks at the negotiations on evacuee property. The question of what to do 
with the property of departed migrants had hung ominously over the heads of both 
the governments, as increasing numbers of refugees became frustrated with the 
rehabilitation programs of the government. The two governments entered into 
negotiations on the question of evacuee property in 1947, and continued to meet over 
this question until 1957. They passed legislation which mirrored each other in terms 
of securing control over the property. It was recognised that the issue could not be 
unilaterally decided, although the space for providing compensation for the 
property also progressively dwindled. These processes worked in a synchronised 
way on both sides of the border, and also reflected a firming up of the impulses to 
‘close’ the ramifications of partition as much as possible.  
Chapter 5 examines the effects of partition on trade within the subcontinent, and 
addresses the bilateral policies on Inter-dominion trade. The early economic policies 
of both governments reveal a desire to become self sufficient, and to be independent 
of one another. This was evidenced—and reinforced—by the devaluation crisis of 
1949, as well as retaliatory policies of the Indian government to reduce their 
dependence on goods from East Pakistan. The volume of trade has progressively 
declined in the decades since independence, and this was, moreover the product of a 
deliberate policy of both governments.  
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THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF PARTITION 
The partition of the subcontinent had been actively pursued by many interested 
parties in both India and Pakistan. Once it came about, the governments of both 
countries set in place structures that deliberately embraced its consequences, rather 
than seeking to undermine the underlying assumptions behind the division of the 
subcontinent. Even in the midst of the catastrophic violence and chaos which 
erupted in the months around the partition, and the complex, and lengthy shadows 
that this event left behind, the two new governments made conscious decisions to 
proceed with decisions that concretised, rather than blurred, the fact of the partition. 
One of the earliest acts of both governments was to establish the structures of a 
bilateral relationship between the two countries, simply because of the need to work 
through the administrative and logistical consequences of the partition. In order to 
have a complete understanding of the India- Pakistan relationship, therefore, it is 
necessary to be able to step back from the sense of cataclysmic violence and 
destruction in the months around August 1947, to look at how the two governments 
attempted to deal with its consequences, and set in place mechanisms that would 
reaffirm, rather than question this event. This chapter will show how, even as the 
immediate after-effects of a horrific partition were on-going, critical decisions were 
made with regard to the other which consisted of a mutual acknowledgement of 
separation, and which recognised the importance of retaining the permanence of this 
status.  
This became evident even in the very early activities of both states with regard to 
each other. The immediate days and weeks following the partition raised a number 
of questions that needed to be worked through bilaterally. Both governments had to 
deal with controlling the violence in the Punjab and Bengal provinces, the 
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finalisation of division of assets between the two governments, and, even more 
emotively, the rehabilitation of abducted women. Examining various responses of 
the state to the immediate challenges posed by the partition is thus important to get 
a sense of the newly established India and Pakistan concretised the fact of separation 
into the fabric of their respective state structures. The ways in which these responses 
developed in India and Pakistan, moreover, operated in tandem and required a 
certain cooperation and dialogue between the two governments. In undertaking 
such cooperation, both governments were acknowledging that the fact of the 
partition needed to be finalised, and that it was on the basis of this mutual 
acknowledgement that their future relations would be based. These were critical 
decisions, and made deliberately, since what both governments were seeking an 
independent and, as far as possible, secure existence. These exercises, therefore, were 
deliberate attempts to consolidate the newly established states, and to chart out the 
future course of relations between them.  
At a meeting of the Special Committee of the Cabinet on 6 June 1947, Lord Louis 
Mountbatten circulated a note entitled ‘Administrative Consequences of Partition’, 
which envisioned the future steps that the government of India would need to take.1 
‘The first step,’ the Viceroy argued, ‘should be to set up a Committee on the highest 
possible level which would be charged with the duty of enquiring into all matters 
connected with the partition.’2 This Committee, named the Partition Council, would 
be chaired by two principle leaders from the Congress and Muslim League, 
including Liaquat Ali Khan, Vallabhai Patel, Ranjendra Prasad, and Adbur Rab 
Nishtar. The Council oversaw the work of a Steering Committee, which would 
organise the minutiae of division of the various branches of the government into the 
                                                
1 Minutes of the First Meeting of Special Committee of the Cabinet held on 6th June, 1947, Partition 
Proceedings Vol IV, pp 5-13, Partition Secretariat, Govt. of India, National Archives of India 
2 Ibid 
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new governments of India and Pakistan. The Steering Committee was made up of 
two senior bureaucrats, H.M. Patel and Chaudhry Muhammah Ali, both of whom 
would go on to have very influential careers in India and Pakistan. Indeed, 
Chowdhury Muhammad Ali went on to become Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1955, 
and before that, was finance minister in 1951. The immediate decisions of the 
Partition Council were about the final demarcation of boundaries, the division of the 
armed forces, division of the staff of the various branches of government, the 
division of assets, the jurisdiction of courts, the economic relations between the two 
dominions, and the processes by which domicile would be determined.3  
The discussions of the Partition Council reveal little desire to break with the 
structures of administration and governance of the previous decades, but on the 
contrary, they represent concerted efforts to secure them within new nations. 
Moreover, their tone is suggestive not of individuals overwhelmed by the violent 
turn of events, but those of cool headed bureaucrats making pragmatic calculations 
about how to secure more assets for their side. H. M. Patel and Chaudhry 
Muhammad Ali differed, for instance, with regard to the framing of the terms of 
reference for deciding how to divide the material assets of the government of India.  
Patel had argued that the existing assets of the government, such as irrigation canals, 
railway lines and telegraph lines, should simply remain in place. Muhammad Ali, 
however, pointed out that merely the accident of geography should not have priority 
over an equitable distribution of assets, since ‘it was only fair that both the successor 
governments should in the matter of efficiency of services start on an equal a footing 
as possible.’4 Although the Partition Council worked amicably enough, and did 
succeed with much of the work of the division of the government, it was also a 
                                                
3 Ibid 
4 Terms of Reference for Expert Committee No. 2, ‘Assets and Liabilities’, Partition Proceedings, Vol. IV,     
p. 30, Partition Secretariat, Govt. of India; National Archives of India  
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forum for the articulation of the differences between the two governments. There 
were many - and some, lasting- disagreements over the ways in which the partition 
was being implemented. Yet, even so, the need to carry this through formed the 
basis of a kind of cooperation between the two governments. This process of 
cooperation was, moreover, integral to the making of both the nation states.  
Agencies of the Partition 
The horrific violence in the Punjab in the months around the partition had 
debilitated the existing machinery of the state, and had stunned the world. The 
question of how to handle the communal rioting in Punjab after 15 August 1947 was 
examined in a meeting of the Joint Defence Council in July 1947. The leaders decided 
that the governor of Punjab would classify the relevant districts in the province as 
‘disturbed areas’. The Punjab Boundary Force was established as a response to the 
violence unleashed during the partition. Ian Copland has argued moreover, that this 
needs to be contextualised in terms of an ethnic cleansing undertaken by Sikh 
kingdoms, with a view to securing a Sikh homeland, which contradicted the logic of 
the proposed boundary line. 5 One question which immediately arose when tackling 
the question of re- establishing law and order, was about the places covered by the 
jurisdiction of the Joint Defence Council would stop. The principal argument put 
forward by the Congress and the Union Government at the Indian centre was that 
they quite simply lacked the legal authority to intervene in the Princely States.  
This problem came up repeatedly when the question of the role of the army in 
quelling the rioting was brought up. For instance, Arthur Smith, Chief of Army Staff 
                                                
5 Copland, Ian, ‘The Master and the Maharajas: the Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 1947’, 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 36, July 2002. see also Kamran, T., The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab, March- 
August 1947: Key Turning Points and British Responses, Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Fall 
2007) 
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in India, sent weekly despatches on the unfolding communal violence to the Vice 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS). His letter on the 12 August 1947 noted, 
for example, that ‘The situation in Alwar State is appalling. Muslims are being 
murdered left and right, and we are pretty certain that State Troops might be 
responsible for this, as well as for burning crops. There are bound to be reprisals’.6 
Gurgaon, (located close to New Delhi) had been engulfed in communal rioting in 
August 1947. Although the army was called in to quell the disturbance here, Arthur 
Smith argued that the efforts of the army to control the situation were hampered by 
the fact that ‘while most of the disturbed areas lie in Punjab, a portion of it extends 
into the United Provinces. Troops in the Punjab have the backing of an Ordinance 
which gives them wider powers- those in the UP have not’.7  
Robin Jeffrey points out that the Punjab Boundary Force, at its largest, consisted of 
some 15,000 men, which amounted to a ratio of four men being allotted to a single 
village.8 It consisted of mixed units of the army that had not yet been partitioned. 
But this was largely an ineffective force. It was disarmed within a month of its 
creation, and faced charges of bias amongst its personnel in favour of the rioters. He 
argues, however that its real failure was implicit from the beginning: it was 
conceived of as an afterthought. What was also recognised at the time was that the 
‘neutrality’ of the Force was not in fact an asset.  
Subsequent scholarship on this issue has shown how the failure of the Punjab 
Boundary Force was unsurprising, given the ambiguity in the structures of 
                                                
6 Reports from Chief of the General Staff of India to VCIGS, Jun-Jul 1947, File No. WO 216/669, Public 
Records Office, UK 
7 Ibid 
8 Jeffrey, Robin, ‘The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947’, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1974) 
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command at the time.9 It was no longer clear which institution prioritised the control 
of communal violence. For example, Arthur Smith noted that the Punjab police, itself 
in the process of being divided, formed a ‘doubtful asset’ in being able to quell 
communal riots. While the Joint Defence Council did exercise operational control 
over the Punjab Boundary Force, its attention was also engaged with completing the 
task of providing India and Pakistan with viable military establishments. Its 
foremost concerns related not to establishing control over the communal violence 
which loomed on the immediate horizon, but to examining of the ways by which the 
two countries could establish viable armies of their own, very possibly for protection 
from each other, in the long term. 
After the transfer of power, the Punjab Boundary Force was a largely ineffective 
organisation, and in no position to be an effective tool to curtail violence in the 
region. It was serviced by personnel many of whom were concerned with which 
country they would serve in, and whose sympathies often extended further for one 
community rather than the other in this situation. The Force was disbanded within a 
month of its establishment. Major General Shahid Hamid, who was Private Secretary 
to the Commander in Chief of the undivided Indian army, Auchinleck, noted in his 
diaries that the Punjab Boundary Force had virtually crumbled under the onslaught 
of the Punjab violence. The entry in his diary for the 19 August noted: ‘The situation 
is explosive… There is even communal tension within the Punjab Boundary Force, 
and there is a likelihood that the troops may be shooting at each other..’10 
Auchinleck, in a meeting of the Joint Defence Council on 28 August, declared that 
                                                
9 See for instance, Marston, D., ‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945- 47’, War 
in History, Vol. 16, No. 4, November 2009 
10 Hamid, Shahid S., Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of India, London 1986 
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the Punjab Boundary Force should now be closed down, and that the units of the 
Boundary Force now be distributed between India and Pakistan.11  
It became very apparent that the use of an undivided army, to control communal 
violence in the Punjab in 1947, could no longer produce the desired results. As early 
as the latter half of August, the relevance of the Joint Defence Council in controlling 
the law and order situation had declined further. Auchinleck, already irritated at 
being hampered in his work with the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, 
argued that ‘No neutral or outside agency operating as the agent for the two 
dominions can perform this task for the reason that his discretion and powers must 
perforce be limited and cramped by the very fact that he is an agent and not a 
principal’.12 At a meeting on 29 August in Lahore of the Joint Defence Council Nehru 
and Liaquat agreed that it was of paramount importance that the psychological 
welfare of refugees travelling from one Dominion to the other, be considered. It was 
necessary, therefore, for both countries to lend soldiers to each other, who would 
conduct the bands of refugees safely across the border, and with whom, the refugees 
themselves would feel secure with.13 A joint statement was issued subsequently, by 
the two Prime Ministers, which assured refugees coming into both countries, of 
protection by soldiers of their own religion. Moreover, the statement continued, 
‘from 1 September, the governments of India and Pakistan have taken over in West 
and East Punjab respectively the full military responsibility of law and order which 
previously was vested in the Punjab Boundary Force’.14 After 15 August, the 
                                                
11 Document No. MB1/D45/2, Agenda for a meeting of the Provisional Joint Defence Council from 
H.M.Patel, enclosing papers action to be taken in the event of disturbances in the boundary areas of the two 
dominions before and after partition, 28 Jul 1947, Mountbatten Papers, University of Southampton 
12 Ibid 
13 ‘Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Joint Defence Council held at Government House, Lahore, 29 August 
1947’, Singh, Kirpal (ed.), Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab- 1947: India and Pakistan, Delhi 
2006, p. 503 
14 ‘Joint Statement of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan’, 4 September 1947, in Singh, Kirpal 
(ed.), Selected Documents on Partition of the Punjab, p. 509 
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Dominion Governments of India and Pakistan would have to approve the decisions 
of the state governments of East and West Punjab to reverse this order. It was also 
accepted at this meeting, however, that the Joint Defence Council could not have the 
authority to intervene in the ‘disturbed areas’ of either state, or be vested with the 
authority to declare a district to be a ‘disturbed area’.15 Joint exercises in maintaining 
the peace, therefore, on the basis of authority that was not clearly defined in terms of 
one government or the other, were thus, dispensed with quickly. Even in the 
immediate days after the partition, thus, it was clear that the two sides would not 
work as a single unit of control as a system of governance.   
An issue that immediately gave rise to acrimony in the Partition Council was the 
question of the division of the army. India did not transfer Pakistan’s share of the 
military stores of the erstwhile Indian Army according to the agreements reached in 
the Partition Council. As Choudhry Muhammad Ali argues, that with regard to the 
division of the army, India’s responses were obstructive from the beginning.16 In 
order to prevent the delivery of military stores that were due to Pakistan, the Indian 
leadership, including Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Baldev Singh, the Indian minister 
of defence, mounted systematic attacks against the office of the Supreme 
Commander, essentially blocking the completion of the division of the forces. ‘Barely 
six weeks after Independence’, Muhammad Ali writes, ‘the Indians had made it 
impossible for the Supreme Commander to continue till the completion of his task 
till 1 April 1948’.17 Major General Shahid Hamid was Private Secretary to Auchinleck 
at the time of the working of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee. His 
memoirs record the tense relationship that Auchinleck had with the Indian 
                                                
15 Doc. No. MB1/D45/2, Agenda for a meeting of the Provisional Joint Defence Council from H.M.Patel, 
enclosing papers action to be taken in the event of disturbances in the boundary areas of the two dominions 
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leadership.18 Hamid asserts that Auchinleck was repeatedly hampered in his work 
with the Reconstitution Committee because of the Indian attitude: ‘Pakistan is 
interested in getting its share of ordnance stores and India is determined it should 
not… They can achieve their goal by getting rid of the Supreme Commander’s 
Headquarters.’ In this, they were largely successful, and the Armed Forces 
Reconstitution Committee was closed down prematurely, on the 30 November 1947. 
Auchinleck met members of the Joint Defence Council on 13 October and stated that 
the task of the Armed Forced Reconstitution Committee had become too difficult 
owing to the differences of opinion between the two Dominions and he could not 
discharge the responsibility laid upon him. The main issue at stake was the ratio in 
which the moveable assets of the former Armed Forces of India were to be divided. 
It was worked out that Pakistan was owed 36% of the assets, but, Hamid stated, ‘the 
Indian government is apparently determined to contest it to the last ditch.’19 
A second pressing, and profoundly emotive question had to do with abducted 
women: this was necessary to both states’ ideas of legitimacy. Urvashi Butalia has 
shown how critical in the debate about abducted women was not so much the 
concerns for the abductee per se, as much as a preoccupation with national honour.20 
Such responses, moreover, were jointly constructed. The question of abducted 
women had been energetically pursued by Mridula Sarabhai, among others, and also 
did receive a fair amount of attention from both the Foreign Ministries. Along with 
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Y. D. Gundevia, at the time under secretary in the Ministry 
of External Affairs, was left in charge of dealing with the question. In his memoirs he 
describes how an inter-dominion agreement came into being regarding the joint 
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machinery for the recovery of abducted women on either side of the Punjab.21 This 
was a fraught process, and it was recognised that the ‘recovery’ of women was not a 
simple task: many were unwilling to return, and feared hostility and stigma from 
their original communities.  
Yet for our purposes here, it is important to note that the two governments entered 
into a process whereby both sides could respond to this task. Y. D. Gundevia, an 
official in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, and currently working on the 
Pakistan desk, directed the Deputy High Commission in Lahore to include the 
clerical establishment of the recovery office into the staff. In May 1949, he received a 
letter from M. R. Sachdev, Chief Secretary in the East Punjab Province. The letter 
complained of a disparity in the numbers of cases of recovery between East and 
West Punjab. The government of West Punjab, Sachdev argued ‘are indifferent, if not 
actually hostile to recovery work, and despite verbal promises made by West Punjab 
leaders that recovery work will be pushed on with rigour in that province, their 
declarations have so far remained mere pious hopes’.22 Moreover, he continued: 
‘The East Punjab government consider that the attention of the Pakistan 
Government should be specially invited to this disparity in figures and that it 
may be brought home to them, that the higher recovery figures in East Punjab 
do not show, as is likely to be stated by them, that there were more abducted 
women and children in East Punjab’.23  
A person particularly prominent in the debates around abducted women, was 
Mridula Sarabhai, a formidable, and well connected, Indian social worker who had 
been actively engaged in framing policy regarding abducted women, and was, in 
addition, a prominent voice in Congress politics in the early 1950s. Sarabhai worked 
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closely with Gundevia in setting up the machinery for the recovery of abducted 
women, and was also, as Gundevia notes, fairly influential in Pakistani Punjab as 
well. Ms. Sarabhai, he writes, had already been in informal contact with Liaqat Ali 
Khan on this question, and the Pakistan government had seemed predisposed 
towards some form of agreement.24   
Legislation around the issue of abducted women was passed on both sides fairly 
quickly, and was designed to set up machinery for the process of recovery of 
‘abducted women’, as well as to define what such a category constituted. In March 
1948, the Partition Council ruled that the governments would provide abducted 
women with rehabilitation regardless of whether they were accepted back into their 
families. In 1949, the Indian government finalised legislation through which they 
were entitled to recover Muslim abducted women. This was kept in place until 1957. 
A corresponding Ordinance was passed in Pakistan, and a Coordinating Officer was 
appointed by the governor general, whose task would correspond to the officer 
overseeing the recovery of abducted persons in India.25 While there was debate and 
criticism on both sides about how the recovery of abducted persons was being 
handled, and the relative slackness of the operations in the other Dominion, the 
measures undertaken to put this process in place were mirrored by both 
governments. That the recovery of abducted women had to be seen to be addressed 
by both governments was recognised by both sides, and, moreover, these operations 
were also undertaken in tandem with one another.  
A small office for social workers aiding in the recovery of abducted women in 
Pakistan was set up as a wing in the office of the Deputy High Commission in 
Lahore. It was financed by a variety of sources within the government, and also 
                                                
24 Gundevia, Y. D., Outside the Archives, Hyderabad, 1984  
25 Ibid  
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
 
 36 
received contributions from the office of the Deputy High Commission.26 Yet, this is 
not to argue that they were smooth – on the contrary. Already by December 1948, 
Goapalaswami Ayyangar was receiving letters of complaint from workers charged 
with this job. For instance, Mrs. Premvati Thapar, wrote Ayyangar, stating that a 
number of Hindu and Sikh women recovered from Pakistan were being housed in 
the women’s Jail in Lahore, rather than at the Provincial Transit Camp, which had 
been agreed upon in the Inter-dominion Agreements of September 1948. Moreover, 
she said, ‘no list [of the women recovered] is sent to our workers at Lahore or to any 
of our recovery officers in India.’ Recovery operations ran into hindrances with the 
classification of ‘closed districts’. Pakistan restricted the access of Indian recovery 
workers to the districts of Jhelum, Sialkot, Gujarat, Rawalpindi and Campbellpore, 
as a security measure in connection with the Kashmir war. India, meanwhile, had 
closed off Gurdaspur and Kangra. In March 1949, Ms. Sarabhai had a meeting with 
the Pakistani ministers for rehabilitation, Khwaja Shahbuddin, and with the Minister 
without portfolio, M. A. Gurmani. The matter was taken up with officials in the 
Pakistan government and corrective action was subsequently taken. These questions 
were dealt with in detail by the offices of the deputy high commissions, in both India 
and Pakistan. In March 1949, the deputy high commissioner in Lahore, Mr. Y. K. 
Puri, held a press conference, in which he entreated the All Pakistan Muslim League 
to utilise its resources for the recovery of abducted women and children. He added 
‘both governments were far from lukewarm in their endeavours to complete this 
work and that they would certainly not relax their efforts,’ and since this ‘was a 
humanitarian task which everybody was anxious to see completed with the least 
possible delay’.27 Although the question of abducted women was important to both 
governments, what was recognised from the outset that these efforts could not 
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emerge from a joint system of governance, but rather, needed to be tackled by both 
separately. The deputy high commissioners’ remarks, thus also reflect a system of 
working whereby both governments, although working towards a similar objective, 
had also recognised that this did need to be carried out on a separated basis.  
Agencies of the partition, thus, such as the Punjab Boundary Force and the apparatus 
for the recovery of abducted women, were wound up fairly soon after the transfer of 
power. What was immediately recognised, moreover, was that joint mechanisms of 
governance could not work in the long term. Such agencies were quickly dispensed 
with. What both governments did instead, was to establish their separate control 
over the repercussions of partition, in ways which operated in tandem with one 
another. Since these needed to be addressed, what both governments decided to do 
was to handle them on an individual, and yet curiously synchronised, basis. Such an 
approach would be fairly consistently followed, on many questions relating to the 
fallout of the partition.  
Establishing Two Separate Foreign Offices 
The erstwhile External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations department, set up in 
1937, had been a large and sprawling affair, and dealt with a diverse set of issues. 
The Government of India had acquired increased prominence in international affairs 
during the inter-war years. Its representatives were frequently attached as additional 
members to already existing British missions abroad. A large part of its work 
concerned the issues relating to Indians settlements elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, most prominently in South Africa, Australia, Ceylon, Malaya and 
Burma.28 Moreover, delegations from India had argued in support of Indians 
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working overseas at the League of Nations. The government of India appointed an 
Agent General for Washington, and Chungking in China. It also had a High 
Commission in London, which was under the control of the department of 
commerce, since its main functions were to look after India’s trade interests in the 
United Kingdom. Trade commissioners also represented the government of India in 
places where there was a high density of exchange, such as Hamburg, Alexandria 
and Zanzibar. Moreover, in 1941, a Department for Indians Overseas came into 
being.29 Moreover, India’s entry into the World Wars, were crucial events in the 
positioning of the government of India in international arenas, as Britain sought to 
increase the presence of the Dominions into her war efforts. For example, Sir Girija 
Shankar Bajpai had signed the Atlantic Charter on behalf of the Indian government 
in 1942. His appointment was at least in part intended to placate a sympathetic 
American public opinion to the nationalist movement in India. Astute and exacting, 
he had worked in the Indian Civil Service for some decades before Independence, 
and had been Agent General for India in Washington during the Second World War. 
Nehru asked Bajpai to oversee the structuring of the Ministry of External Affairs in 
July 1947, and he retained the position of Secretary General in the Ministry until 
1952, when he became the Governor of Bombay.30 The infrastructure, therefore, for 
conducting a foreign policy was partly set in place for the government of India 
before to the transfer of power.  
It is therefore important to remember that the nation states of India and Pakistan 
emerged from structures of administration, as well as administrators, who had been 
influential in the making of policy during the decades before the transfer of power. 
These men had also lobbied for the transfer of power, and, in many cases, for the 
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partition, and had done so in the pursuit of their own interests in the two new nation 
states. For example, at the time of the Second World War, the officers who occupied 
these positions were Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai in the United States, and Zafrullah 
Khan in China. They had actively worked to have continuities in the structure of 
government, and to be the ones servicing them when the time came. The ways in 
which the nation states of India and Pakistan could be concretised, and how their 
structures of government could work were clearly present in the Transfer of Power 
negotiations. Thus, an assessment of an overpowering ‘nightmarish quality’ 
characterising the final days in the run-up to the Partition, and the negotiations 
around the transfer of power at this time, culminating in the thunderclap of the 
violence of partition and the birth of two nation states can be taken too far. The 
structures of governance that came into being after 1947 shared marked continuities 
with those of the undivided government of India during the inter-war years, and 
were, moreover, painstakingly assembled in the midst of a traumatic partition rather 
than being allowed to disappear.31    
A separate sub-committee, associated with the External Affairs and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, would handle the division of infrastructure for the Foreign Offices 
of the two Dominions. The Sub-Committee -- named Expert Committee IX -- was 
instructed to make recommendations on relations between the two Dominions, and 
with other countries; what the diplomatic representation of the two Dominions 
would be abroad;  on membership of international organisations; and on existing 
international treaties and engagements. Its members included Mr. A. V. Pai, P. 
Achuta Menon, Lt. Col. Iskander Mirza, and Major Shah.32  They met daily from June 
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22 1947, and submitted their report to the Partition Council on 19 July.33 The Expert 
Committee considered the division of assets which belonged to the External Affairs 
and Commonwealth Relations department of the Government of India, and their 
holdings abroad, as well as assets which had been jointly owned by other 
governments in India.  
One of the knottiest questions for the Expert Committee was that of membership of 
international organisations and the continuation of treaties by the Dominions of 
India and Pakistan. India insisted on remaining the same international entity that she 
was before partition, and so would continue to be entitled to the benefits and 
obligations of her long standing international engagements. The case, however, was 
different with Pakistan. Membership to international organisations and treaty 
commitments would need to be entered into anew. H. M. Patel declared to the 
committee, ‘When a country is partitioned, her standing commitments in 
international relations remain valid.’ Laiquat Ali Khan vigorously opposed this 
position, and argued that the government of Pakistan should inherit the 
international obligations of the erstwhile government of India. At the meeting, the 
question of extinguishing the erstwhile identity of the government of India was 
raised. Such a position, was however rejected by the Viceroy. For one thing, he 
argued, ‘the fear was that a country might borrow money much in excess of her 
needs, then go through a formal partition and claim that neither part of the divided 
country was responsible for the debts incurred prior to the partition.’34 Keeping the 
existing international obligations of the independent government of India intact, was 
an important concern to the British, and the interests vested by them in the 
government of India. The obligations as well as the debts of the pre-existing 
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government of India needed to be continued to be serviced, and it was necessary 
therefore to keep this entity in place.35  
For India, the report noted, few changes would need to be made to the existing 
Commonwealth Relations department, apart from one major exception: ‘there will be 
substantial addition of work to the Commonwealth Relations Wing of the 
department arising from India's relations with the dominion of Pakistan 
Commonwealth Relations Wing will require one joint secretary, one deputy 
secretary and one under secretary and one additional Pakistan Section to deal with a 
large volume of complicated work connected with the dominions of Pakistan.’36    
Unsurprisingly, differences soon arose within the committee arose over the issue of 
division of assets outside of India. A. V. Pai and C. S. Jha argued that there should be 
no division of such properties, and that the Government of India continue to retain 
control over them. But this did not go unopposed. Iskander Mirza and Mr. 
Ikramullah raised objections to this, and argued that the two governments should 
each take over exclusively some of the offices in foreign countries. Their other 
suggestion was that ‘should this not be considered feasible, the government of the 
Dominion retaining the buildings and other assets should compensate the other 
governments in the currency of the foreign country concerned.’37 Ikramullah added 
that the Pakistan government would for the moment be interested only in 
Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt, UK, USA, and Burma. The immediate priority for 
Pakistan thus lay with establishing its position in the neighbourhood, and 
establishing direct relations with states with which it shared a border. Moreover, it 
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appears to have deemed it to be a priority to establish relations with nearby Muslim 
countries as a separate, and potentially sympathetic, ally.38 
The beginnings of Pakistan’s foreign relations had been sketched out by July 1947. 
By then the members of the sub-committee on External Affairs had handed in their 
report, which visualised the structures of the two new foreign ministries.39 It noted 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Karachi would need ‘one secretary, two joint 
secretaries, four deputy secretaries and eight junior officer.’ Between them, they 
would manage the various sections under which external policies would need to be 
made; such as the Middle East, the United States, USSR, Commonwealth countries, 
India, emigration and Hajj travel, international conferences and UNO 
documentation, protocol, passports and so on.  
The committee also examined the question of officers who could be recruited to the 
Pakistan Foreign Service, and the question of transfer of those who had ‘opted’ to 
serve in Pakistan. Officers who had been in the government, and served abroad in 
various capacities, were highly valued. A recruitment board, which interviewed 
officers in the government of India, who had opted for Pakistan, and wished to join 
the Foreign Service, interviewed some 39 candidates. Aga Hilaly was one of them. 
He was in the I. C. S., was in the Commerce Department of the government of India, 
and worked in the province of Mysore. He had travelled in Europe and Egypt as 
part of the Indian delegations for various conferences, and, the report concluded, 
‘had a fair acquaintance with current problems, political as well as economic, 
national as well as international’.40 Hilaly, a Law Tripos from Cambridge, went on to 
have a long and successful career in the Foreign Ministry, and, in 1969, went as 
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Ambassador to the United States. Yet, what this also shows is that far from 
questioning the soundness of the reasons for partition, many officers eagerly 
embraced the opportunities for success in Pakistan; and were eager to participate in 
the making of the state. For them, the best options for advancement lay not in 
preserving links with the un-partitioned subcontinent, but in contributing to carving 
out a separate, and sovereign state identity, with a clear foreign policy agenda of 
their own. While this agenda would come to include differences with India- 
differences, moreover, which were serious and lasting- it was also important to both 
to establish machineries which could clearly differentiate the governments of both 
countries.   
Pakistan’s initial foreign policies were certainly forged in difficult conditions. By all 
accounts, the government of Pakistan was badly under-staffed and under-funded in 
the immediate period after Independence. The ministry of foreign affairs was based 
in Karachi, itself a city which was undergoing a seismic shift under the onslaught of 
partition migration. On 6 June 1947, Liaqat had circulated a memo cautioning that 
the needs of the future central government of Pakistan in Karachi were urgent, and 
that ‘A survey carried out by the Sind government has shown that even if the Sind 
government move out of Karachi, the available accommodation will be far short of 
the requirements of the Pakistan government.’41 Therefore, Liaqat continued, the 
partition council should ‘issue a directive to all departments of the government of 
India that they should give full assistance and provide the necessary facilities and 
the required priority for the establishment of the headquarters of the Pakistan 
government at Karachi.’42 However, it seemed as though India would press through 
the various disadvantages that Pakistan was left with in the terms of the partition. 
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For instance, Pakistan was owed a sum of Rs. 500 million in currency from the 
Reserve Bank of India, as part of her share of the financial assets of the government 
of India. Despite the ruling of the partition council, the Indian government 
instructed the Reserve bank to not forward the sum.43  
Zafrullah Khan was appointed Foreign Minister of Pakistan in 1947, and worked 
closely with Liaquat Ali Khan in shaping Pakistan’s initial foreign policy. Within a 
few weeks of taking over as Foreign Minister, the dispute over the line of control in 
Kashmir broke out, and he was despatched to the United Nations to represent 
Pakistan’s case.44 Pakistan’s membership at the United Nations had been 
approved—unanimously—in September 1947, and Zafrullah’s time in New York in 
January 1948 was busy. While putting forward Pakistan’s case for the Kashmir 
dispute, he also remarked ‘As a matter of fact, the stage members around the table 
were rather surprised at how much agreement there was between the two 
governments despite the differences which had arisen…’45 It was thus important to 
both sides to show that the fact of the partition was being upheld by both 
government, and that India and Pakistan operated as separate entities from the 
beginning.    
In India, Nehru decided to take on the additional portfolio of the Ministry of 
External Affairs -- this was an area in which many of his colleagues were relatively 
inexperienced, and where he himself hoped to exercise a greater sway in the making 
of policy. He had been active in involving the Congress Party with foreign policy 
during the 1920s and 1930s. He would certainly leave his unmistakable stamp on the 
Ministry in the first two decades -- its functioning, and its approach to international 
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affairs. Yet, it is misleading to portray his role as being the sole architect of India’s 
foreign policy in this decade, as some historians have suggested. For example, Judith 
Brown has argued that such a domination exercised an adverse effect: ‘[Nehru’s grip 
on the making of foreign policy]…prevented the development of independent and 
critical expertise among civil servants and among other politicians and 
parliamentarians in this area, and gave experience to those who were close to Nehru 
but often lacked experience and judgement.’46 Brown argues that the Ministry was 
staffed by inexperienced, and mainly amateurish professionals, hastily assembled in 
1947, when a new Ministry of External Affairs had to be formed. Yet, this presents a 
misleading picture. Although Nehru was obviously keenly interested in the 
direction of the foreign policy of India, and had himself been involved in the crafting 
of international positions of the Congress, it would be a mistake to assume that his 
control over the activities and decisions in the Ministry was absolute. Many senior 
officials in the Ministry, including Sir Girija, had strong differences with the Prime 
Minister on what positions should best be taken on specific issues. Moreover, the 
relationship with Pakistan was too diverse and broad to be handled by any one 
person, or even one branch of the government. The day-to-day exchanges across the 
border, conducted at a variety of inter governmental levels, often occluded the 
centre. The bilateral relationship therefore did not proceed along a strictly imposed, 
and single, ‘line’ crafted by Nehru, which was then adhered to in all the dealings 
between the two countries. Moreover, even at the level of ‘high policy’ decisions, 
Nehru encountered a great deal of opposition. He was frequently presented with 
clear alternatives, to his own vision by men of great experience, ability and influence. 
These voices -- raised in a number of places, such as by critical Chief Ministers of 
border provinces, disapproving politicians at the Centre like Sardar Patel, or by 
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sceptical onlookers in the press, as well as within the ministry all meant that the 
crafting of decisions with regard to this country could not be Nehru’s exclusive 
domain.  
Moreover, many officials in the MEA came with their own histories of experience in 
foreign affairs and governance. Y. D. Gundevia, who also joined the ministry in 1947, 
had been under- secretary in the Indian mission in Burma during the in-flow of mass 
refugees into India.47 K. M. Pannikkar, similarly, had been foreign minister to the 
princely state of Patiala. All this would suggest that the new ministry was not simply 
the only place for Nehru to have an untrammelled hand in being able to direct 
foreign affairs according to his own ideals, but also a place where the making of 
policy, and the ideological direction of foreign affairs was very contested. The is 
nowhere more evident than in conducting a relationship with Pakistan, a 
relationship which often involved politically sensitive questions, and which invited 
concerns from a variety of quarters, in various ways very critical of too much 
accommodation with that country.  
Immediately after taking up the portfolio, Nehru was deeply concerned about the 
way in which the situation in Punjab ought to be handled. In September 1947, he 
approached Gopalaswami Ayyangar to play a larger role in the administration of 
that province, and asked him to contribute substantially to the making of policy with 
regard to Pakistan. In a meeting with him in September 1947, Nehru discussed the 
arrangements which could be made for dealing with the movement of refugees. 
Ayyangar assured him that although ‘he [Nehru] was not extra popular with quite a 
considerable section of this population, particularly Hindus and Sikhs, but this must 
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only be a passing phase’.48 He then broached the possibility of appointing Ayyangar 
‘Minister of State’ for East Punjab, over and above the machinery of the State 
government, with the same ranking as a Cabinet minister, who might ‘issue orders 
on the spot without having to refer to Delhi and who could also have the necessary 
authority for seeing that those orders were implemented loyally and with 
expedition’.49 Ayyangar was eventually made Minister without Portfolio in the 
government, and would have a wide brief to handle questions relating to the 
relationship with Pakistan, including the division of the army, and reconstitution of 
the armed forces, and to dealing with questions relating to East Punjab at the 
Cabinet level.   
Although the contours of a foreign ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ had been laid down 
by Nehru during the nationalist movement- consisting, broadly, of a non aligned 
approach to either of the two blocs during the Cold War, a friendly relationship with 
China, and a spirit of fraternity with anti colonial movements and newly post-
colonial nations, what this would actually mean in the minutiae of dealings between 
India and other countries was left fairly open-ended. These spaces, moreover, left a 
considerable latitude for manoeuvre with regard to the everyday dealings between 
India and other countries; and this was particularly true of India-Pakistan relations. 
The scope of this relationship was so broad, that it was frequently conducted 
without regard to the ‘broader policies’ that either government would adopt. What is 
striking about the India-Pakistan relationship is that it was not the product of a 
single foreign policy which was consistently followed, after being laid out by Nehru; 
but was a more fractured and ad hoc set of approaches that were adopted at a 
variety of inter-governmental levels.  
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The task of setting up offices to deal with the foreign relations of the two Dominions 
was quickly tackled. A functional foreign ministry establishment, and the personnel 
required for this were rapidly recruited. As in Pakistan, most of these men were 
those who had been active in the Indian Civil Service before independence, and had 
worked outside India in the diplomatic establishments of the government of India 
including South Africa, Washington, and China. The tussle, moreover, for influence 
between those from within the ICS, with the requisite backgrounds of Oxbridge, 
followed by sober careers in the Civil Services, and those who were appointed from 
‘outside’, also began fairly early on. Indeed, the first High Commissioner to Pakistan, 
Sri Prakasa learnt this the hard way. In his memoirs, Sri Prakasa complained of the 
strangle-hold that ICS officials in the MEA established from the very beginning: ‘The 
Government of India under the leadership of old and experienced ICS officers were 
not at all sure of the public men who were sent out as high commissioners or as 
ambassadors by the Prime Minister’.50 Within a year of his arrival at Karachi, Sri 
Prakasa had had to contend with the differing, and often more rigid views of his 
Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore, who, Sri Prakasa felt, had closer ties with the 
Ministry in Delhi. Sir Girija refused to budge on the issue of appointing officers from 
within the MEA to be recruited as High Commissioners from an early date, and 
differed from Nehru on how this process could be carried out. Nehru, for his part, 
was more open to the idea of allowing ‘public’ figures to be sent to important 
countries as High Commissioners.  
The exchange of High Commissioners between the two new Dominions, moreover, 
was a task of the highest urgency. While discussing the question of relations between 
India and Pakistan Expert Committee Number IX observed 
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‘in order to facilitate mutual cooperation in the solution of the numerous 
complicated problems that are bound to arise, at any rate in the initial period, 
in the course of adjustment between their relations, the committee recommend 
that as soon as possible after the 15th August 1947, there should be an exchange 
of High Commissioners between the two Dominions. The Steering Committee 
have considered this matter further and come to the conclusion that it is 
desirable that the two Dominions have their respective High Commissioners in 
place by 15th August 1947.’51  
The Partition Council, moreover decided on 6 August that the two governments 
would give ‘reasonable assistance to the High Commissioners of India and Pakistan 
in finding the office and residential accommodation they required.’52 The Council 
decided that the High Commissioner for Pakistan, Mr. Mirza Ismael, would 
represent his government at the Partition Council meetings after 15 August. Thus, 
amongst the earliest diplomatic acts of the government of Pakistan was related to the 
completion of the division of assets.  
Sri Prakasa arrived in Karachi as High Commissioner of India, on the eve of the 
Independence Day celebrations. His tenure was short lived. It was mostly 
successfully hampered by his colleagues in Delhi, as well as the deputy high 
commissioner in Lahore. His first few days in this position were uncomfortable -- in 
his memoirs, he describes how, immediately after his arrival, he stayed in the house 
that had once belonged to Lala Lajpat Rai: ‘His hospitable house was also full of 
refugees, and there was scarcely room enough to move about’.53 Indeed, the 
substantial portion of the work of his high commission related to dealing with 
refugees, to and from India. His office was flooded with requests for help by 
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departing Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab, and later, from Sind.54 During his time in 
Pakistan, Sri Prakasa was vocal in his criticism of the Two Nation Theory, and, in his 
memoirs, records the many private conversations he had with prominent 
personalities in Karachi about the futility of the partition. For the most part, 
however, these reflections suited neither government. His endeavours to be more 
lenient with Muslim migrants who wished to return to India were generally 
thwarted. He repeatedly complained to Delhi about not being included in the 
making of policy with Pakistan, but was generally met with polite unhelpfulness. Sri 
Prakasa also argued against India’s detaining Pakistan’s share of railway wagons, 
which had been allotted by the Partition Council. In this case, eventually, the Indian 
Prime Minister interceded on his behalf and arranged for the supplies to be 
forwarded to Pakistan.55 Yet, the question of the process of division of assets would 
continue to remain an important item on the bilateral agenda between India and 
Pakistan.  
Moreover, the bilateral agenda and their wider foreign policy pursuits of both 
governments were interlinked from the beginning. The process of working through 
the questions of partition was integral to the making of the larger foreign policy of 
both countries, and their relationships with other countries. These various arenas, 
moreover, informed each other in terms of how the bilateral relationship between 
the two countries would progress, and in turn shaped their propositions to the 
world. While it is outside the scope of this work to address the foreign policies that 
India and Pakistan pursued, it is necessary to point out that their bilateral 
relationship was a critical ingredient in this pursuit. Indeed, what also becomes 
clearer as both governments followed through their initial thinking about their 
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positions in the world, is that the broader scopes of the task of foreign policy-- such 
as defining a relationship with the United States, what sort of position to have in the 
Commonwealth, and the sorts of relationships that were being sought by India and 
Pakistan in the international arena-- required that the two countries cooperate on the 
basis of needing to separate themselves from each other as soon and as completely as 
possible. These various relationships, were, moreover initiated and pursued from the 
start. A mutual recognition of the basis of clear separation had to be established from 
a very early date, and bilateral activities in this period do reflect this.   
India, Pakistan, and the wider world  
These questions shaped the foreign policies of both India and Pakistan towards the 
world. Both the countries drew in other governments and international 
organisations into the questions that remained from the terms of the partition. Over 
the drawing of the boundary line, Jinnah had approached Mountbatten to bring in 
judges from the United Nations Organisations, since, he argued, their impartiality 
could be vouched for.56 Yet, this exercise did require a basis of agreement between 
the two governments that they needed to disentangle themselves from one another 
as much as possible. Indeed, in a speech to the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah stated 
that ‘It is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign states 
to collaborate in a friendly way to jointly defend their frontiers… but this depends 
entirely on whether India and Pakistan can resolve their own differences. If we can 
put our own house in order internally, then we may be able to play a great part 
externally in all international affairs.’57 
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Seeking membership into the Commonwealth was a logical first step, despite the 
lengthier negotiations that India was conducting over the terms of her own 
membership. The question of membership into the Commonwealth certainly 
involved tortuous negotiations within different levels in the British government, and 
the Indian leadership. Nehru, C Rajagopalachari and Gopalaswami Ayyangar had 
been in the midst of negotiating with Anthony Eden and Phillip Noel Baker over the 
ways in which India could become a republic, while staying inside the 
Commonwealth. The Indian government did not wish to step out of the 
Commonwealth association entirely; Nehru wrote to the British government ‘We 
earnestly desire association in the Commonwealth and we feel it is feasible and 
likely to survive legal and other challenges’.58 One important implication from 
membership in the Commonwealth was the advantages of some preferential 
treatment on trade from other member countries. Both India and Pakistan 
recognised the importance of this, and were keen to use this network in their foreign 
trade. The Government of India had been a signatory of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade with Britain in 1939, and continued to use the terms provided by it 
after gaining independence. There was also undoubtedly a mutual desire, both in 
India and in Britain, that India should remain in the Commonwealth. One possibility 
discussed in the early stages of the negotiations, between Mr. Gordon Walker and 
Nehru during a visit to Delhi, was that the President of the Indian republic appoint 
Heads of Missions on behalf of the King; and that each time a President assumed 
office, such an authorification from the Crown be renewed.59 The passing of the 
Indian Independence Act entailed a termination of an allegiance derived on the basis 
of the King being the Sovereign of India, and India being one of his Dominions. The 
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Indians were consistently unwilling to let their membership in the Commonwealth 
imply an acceptance of the titular sovereignty of the Crown. They presented an 
argument for the creation of a separate category of ‘Commonwealth States’, as 
distinct from ‘His Majesty’s Dominions’, and ‘Foreign States’60. The Indian 
delegation presented a firm line against adjusting their Constitution to include a 
symbolic allegiance to the king, arguing ‘India becomes completely sovereign 
independent republic deriving its authority from the people. There is no allegiance 
to the King or any other external authority’.61  
This was largely a question of semantics. Yet, it is also interesting to look at these 
exchanges in terms of the initial stages of the formation of the roles of the 
Commonwealth, as well as the setting up of international personalities of India and 
Pakistan. A largely self- congratulatory note on the agreement with the 
Commonwealth, circulated by Nehru to the Cabinet argued, ‘On the while, I feel 
convinced that we have every reason to be gratified at the result of this meeting… 
Apart from the obvious advantages gained by us, I think India will have the 
opportunity to progress more rapidly now, industrially and otherwise, and at the 
same time to play a much more definite role in Asian and World Affairs’. Finally, he 
added, ‘There was also a general impression that we had gained a diplomatic 
victory… In the London meeting, Pakistan did not come off well at all and produced 
an unfavourable impression on those present’.62 The Pakistani delegation at the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in 1949, viewed India’s 
manoeuvrings with irritation. Liaquat Ali Khan raised the question of what 
assistance could be received from the rest of the Commonwealth, in the case of 
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aggression. Secondly, he suggested that the retention of India as a republic within 
the Commonwealth, while remaining a Republic, could be a ‘development, which, if 
widespread, might lead eventually to the disintegration of the Commonwealth’.63 
Despite Pakistan’s protestations against the terms offered to India for her to retain 
membership in the Commonwealth, these were carried through.  
Both states also looked for monetary support from the United States, and 
consistently sought to claim its support against the other.64 Support, financial and 
military, from the United States seemed elusive in the beginning, as the dynamics of 
the Cold War seemed to be distant from the horizons of the sub continent. The initial 
thinking on the part of the United States with regard to developments in the sub-
continent was that there was no pressing need for the United States to be drawn 
intimately into the governments of either India or Pakistan, or, indeed, their bilateral 
affairs. In the years immediately following the partition, the United States had 
followed a policy of even-handedness with India and Pakistan, on the assumption 
that a stable subcontinent would be in the interests of all. In shaping these responses, 
the United States was for the time being, seemingly willing to accept tutelage from 
the British, who in turn aimed to have a stable subcontinent in their 
Commonwealth.65   
Moreover, the hostility in the India- Pakistan relationship was not seen as a 
calamitous and explosive danger by the United States, which was in fact content not 
to intervene too strongly in the situation for the time being. On 9 July, Jinnah met 
Lewis, the American Consul General in Karachi, to discuss plans for exchanging 
High Commissioners between Pakistan and the United States. These establishments, 
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including naval and military attaches to the US embassy, should be set up as quickly 
as possible. Lewis reported to his State Department that the ‘Pakistan government 
was setting aside quarters for Embassy and Embassy residence, and if further 
facilities were needed, I should inform him’.66 In August, Jinnah told Lewis that he 
intended to establish diplomatic relations with United States as soon as possible, and 
that, moreover, he had already selected an Ambassador.67 This was to be M. A. H. 
Ispahani, a member of the influential Ispahani clan, and who had been prominent in 
Muslim League politics in the decades prior to partition. A despatch from the 
American Consul General in Karachi, however, requested the State Department to 
await further information from him before making further appointments to the 
American consulate there, since the housing problem at present was desperate.68 
Indeed, relations between Pakistan and the United States were relatively minimal in 
1947, and took many months to acquire firmer shape.69   
American policies towards the subcontinent were initially fairly disinterested and 
hesitant in the period immediately after independence, and South Asia was not at 
this stage a major theatre of the cold war. It was, moreover, unenthusiastic about 
taking too active a role during the outbreak of war in Kashmir in December 1947. 
The US took several years to shape its position on the subcontinent, and was initially 
indecisive about deciding what line to take with India and Pakistan without 
alienating one or the other.70 The relationship between the United States and the two 
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countries grew incrementally, but a key consideration remained in terms of how a 
closer relationship with one could affect relations with the other. In a discussion 
between the three American Ambassadors to India, Pakistan, and Burma in 
December 1947, Ambassador Grady in India made the following argument:  
‘There is a chance for overall cooperation without disturbing the institutional 
independence of either country… This would not represent an about face on 
the question of the division of the country, but would be an attempt to 
cooperate along economic and defence lines. Real progress in this direction was 
made in the recent Lahore meetings, with only Kashmir left unsettled’.71  
The Ambassador was arguing that the United States encourage the sentiment of 
‘good neighbourliness’, without too active an involvement in the Commonwealth, 
which, he argued, was more unpopular in the country at present. The three 
ambassadors agreed, therefore, that they ‘would never question independence of 
either country in our policy, but will encourage cooperation wherever possible’.72 
Using Pakistan as a strategic base against the hegemony of the Soviet Union across 
the region faltered on several occasions, but had been consolidated into a feasible 
policy by the mid fifties. Liaquat Ali Khan made repeated requests to the US 
government for financial help, and was also keen to stress the strategically 
significant location of Pakistan -- which shared a contiguous border with the Soviet 
Union- for the purpose of discouraging the spread of the Soviet sphere of influence. 
A key consideration continued to remain the Indian reaction to a possible defence 
alliance in the area. Yet, the communist victory in China and the outbreak of the 
Korean War provided America with greater incentive to acquire Pakistan as an ally. 
In 1952, Pakistan became a signatory of the Middle East Deference Organisation 
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Treaty, which provided for an alliance system against the spread of the Soviet Union 
in the Middle East. Pakistan’s decision to sign to the MEDO Treaty was fiercely 
criticised in India as presenting a threat to her security. Yet, this was accepted by all 
the parties concerned: what was recognised quite clearly in Pakistan, as well as in 
the United States, was that the pursuit of such a strategic partnership with the 
United States did have more to do with concerns against domination by India, than 
with the unfolding of the Cold War.73 The acrimony in the bilateral relationship 
between India and Pakistan was present in various degrees, in all their dealings with 
the rest of the world.  Yet, while this was certainly carried out in both governments, 
it was part of an attempt to establish the finality of partition, rather than to 
undermine it. The dealings between India and Pakistan and the wider world, thus, 
had to assert that both were separate, and sovereign entities, even while they 
continued to voice the differences between them.  
Both governments were in search of additional funds. In a conversation with US 
Ambassador Grady, in October that year, Bajpai asked if the US could make 
available ten army transport planes, to fly out 50,000 Hindu refugees stranded in 
Peshawar, to Amritsar. This group of migrants had started out from the NWFP on 
the 3 October 1947, and had been attacked during the journey. Bajpai argued that 
‘when news gets out a new outburst against Muslims in Delhi is almost certain and if 
the 50,000 perish from hunger and/or communal attack, communal war will reach 
proportions beyond anything yet seen’.74 This appeal, however, failed. The reply 
from the Secretary of State firmly said ‘US could only act if request was made jointly 
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by the Governments of India and Pakistan’.75 Although Bajpai renewed his request a 
few days later, he met again with a negative answer. A telegram from the office of 
the secretary of state to its Embassy in India noted ‘GOP obviously not enthusiastic 
about US planes, as Lewis [American charge’d in Karachi] never approached, and 
GOP made special effort to move the NWFP group by rail’.76 In October 1947, Jinnah 
wrote to President Truman to request a loan of some $2 billion for various 
agricultural and industry development schemes in Pakistan. For the time being, 
however, this request was rejected, as the State Department explained that it was 
unprepared to give such a large grant.77 Yet, it was important to both governments 
to assert their separate establishments to the world, and to conduct a separate 
foreign policy from the beginning. Despite the failure of such overtures, it was 
necessary for both to proceed having established that the partition had happened, 
and the two were thus separate entities.  
The weeks and months following August 1947, were not, therefore, temporary blips 
in how the governments of India and Pakistan would progress. Its officials sought 
quickly to come to grips with the processes of separation, and eagerly looked for 
ways to establish their positions in the world. Moreover, dealing with the questions 
of the administrative consequences of partition, even through the seemingly 
humdrum and messy process of the division, does need to be woven into the fabric 
of the bilateral relationship, as well as the larger foreign policies of the two countries. 
These decisions were not on a separate plane from how the international positions of 
India and Pakistan were established, but in fact formed their very skin and bone. The 
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choices made on all levels by the governments of India and Pakistan were to embark 
on processes that cemented the fact of partition -- it was necessary to do this with 
regard to the division of the assets, as it was in the negotiations of Commonwealth 
membership. Establishing a clear process of separation from one another, was as 
important in the internal politics of India and Pakistan, as it was in the making of the 
rest of their foreign policy. Indeed, in order to have a viable foreign policy, it was 
necessary for both governments to cooperate with one another on how to finalise 
their separation. This process of separation was, moreover, melded into the foreign 
policies of both India and Pakistan. Although there were undoubtedly serious- and 
potentially unsolvable- differences from early on, it was important to both to be able 
to articulate the basis of the differences. This in itself, called for a tacit, and complex, 
basis of agreement. The process had necessitated a form of cooperation between the 
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INTER-DOMINION APPROACHES TO MOVEMENT 
AND MINORITIES  
 
The first high commissioners, Sri Prakasa and Zahid Hussain discovered from the 
very first few days of being in office, that their foremost task, and immediate 
relevance, would concern the demands of the minority population of both countries. 
Both missions were immediately swamped by petitions relating to the concerns of 
members of the minority population across the border, as well as with purposes of 
inter-dominion travel. While the arrival of refugees in significant, and potentially 
uncontrollable numbers panicked the state governments in both countries, this also 
needs to be contextualised against a more complex picture: where the movement of 
travellers across these regions had in fact pre dated partition.1 This was particularly 
true of the Bengal delta, where the movement of migrants across the new border was 
a part of a larger—and durable—ecosystem, which could not be broken.2 Yet, 
although such migratory patterns had predated partition by many decades, traffic 
across the border after Independence was analysed primarily in terms of religion 
and nationality by both governments. 
Moreover, the task of regulating inter-dominion movement acquired additional 
complexity particularly when faced with angry accusations from provincial 
governments unwilling to support the burden of additional numbers of refugees. 
Both governments were wary of the consequences of unchecked migration from 
across the border. The scale, and unpredictability of inter-dominion migration was a 
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politically sensitive topic in both countries, and this topic was discussed by a large 
number of individuals from across the political spectrum on both sides. This issue 
drew angry criticism from many leaders accusing the other government of 
persecution of its minority population. For instance, Vallabhbhai Patel, speaking 
before the Congress Subject Committee in September 1949 contended that the ‘sad 
plight’ of Hindus in East Bengal was driving them across the border. ‘Nobody,’ he 
continued, ‘wants to leave their hearth and home without any reason. It is because 
the conditions in which they live there are so bad that they migrate to India…’3 He 
warned that unless the government of Pakistan took steps to halt the persecution of 
Hindus in East Pakistan, India would be crushed under the weight of even more 
incoming refugees.  
Both governments, therefore sought ways to firstly, limit the movement of migrants, 
and secondly, to prevent it from creating dangerous levels of political instability. 
Inter-dominion conferences on this question therefore explored ways of limiting the 
movement of minorities, as well as devising means by which the interface between a 
government of one country, and the minority population of the other, could be 
legitimised, and, to the extent possible, regulated. One way to achieve this was to 
make both governments formally accountable to each other for the protection of the 
interests of minority populations within them. While the machinery set up to do this 
would not necessarily lead to a complete halt in the movement, it would nonetheless 
provide both governments with means to address and contain the threats posed by 
it. The question of how minority populations across the border could look to the 
governments for protection and guidance, therefore could be controlled by this 
means. Framing inter-dominion agreements on the rights of minorities, therefore, 
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provided both governments with a way of balancing the requirements of ‘ending’ 
the impact of partition, and carving out a separate and sovereign voice, while at the 
same time be able to continue their links with the concerns of minority populations 
across the border. 
The continued and uncontrolled movement of large numbers of minority 
populations across the border therefore required a response from both states that 
would clarify their separation from each other, and an elaboration of the ways in 
which such a separation was permanent. The issue of controlling the unchecked 
movement of migrants from across the border provided for a strong basis of 
agreement on the need to cooperate between the two governments. Yet, this was no 
easy task, since migration across the eastern borders, its fluidity, as well as the 
prospect of it remaining very much a permanent feature in the eastern landscape. 
What emerged instead, was a set of understandings reached between the two 
governments over the ways in which such travel could be controlled and, if possible, 
restricted. 
At the same time, however, neither side was in a position to be able to cut itself off 
completely from the demands and concerns of the minority population across the 
border. The missions on both sides found themselves to be the repositories of 
complaints and requests for help, by the minority communities. What concerned 
government officials most, however, and the point at which their intervention was 
most critical, was not so much the treatment of minorities across the border, as much 
as their movement. This could be seen particularly clearly in the modalities of dealing 
with the requirements of enormous numbers of migration and minority related 
concerns in India and Pakistan. 
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Given that this movement itself could not be stopped, it was necessary to devise a 
framework that could limit the enormous potential for damage that this could have 
to the political and territorial stability of both countries. Moreover, the sheer scale in 
the numbers of the minority community, as well as the nature of their concerns 
could only mean that both governments would have to remain engaged with this 
task. This chapter thus explores the responses of both states to the question of 
movement across the border, and, moreover, how these responses were bilaterally 
constructed.  
Inter-Dominion Deliberations 
The question of migrants, and their treatment across the border was a critical factor 
in shaping the politics of the two new nations. The influx of migrants from across the 
border was frequently linked to a critique of the policies of the neighbouring 
government with regard to their minority population. Such criticism was voiced 
particularly strongly by leaders in the provinces of India and Pakistan, which were 
the destinations for large numbers of migrants. Both Nehru and Liaquat faced 
attacks from powerful provincial leaders over how the refugee crisis was to be 
handled, and threatened the stability of their government. In April 1948, the ministry 
of M.A. Khuhro, in the Sind province was dismissed over differences with the centre 
as to the numbers of migrants who could be resettled in that province.4 Nehru, for 
his part, had to face the increasing wrath of leaders from West Bengal and Assam 
over the influx of migrants from across the border. Both governments had to evolve 
convincing responses on the rehabilitation of migrants across the border, at a time 
when the justifications and politics of the partition were still vividly imprinted in the 
politics of both countries. 
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It was necessary for both governments to fashion for themselves, an active role in the 
process of movement and migration of inter- dominion populations, and to explore 
ways in which it could be controlled.  In April 1948, an Inter-dominion conference 
was convened with the purpose of framing an inter-governmental response to the 
flow of minorities. The main issue at the conference related to inter dominion travel 
along the eastern border. The flow of travellers across the eastern border needed to 
be acknowledged, incorporated, and if possible, curtailed by both the governments. 
In the discussions, H. M. Patel urged that the question not be addressed ‘in terms of 
the prestige of either government’, but rather something which needed to be seen as 
a ‘big, human problem.’5 What was more difficult, however, was finding a 
compromise acceptable to both sides, as to how the problem could be addressed. A 
bland Communiqué issued at the end of the conference stated ‘The Conference met 
and had a fair and frank discussion on the various issues involved in an atmosphere 
of cordiality and understanding.’6 This, however, betrayed nothing of the detailed, 
often combustible, and exhaustive perusal of questions related to the flow of 
minorities. 
The conference was held in Calcutta, in the sombre and imposing settings of the 
Writers Building. The head of the Pakistani delegation at this conference was 
Ghulam Muhammad, minister for finance; on the Indian side, the delegation was 
headed by KC Neogy, minister for rehabilitation. Discussion at the conference 
quickly focussed around the issue of the extent, and reasons, for both governments 
being involved with the concerns of minority populations in the other country. The 
Pakistan delegation argued that the policies of reclamation of land in Assam would 
drive out minority cultivators into East Pakistan. Gopinath Bardoloi, chief minister 
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of the province of Assam, and an increasingly shrill advocate of the policy of 
protecting the state of Assam from the influx of ‘outsiders’, began by complaining to 
the conference that the policies of the East Bengal government were driving migrant 
cultivators -- both Hindu and Muslim -- into his state in increasingly large numbers. 
His government, Bardoloi continued, was entitled to evict those- mainly Muslim 
cultivators- who had migrated to the province after 1938, on the basis of an 
agreement reached that the government of Assam had entered into with the Muslim 
League in 1945.7  
The conferences were attended by politicians from the provinces of both countries, 
deeply concerned with the impact of continuing inter-dominion migration, and 
frequently at odds with the central government over their handling of this question.  
In India, politicians from the provinces who participated in these conferences 
pursued a complex, and often separate, agenda with regard to the influx of migrants, 
and frequently used this question to attack the centre. Indeed, officials and 
politicians from the border states of Assam, Tripura and West Bengal were key 
players in the shaping of the relationship with Pakistan. Their contributions, thus 
added a different layer to the discussions of how inter-dominion movement could be 
controlled. Their participation in the conferences thus reveal the multiple centres at 
which implementing bilateral policies were located. Moreover they were also a 
necessary exercise in attempts at channelling the criticism and antagonism that 
sprung in the provinces against the centre. 
Yet if the flow of minorities across the border had to be curtailed, it was necessary 
for both governments to take action to ensure their security in their current situation. 
A joint declaration that undertook both government’s protection of minority rights 
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was a possible solution. Ghulam Muhammad for instance pointed out that ‘A great 
service would be provided for the minorities, wherever they are,’ if the Conference 
could lay down machinery that both countries could impose for their protection of 
minorities. 8 The agreement declared that both governments ‘are determined to take 
every possible step to discourage such exodus and to create such conditions as 
would check mass exodus in either direction, and would encourage and facilitate as 
far as possible the return of evacuees to their ancestral homes’9 This agreement 
guaranteed equality in ‘rights, opportunities, privileges and obligations’ to 
minorities, and, significantly, also stipulated that ‘all tendencies towards an 
economic boycott of minorities or strangulation of their normal life should be 
curbed’.10 The declarations were aimed at soothing the concerns of minority 
populations in both countries of the security of their continued existence in the 
country, and to discourage them from deciding to migrate.  
What was especially interesting about the inter-dominion conferences of 1948, were 
the ways in which the questions regarding protection of minorities interests were 
framed. Sri Prakasa, the Indian high commissioner, suggested that such a declaration 
was necessary to ‘clear the air’ in both countries. The influx of migrants across the 
border therefore became an issue about the minority community, and their security 
in India and Pakistan. Such arguments were given shape in inter-dominion 
declaration in 1948, which contained the stipulation that ‘In Pakistan and in India 
every citizen shall have equal rights, opportunities, privileges and obligations, and 
there shall be no discrimination against the minorities’11. Such provisions, however, 
would only come into being when they were imposed by both states, as Ghulam 
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Muhammad pointed out at the Conference: ‘When we are trying to work out the 
rights of minorities, if you want it I am quite prepared to have an identical thing for 
both the Dominions’.12 If the machinery to protect minorities’ rights was absent in 
one country, then it would also be correspondingly absent in the other. Much of the 
discussion was in fact focussed on the nature of rights that minorities would enjoy in 
both countries -- and the ways in which India and Pakistan could mutually 
guarantee to each other that these rights would be put in place. The principle of 
reciprocity, thus, on the basis of bilateral cooperation was present from the earliest 
bilateral dialogues.  
Delegates at the Calcutta conference acknowledged that the stability of the minority 
populations in the eastern side of the subcontinent was important to secure, and 
would have to be accommodated, since the economic viability of the region as a 
whole, which rested partly on the traditional networks of commerce and migration 
that criss- crossed over the region as a whole, and partly on the sheer size of the 
numbers involved in these transactions. The issue of migrants from East Bengal, 
minorities communities in that province, and trade between East Bengal and India 
were all deeply connected with the politics, and economics of the provinces of 
Assam, East and West Bengal. It was difficult, thus, to completely halt movement 
across this delta, although necessary, at the same time, to insert the infrastructure of 
both states into these activities.  
Moreover, the ways in which the state infrastructure of India and Pakistan would 
insert themselves into minority- related concerns across the border, thus, were being 
felt through in the 1948 conference. The delegates also agreed that the chief 
secretaries of east and west Bengal would meet every month to deal with issues 
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relating to traffic between the two provinces, including the terms of transit and 
customs for goods.13 Provincial and district minorities boards, with representation 
from members of the minority community who had been elected in the legislative 
assemblies, were moreover, to be set up under the terms of this agreement, for the 
daily welfare of minority related concerns.  
But the task of addressing this movement also raised questions as to whether 
measures should be taken to control movement only in the case of refugees from the 
eastern part of the subcontinent, or whether the task should in fact be addressed at a 
sub-continental level. K. Shahbuddin, a part of the Pakistan delegation, pointed out 
that his government were entitled to raise the issue of the treatment of Muslims 
throughout India, since it was also ‘a question of principle, involving both the 
governments’ concerns with minority welfare across the border.’14 The Indian 
delegation, however, repeatedly insisted that the goal of this conference was to 
address the numbers of migrants in the East. Yet, the numbers of migrants going to 
East Pakistan were far fewer than those who had gone into West Pakistan. 
According to the 1951 census, about 700,000 had migrated from India to East Bengal, 
compared to some six and a half million to West Pakistan.15 Accusations over 
interference in the affairs of minorities in the other country therefore could stick both 
ways, and for many regions. 
Discussions became particularly heated over the question of persecution of 
minorities in Assam, East and West Punjab, the United Provinces, Sind, and 
Bombay, and Bihar. Ghulam Muhammad argued that ‘if you really want to purge 
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the minds of hatred we must cover all those areas.’16 Moreover, he pointed out, the 
Indian high commission was closely involved in the concerns of minorities in West 
Pakistan: ‘Mr. Sri Prakasa looks after the interests of Hindus in Sind. My government 
gives him every facility to do so... Ask him if his house is not the beehive of lots of 
people.’17 The Indians however, were reluctant to bring in other states into the 
discussions, arguing that the conference had ‘met principally for East and West 
Bengal’18. The delegates decided to consider this question at a future inter-dominion 
conference.   
The Calcutta agreement failed, however, in bringing substantial relief to the question 
of how the issue of minorities and their movement could be settled. Its provisions 
were often flouted by both the governments. The two Bengals continued to have 
uneasy relations, in terms of movement of goods across the borders, as well as in 
trading accusations of the policy of mistreatment of minorities. B. C. Roy argued, for 
instance, the influx of migrants into the state of West Bengal was the result of ‘a 
deliberate policy of the government of East Bengal to drive out the minorities.’19 Both 
foreign offices exchanged a great deal of correspondence on instances of violation of 
the agreement, although this had little effect on the actual decision making on these 
issues in the months that followed. In August 1948, Subimal Dutt noted that ‘since 
the Calcutta Agreement… there has been no radical change… [and] the Pakistan 
Government have entered on an undeclared war against India’20. Therefore, Dutt 
argued, India’s implementation of the clauses in the Agreement, relating to the 
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supply of coal and steel- which were ‘materials that were essential to the prosecution 
of that war’- could be halted.21 Complaints came in increasing numbers regarding 
the movement of food and other everyday commodities between East and West 
Bengal. The District Magistrate, West Dinajpur, reported ‘In spite of the decision of 
the Inter-dominion conference, movement of eggs, fish vegetable, bamboo, fuel etc 
are not being allowed by the Pakistan officials and people.’22 On his return from a 
tour in East Pakistan, J. N. Mandal, Law Minister of Pakistan met with the Indian 
Deputy High Commissioner in Karachi, M. K. Kirpalani. He argued that the exodus 
was taking place due to economic and not political reasons. Deteriorating economic 
conditions in East Pakistan, due to ‘India’s strangulation of East Pakistan’, were 
responsible for the increasingly hostile environment for Hindus in East Bengal.23 
Thus, what was also recognised while dealing with this question, was that inter-
dominion migration was also caused by a economic rationale, and in fact reflected a 
pattern of movement which proceeded along a logic of an ecosystem which had 
predated the partition, and which was difficult to halt entirely.   
In the years following the partition, the government of Assam insistently pressed for 
a Permit system to be imposed on the traffic between Assam and East Bengal.24 Both 
the Ministry of External Affairs and Gopalaswami Ayyangar discouraged the idea, 
and repeatedly argued against setting up a permit system in the east. This was 
discussed in a meeting in Gopalaswami Ayyangar’s house, with Bardoloi, B.C. Roy, 
and K.C. Neogy in July 1949.25 Barodoloi argued that a permit system was essential if 
the influx of migrants into Assam was to be controlled. He suggested that persons 
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without permits attempting to enter Assam from Goalpara check point should be 
turned back. Yet, Ayyangar pointed out this could only lead to reciprocal action 
from East Pakistan, and further controls would be imposed all along the Assam, as 
well as West Bengal boundaries with Pakistan. Within the state of Assam, Ayyangar 
argued, the Khasi and Jaintia Hills would be adversely affected, in addition to 
upsetting what equilibrium had been achieved in West Bengal with regard to the 
arrival of Hindu migrants. B. C. Roy also voiced his disapproval, fearing that a 
similar retaliatory measure by East Pakistan against migrants from West Bengal, 
would only lead to a further onslaught of Hindu migrants into their own state. Such 
a measure could also be disruptive to trade, and the flow of goods, cattle, as well as 
vital food supplies including fish, in that region, all of which were vital for the 
economic well being of the state.26  
Indeed, it was also difficult to cite legislation under which migrants could be 
expelled from the state of Assam: the provisions of various laws barring the entry of 
outsiders, such as the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act of 1949, Assam 
maintenance of Public Order Act of 1947, Indian Passport Act and Foreigners Act, all 
lacked clauses which could specifically apply to migrants from East Pakistan in 
Assam being deported back.27 This also reflected a dilemma on part of lawmakers 
regarding a pattern of migration which was well established in the east before the 
partition, and whether this could continue to remain permissible with partition 
having taken place. Drafting an Ordinance especially for this purpose also carried 
the risk of attracting the attention of the Pakistan government, who would make 
retaliatory provisions in their own legislation for migrants. Eventually, in October 
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1949, it was decided that the government of Assam could pass an Ordinance which 
would enable it to remove migrants who had come there after that date.  
However, the exodus of Hindu migrants from Pakistan into eastern India continued, 
to the great alarm of government officials, as well as politicians in these provinces. 
Gopinath Bardoloi and Dr. B. C. Roy, the Chief Ministers of Assam and West Bengal 
had increasingly greater leeway to attack the centre, and Nehru in particular, on his 
tactics with Pakistan, as well as his handling of the refugee crisis. Officials in these 
areas made increasingly panicked assessments of the strain of the influx were 
causing to the resources of the provincial government. A report prepared by the 
West Bengal government in October 1948 noted ‘if migration is allowed to continue 
there is a possibility that much more than two million people whom West Bengal 
could not afford to absorb, would come.’28  
Moreover, the movement of minorities across the border was not only a de-
stabilizing and politically unpredictable issue, but also brought into harsh clarity the 
costs of war with Pakistan, and the advantages of avoiding such an eventuality. The 
exodus of minorities into India and Pakistan was reminiscent of those in the wake of 
partition, and the price of such drastic measures in this situation would be too high. 
For example, Gopinath Bardoloi, premier of Assam, asserted that the inflow into 
Assam from East Pakistan were evidence of ‘the evil designs of Pakistan upon the 
state of Assam’.29  In November, speaking at Nagpur, Sardar Patel declared that the 
government of India were considering asking Pakistan for territory for the 
rehabilitation of those who were arriving from East Bengal.30 In his speech, Patel 
emphasised that ‘the seriousness of this situation had been conveyed to Pakistan… 
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and that the problem had to be settled through mutual discussion and agreement.’31 
Patel’s own suggestion to the Prime Minister was to demand territory from Pakistan 
for the rehabilitation of refugees in India. At Nagpur, he concluded ‘it is for Pakistan 
now to take concrete steps to solve the problem; otherwise India cannot undertake 
the burden of these refugees, and will be crushed under its weight.’32 In March, 
Nehru had declared that ‘the minorities in East Bengal are certainly our concern to 
the extent that they have security and if they do not have security measures will 
have to be devised to give them security.’33 At the same time, the wholesale 
resettlement of the Hindu and Muslim minorities of India and Pakistan into the 
countries of their majority was, Nehru frequently argued, an impractical and 
foolhardy course of action.  Yet, what this also shows is that Nehru was frequently 
challenged with regard to the sorts of policies to be adopted with Pakistan, which 
were, moreover articulated by a wide variety of people.  
Moreover, Nehru had not immediately rejected the possibility of resorting to war 
with Pakistan over the question of swelling numbers of migrants flowing across the 
border. Nehru ordered the movement of divisions of the Indian army closer to the 
West Pakistan borders, and for a heavier concentration of war related stores and 
equipment in militarily important areas like Ferozepur, Jullunder and Ludhiana.34 At 
the height of the refugee crisis, Nehru wrote to C Rajagopalachari ‘The situation is so 
complex and difficult that even I, with all my abhorrence of war and my 
appreciation of its consequences cannot rule it out completely’.35 This was also 
reflected in some furious expostulatory exchanges between Nehru and Liaquat at the 
time, asserting that the persecution of minorities across Bengal had to end, and both 
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governments had to come to clear conclusions as to how the security of minority 
populations should be ensured. Moreover, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary 
General in the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, informed the UK High 
Commissioner, Sir Archibald Nye, that unless the situation of the influx of refugees 
across the Bengal borders were redressed, Indian military actions against Pakistan 
would inevitable.  
In a telegram to the Prime Minister Attlee, Liaquat argued that the Commonwealth 
intervene on behalf of Pakistan, as the situation regarding the migration of 
minorities on both sides had become acute. Liaquat pointed out, that ‘thousands of 
Muslims are being driven out of India and are pouring into Pakistan to seek asylum’. 
This was exacerbated, he added, by a ‘systematic and organised campaign in the 
Indian press and by some Indian leaders that India should declare war on Pakistan 
to avenge the ill treatment of Hindus across the border.’ He concluded ‘when I am 
confronted with an enormous concentration of men, armours and stores so close to 
the Frontiers of Pakistan, you will no doubt agree with me that I cannot but treat the 
situation as extremely anxious… We have, despite the gravest of provocations, kept 
our heads cool. We still believe that the difficulties between India and Pakistan can 
be settled by negotiation and arbitration.’36 He also stated that the possibility of the 
refugee issue being raised at the United Nations by the Pakistani representative 
there, was being considered by his government.  
Powerful politicians, such as Syama Prasad Mukherji, leader of the right wing Hindu 
organisation, the Jan Sangh, Dr. Bidhan Roy, Chief Minister, West Bengal, and 
Vallabhbhai Patel were calling for an ‘outright solution’, in terms of a wholesale 
exchange of minority population, or recourse to war, with the object of gaining more 
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territory from Pakistan where these migrants could be settled. On 22 October 1948, 
while Nehru was away in Europe, Gopalaswami Ayyangar met with Syama Prasad 
Mookerjee, K.C. Neogy, Mohanlal Saxena, and B.C. Roy, a group of individuals who 
had been expressing dissatisfaction with the centre’s policy with Pakistan in an 
increasingly loud chorus. The feasibility of the option of holding a complete 
exchange of all minority populations of India and Pakistan was discussed, as a 
‘possible alternative for preventing uncontrolled migration on a large scale of non 
Muslims from East Bengal’.37 A few days later, Ayyangar reported to Nehru that ‘the 
grave situation in West Bengal owing to the arrival of large numbers of Hindu 
refugees is daily worsening… West Bengal is faced with complete disruption of its 
economy.’38 Moreover, Ayyangar warned, the Cabinet was increasingly of the view 
that this migration was caused by deliberate policy on the part of Pakistan, and that 
‘we must decide soon on a strong policy on this issue’.39 
These recommendations, moreover, found favour with prominent newspapers in 
India, such as the Anand Bazaar Patrika and the Hindustan Times, whose editorials, 
almost daily, lamented the harsh treatment meted out to minority communities in 
Pakistan, who had no option but to flee to India. A story in the Hindustan Times, in 
particular attracted a great deal of comment. The newspaper carried an article on the 
condition of Gandhi Camps in Noakhali, which had been set up in the aftermath of 
the Noakhali riots rehabilitating those affected by the riots. The Camps were now 
faced with ‘a Campaign of repression… [and] the authorities were determined to 
frame as many Camp workers as they can. Moreover, it was asserted in the article, 
that ‘the authorities in East Bengal do not want a meeting ground for both 
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communities, [and] did not wish a Hindu minority once more to rise and take its 
place in the working of the State.’40    
The Indian high commissioner, Sri Prakasa, became concerned at the impact that 
Patel’s and other Indian leaders’ statements on the option of exchanging land for 
refugees had had in the Pakistani press. His despatches to Delhi argued that it ‘is 
necessary for responsible Indian authorities in public statements to credit [the 
Pakistan] Government with good intentions, [since] if we attack the Government, 
Hindus will be encouraged to leave.’41 Sri Prakasa delivered the same message in the 
Pakistani press himself, and made a statement to the effect that the intentions of the 
Government of Pakistan ‘were trying to do justice to Hindus and had issued 
instructions to their officials to treat the minorities well’. This, however, evinced a 
strong reaction in India. Sri Prakasa received an angry telegram from the Premier of 
West Bengal, B.C. Roy, the very next day, demanding ‘further explanation’ of such a 
statement.42 Sri Praksa’s argument was that the best strategy would be to withhold 
statements hostile to the government of Pakistan, until the Indian government had 
‘finally decided to take strong action’. In the interim, an openly hostile stance would 
only stoke further unease. This approach, however failed to cut ice with any of the 
Indian leadership. An additional terse telegram arrived from Nehru, stating that 
‘Unfortunately what Pakistan Government says is not reflected in local policy in East 
Bengal.’43 As the year drew to a close, the number of migrants entering India from 
East Pakistan increased, and with this grew the tide of angry complaints from state 
governments.     
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This question was repeatedly raised in inter-dominion conferences. Indeed, one of 
the main themes of the Inter-dominion Conferences of the late 1940’s was discussion 
as to how the problem of the movement of the minorities had to be handled. In April 
1950, Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met in New Delhi, and signed a landmark 
declaration that their governments would protect the interests of minorities in both 
their countries. Both governments were now accountable to each other on the issue 
of protection of rights of minorities, and the Declaration set out a variety of 
infrastructure by which its requirements would be implemented. It was specifically 
aimed at staunching the flow of migrants from across the border, composed of 
minority populations in search of a state they would feel secure in. The declaration, 
fairly comprehensive in its definitions of minority discrimination, stated that the 
governments would ‘solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to the minorities 
throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a 
full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, 
freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and 
worship, subject to law and morality.’44 The agreement guaranteed safety of 
movement for migrants who were leaving areas which had seen communal tension, 
and stipulated that they not be harassed by Customs officials at the border. Migrants 
were entitled to continued ownership of their property while absent, and entitled to 
rehabilitation from their government, should restoration of property not take place.45  
Secondly, minority commissions would be set up in East and West Bengal, and 
Assam. These would be chaired by the Chief Minister of that Province, along with a 
Hindu and Muslim member, who were elected representatives of the state 
legislature. The commissions would have their own staff, and would supervise the 
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implementation of the agreement in the province. Subsequent to the April 
Agreement, C. C. Biswas and Dr. A. M. Malik, the ministers for minority welfare, 
met in August to review the steps taken to implement the agreement, and to put in 
place arrangements whereby cases of discrimination would be promptly 
investigated, and redressed. The annexure also called for the results of the enquiry, 
and action taken, to be communicated to the other government.46 It was also decided 
that travellers between East and West Bengal, via the border stations of Darsana and 
Benapole in Pakistan, and Banpur and Bongaon in Pakistan, would be counted 
jointly by both sides of border officials. The agreement also specified that the figures 
released of inter-dominion travel would be mutually agreed upon by both sides of 
officials, although this was seldom true in practice.  
The Nehru- Liaquat Pact had a certain amount of impact on the ground: of the 3.64 
million Hindu migrants who had entered India in 1950, some 1.77 million migrants 
felt encouraged enough to return.47  It was noted that there was a rise in the overall 
traffic of daily travellers crossing the border, since the signing of the agreement. A 
tense bilateral situation could also be measured in terms of the size of the influx of 
daily Muslim travellers into West Bengal -- this had dropped to less than a thousand 
in the weeks before the April Declaration.48 As the summer continued however, 
these numbers rose and stabilised to an average of 17,000 travellers a week. It was 
also noticed that there was a rise in the traffic of Muslim migrants coming into 
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Assam, who were entering India for the first time, after the signing of the 
agreement.49  
In the weeks and months that followed the Agreement, however, the gap between 
Hindus arriving weekly into that state, and departing back to East Bengal reduced to 
a significant extent.50 The return of Hindus from West Bengal back to East Bengal, 
meanwhile, also rose in the months after the Delhi Pact had been signed. For 
example, the last week of March 1950 had seen a net influx of approximately 100,000 
Hindus from across the border into West Bengal. In July, the government of West 
Bengal estimated that it had rehabilitated some 7,907 Muslim families of returned 
migrants.51 Similarly, the government of Assam also reported that 15,727 families of 
displaced Muslims had been provided for by the state.52 The agreement brought 
about temporary relief in the scale of migration across the border, but more 
importantly, its terms validated and replenished a structure whereby such a flow 
could be addressed, and regulated, in both countries.    
Setting up the Bilateral Machinery 
A major impact of the Calcutta conference in 1948 was that the diplomatic 
infrastructure of both sides became integral in the concerns of minorities across the 
border. What the agreement did was to bring the affairs of minority communities in 
India and Pakistan, squarely into the ambit of bilateral dialogue. By co-opting the 
question of minority welfare into the bilateral dialogue, the governments of India 
and Pakistan were also recognising each others’ sovereignty. By its very nature, this 
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was a messy, intricate and strangely intimate exercise.  What the bilateral machinery 
provided, was a means by which these activities could be carried out with the 
interface of the State, rather than allowing for the possibilities of individuals being 
allowed to challenge the premise of the reality of the nation states of India and 
Pakistan.  
The infrastructure of bilateral relations, shaped itself as a response to the demands of 
the aftermath of partition, as much as a means of trying to contain these events. The 
question of the movement of minorities occupied an increasingly growing space of 
the infrastructure in bilateral relations. The missions received petitions on requests 
for permits, for business on property and bank transfers in the other country to be 
conducted on their behalf, as well as receiving complaints of mistreatment by local 
officials. Those who found themselves inadequately protected by the legal structures 
of the new states sought the help of the diplomatic missions of the other country. 
The minorities question formed an intrinsic part of the day to day dealings of the 
missions, and in terms of the sheer bulk, and magnitude of the task, formed policy at 
a more functional and ad hoc level. They thus became an alternative place of appeal 
for the minorities of both these countries. The ways in which both states could get 
involved in the concerns of minorities across the border, while remaining separate 
entities, were thus worked out.  
Questions on how to handle complaints from minorities in East Pakistan had been 
debated from the beginning. Much of the work of the diplomatic representatives of 
both the countries involved voicing the discontent of minority populations against 
the policies of their government. This was always a negotiable policy, however, and 
could be adjusted in a variety of situations. Subimal Dutt was a senior official in the 
Indian ministry of external affairs, and for many years a key figure in the handling of 
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questions relating to Pakistan in the ministry, was amongst the first to examine this 
question. He instructed the first deputy high commissioner at Dhaka, S. Bose, that ‘in 
strict theory, minorities must seek the protection of their Government, and not of the 
Government of the neighbouring Dominion.’ In the same note, Dutt told the Bose  
‘You should advise the complainants accordingly, while at the same time keeping a 
note of the complaints so that at a suitable opportunity, either informally or on the 
occasion of the Chief Secretary’s or Premier’s Conference, you can point out that 
minorities are not being treated in the way provided by the Delhi Agreement’.53   
S. Sen, Chief Secretary of West Bengal in 1948, grasped the nuances of this problem 
immediately. In response to a query from the deputy high commissioner in Dhaka, 
Srijut Basu, as to how complaints of harassment from minorities in Pakistan should 
be dealt with, Sen pointed out ‘If we want our High Commissioner or Deputy High 
Commissioner to pursue complaints from Hindus in East Bengal, a similar request 
from Pakistan is sure to come.’54 Too close a relationship between the minority 
populations and the diplomatic missions would also lead to ‘Muslims in India 
coming to regard the government of Pakistan as their protector’ and which would 
‘be taken advantage of by Pakistan and will lead to embarrassing results in actual 
practice.’ Moreover, the consequence of such a policy would also require the 
granting of facilities to the Pakistan deputy high commissions to ‘visit all parts of the 
Indian Union, since it is their contention that that Muslim migration has been taking 
place from all across the Indian Union.’ On the whole, Sen considered, the best 
course of action would be to advise complainants from minority communities to 
seek the assistance of the district minority boards. These had been set up in 
accordance with the inter-dominion agreement of 1948, and were meant to be an 
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avenue for assistance for concerns of minorities. Yet, the strategy of leaving 
minorities to grapple with their own government without any assurances of security 
from diplomatic missions based there was also risky. It was feared that this would 
lead to an increase in the numbers of migrants. Sen acknowledged that the 
possibility of diplomatic offices being used to pursue complaints with the local 
officials in East Bengal, would have a ‘steadying effect’ on Hindus who wished to 
leave East Bengal and migrate to India.55   
This was often ambiguous terrain: although the practice of the Deputy High 
Commission being a place for appeal for Hindus continued well into the late 1950’s, 
the precise significance of such a practice was not clear. Subimal Dutt, has written, 
that ‘Nehru himself was not clear in his mind as to what the Government of India 
could do to assist those who were nationals of Pakistan and were still living in East 
Bengal’.56 The policy of aligning the concerns of the missions, with those of 
minorities’ across the border thus was not always unquestioningly adopted, 
although this did nonetheless eventually prevail. The issue of their welfare and their 
movement across the border was consistently present in both major and minor 
bilateral dialogues across the fifties. Reports on the conditions of minorities in the 
two Dominions went back and forth to both the foreign offices well into the late 
1950’s. While such discussions had varying degrees of impact on the welfare of 
minorities themselves on the ground, or even on the scale of their movement, this 
did put in place a structure in which the welfare of minorities could be used as a 
bargaining counter in the relationship between the two countries.  
The way in which such correspondence was handled also changed with shifts in the 
political climate. Following the prime ministers agreement of April 1950 -- in which 
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it was declared that the protection of minorities would be the responsibility of the 
country they resided in, and both governments were accountable to each other for 
the implementation of this declaration -- the foreign ministries of both governments 
agreed that excluding the provinces of East and West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, 
individual cases of complaints of harassment, need not be taken up at the 
governmental level.57 The scope of formal complaints would be limited to cases 
which could actually affect the stability of the two governments. In effect, the 
proposal was intended to limit the scale at which the two foreign ministries and 
diplomatic missions would remain involved in the pursuit of redress for minority 
complaints. The Pakistani high commissioner suggested that such correspondence 
could be restricted to ‘only major cases involving whole classes of people, breaches 
of clear rules, action designed to embarrass one of the two countries politically, e.g. 
pushing in refugees etc, and important individual cases’58. The mission in Karachi 
was instructed that since complaints continued to be received from the government 
of Pakistan, it should present ‘important cases’ to the notice of the Foreign Ministry 
of Pakistan.  
The volume of inter-governmental correspondence did not, however lessen after this 
exchange. Neither government could significantly distance themselves from the 
concerns of minorities across the border in the first decade. Although the high 
commissions of both countries continued to act as representatives of the minority 
population, this exercise was increasingly encased in a structure which co-opted the 
apparatus of the two nation states.  In November 1948, one Surendranath Haldar, ex- 
Chairman of the Jessore municipality, met with B. C. Roy. His delegations’ report on 
                                                
57‘Agreement between India and Pakistan about the procedure to be adopted for representing minor 
cases of harassment of minorities and not individual cases’, File No. 12(21)- Pak III- 50; MEA File, 
NAI 
58 Letter from High Commissioner of Pakistan to Ministry of External Affairs, 15 March 1950, File No. 
12(21)- Pak III- 50, Ministry of External Affairs, Pak III Branch, NAI  
Inter-Dominion Approaches to Movement and Minorities 
 85 
the situation of Hindus in Jessore concluded ‘The whole show of house searches, 
arrest warrants, and sealing of houses is to dub the individuals as enemies of the 
state, blackmail them in open public and strike terror into the hearts of the people.’59 
Cases of diplomatic correspondence on minority- related issued included, for 
instance, the situation of a petitioner whose wife had been ‘abducted, and is living 
openly with the Muslim who enticed her away’, since it was argued that this case 
had to potential to cause dissatisfaction amongst the public in India.60 Taking up the 
causes against minority discrimination by leaders across the border was, to a large 
scale, legitimised by the deliberations of the inter-dominion conferences.  
Items for discussion for future inter-dominion conferences thus included the 
institutional structures in both countries which discriminated against the minorities, 
whether in terms of distribution of property, providing cultural equality, educational 
infrastructure, as well as movement. For example, in September 1950 the Indian 
deputy high commissioner made a representation to the East Pakistan government 
that its employment of Hindu candidates in the administrative services was too low, 
and the ratio of its Hindu population in the province was not reflected in its pattern 
of recruitment.61 In December 1950, C. C. Biswas wrote to his counterpart 
complaining that the Pakistan government was discouraging private industrial firms 
from employing Hindus, and the branch secretariat undertook further 
correspondence on this issue.62 Ownership patterns of land were similarly the 
subject of frequent inter-dominion conversation. On his tour of East Pakistan in 
March 1953, the Indian high commissioner received 25 petitions from Hindus in 
Lalmonirhat in the Rangpur district, appealing against the requisitioning of their 
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land by the East Bengal government. This was taken up in correspondence between 
the deputy high commissioner in Dhaka and the Pakistan foreign office. Such 
communications became increasingly routinized, and, as the reports on the 
implementation of the agreement noted, largely failed in producing adequate 
responses from either government.    
On the Indian side, much of this paperwork was handled in the branch secretariat at 
Calcutta, rather than in Delhi; while in Pakistan, this was handled by the provincial 
secretariat in Dhaka, rather than in Karachi. A ‘Branch Secretariat’ to the ministry of 
external affairs had been set up in Calcutta following the inter-dominion conference 
of 1948. Its primary purpose was with dealing with the concerns of migrants in the 
eastern borders. The secretariat carried out an enormous amount of correspondence 
with the Foreign Ministry in Dhaka regarding the treatment of migrants at the 
border check-posts by the Pakistani government. Yet, its importance to the ministry 
in Delhi was secondary. By 1952, its was noted, ‘the Branch Secretariat had been 
reduced to a Secretariat of the Minorities Minister and the main part of its work is 
devoted to long range and often interminable correspondence on individual cases of 
harassment of non Muslims in East Bengal’.63 Although such inter-dominion 
correspondence was frequently relegated to a lower priority by both governments, it 
was nonetheless continued by both sides. In 1952, the Ministry of Home Affairs in 
India instructed state governments across the country to send reports to the MEA on 
communal incidents’ in their states, ‘in order to deal with representations from the 
Government of Pakistan or their High Commissioner in India’.64 Moreover, the state 
governments of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura also participated in this dialogue, 
and carried out an enormous amount of correspondence with the government of 
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East Pakistan relating to instances of persecution of minorities, and with the question 
of the scale, and remedies for, their movement across the border.  
The provincial elections of 1954 in East Pakistan brought dramatic results. The 
Muslim League – the party that had come to power in 1946 based on the mandate of 
partition – had lost, and was replaced by the United Front coalition.65 The role of the 
Branch Secretariat could have conceivably changed after the elections of 1954. 
Indeed, M. J. Desai argued ‘In view of recent developments, it is necessary for the 
Branch Secretariat to take more interest in the wider political work of Indo- Pakistan 
relations in the Eastern Zone.’66 It was possible that, the nature of the work of the 
branch secretariat would change in the aftermath of the recent elections. If the visa 
and passport regime of East Bengal were abolished altogether, then the size of staff 
required to deal with migrant traffic could be reduced. If, on the other hand, this 
regime was not abolished, but instead liberalised on a substantial scale, it would be 
‘useful that the manner in which the new policy were implemented by the East 
Pakistan government would be fully known to the Secretariat.’67 The mechanisms for 
bilateral cooperation evolved, thus, with developments in the governments of both 
countries, but did continue to remain, nonetheless a durable feature in the landscape 
of bilateral dialogue.   
While the involvement of the high commissions made little material impact on the 
uneasy situation of minorities in these areas, they were nonetheless a means of 
incorporating the two separated state structures of India and Pakistan into the 
dealings of minorities with their governments. The inter-dominion conferences thus 
set in place a variety of structures in both countries, including contact between the 
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ministers for minorities, exchanging information on the activities of minority 
commissions, setting up district intelligence bureaus, as well as exchanges between 
chief secretaries of the border provinces, as a means towards this. Yet, such 
involvement in fact made very little difference to the uneasy situation of minorities 
on the ground. Policies of discrimination and institutional exclusion of minorities 
from various structures of empowerment largely continued in both countries. Indeed 
bilateral communication on concrete instances of grievances of minorities, although 
voluminous, was generally relegated to a lower priority. Yet, bringing the issue of 
minority welfare into the fold of bilateral relations did bring about a structure that 
could stand in the way of the inter-dominion movement of minorities. They were thus 
designed as a check, and not a facilitator on cross- dominion interactions of 
minorities.  
Instances of discrimination or violence against the minority population were thus 
faithfully tracked by both the foreign offices. For instance, on 1 August 1952, the 
ministry of external affairs in Delhi received a letter from the Pakistani deputy high 
commissioner in Calcutta, requesting that he be allowed to visit the town of Silchar 
in Assam, to enquire into disturbances that had taken place there recently. A 
disagreement between a Muslim shopkeeper and his Hindu customer had turned 
violent, and resulted in ‘brickbats and stone chips freely thrown on the fixed shops 
and sheds in the bazaar’.68 In the ensuing disturbance, two Muslim men were 
injured, and a third killed. One of the injured was from Sylhet and the question arose 
as to whether he should return once being discharged from hospital. The deputy 
commissioner pointed out that this could cause further tension in East Pakistan, and 
the man was persuaded to stay. Abdul Hamid Chowdhry, the Pakistani deputy high 
commissioner in Calcutta, accompanied by D. M. Gupta, deputy secretary in the 
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branch secretariat went on a day long tour of Silchar, talked to eye witnesses at the 
bazaar, and met local leaders, the chairman of the municipality board, and other 
state officials. Chowdhry informed his audience that the district authorities had 
acted with promptness and ‘he would not have been able to do anything better or 
different from what the local officers had done.’69 Such episodes occurred very 
frequently, particularly in the states of Assam, West Bengal and Tripura, and the 
correspondence between the two foreign offices in this period was crowded with 
reports and enquiries relating to such events.  
Such detailed involvement of diplomats from the other dominion in the concerns of 
minorities across the border did not go unquestioned. Azizuddin Ahmed proposed 
that the Deputy High Commissioners of both countries need not contribute, since 
this would have consisted largely of accusations against his government on 
violations of agreements on minority protection. B. K. Acharya served as the Indian 
deputy high commissioner in Dhaka from 1952- 56. His  purview was predominantly 
related to the condition of the Hindu population in the province. The deputy high 
commission forwarded, almost daily, to the foreign office in Dhaka, complaints on 
unlawful requisition of land, harassment of Hindus on by customs officials on the 
border, cases of abduction of women, seizure of cattle following raids from parties of 
peasants across the border, and a variety of complaints of different scale.70 Acharya 
obstreperously replied that it was ‘absurd that at conferences in which the deputy 
secretaries, secretaries, board of revenue etc. of the two provincial governments 
freely take part in the discussions without any objection being raised, objections 
should be taken only when the deputy high commissioners open their mouths.’71 
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Moreover, he noted, ‘the Pakistan deputy high commissioner has been speaking 
freely at these Conferences in connection with the desecration of mosques etc.’72  
The politics of the dangers of uncontrolled migration, continued well into the 1950s. 
The numbers of travellers who crossed the border was closely monitored on both 
sides, and frequently cited as evidence to support claims of mistreatment of 
minorities, which led to their migration. Yet, this also required an agreement of sorts 
between the two governments. In September 1950 a conference of chief secretaries of 
the eastern provinces, agreed that officials of the two dominions would jointly count 
the number of travellers along the two principle rail routes between East and West 
Bengal, along the railway routes of Darsana-Banpur and Benapole-Bongaon. Such 
decisions did not, however, necessarily lead to agreements on the numbers, and the 
two sides continued to make widely different estimates of the influx of migrants. At 
a press conference in Dhaka in October 1952, the Pakistani prime minister, 
Nazimuddin declared that since the signing of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, 
approximately three million migrants -- both Hindu and Muslim -- had come to East 
Pakistan.73 According to figures published by the government of Pakistan, some 
13,06,830 Hindus, and 13,16,051 Muslims had made their way into East Bengal.74 
These estimates were rejected by the Indian government, who named this 
characterisation as ‘the sort of simplified fact which goes down extremely well in 
foreign countries’.75 In a report from the branch secretariat it was argued that the 
system of joint counting of migrants along these two routes was frequently 
unreliable, since practices such as ‘double counting’ and misrepresentation of the 
numbers of passengers at railway check points, would prevent officials from arriving 
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at a correct estimate. Moreover, it was argued that these figures were based on travel 
only along these two routes, and did not take into account net influx of migrants 
entering from other points along the border.76  
Both governments had toyed doubtfully with the idea of a permit, and later 
passport, for being necessary for inter-dominion travel for many months before they 
were set in place. The government of Pakistan issued a Pakistan (Control of Entry) 
Ordinance in October 1948. This decision was also dissented with on a number of 
levels in the government of Pakistan. It was argued by the ministry of foreign affairs 
that such a permit system would largely be ineffectual in keeping large numbers of 
migrants out of Pakistan. The ministry of foreign affairs suggested that a less 
controversial means of reducing the numbers of migrants into West Pakistan would 
be to control the sale of lower class tickets for trains and ships for passengers from 
India.77 Secondly, the foreign ministry argued, the permit system would most likely 
simply be ineffective in curtailing the numbers of migrants across the long, and 
mostly unmanned India- West Pakistan border.78 The justifications for the 
introduction of a permit system were similar to those given in India: the economic 
threat to state governments posed by large numbers of migrants. 
Although the permit system was imposed for travel along the western sector, it was 
found wanting on a number of counts. In India, officials both within and outside the 
ministry of external affairs criticised its efficiency. If control on the movement across 
the West was to be imposed, the permit system was a cumbersome and often 
ineffective means of achieving this. Four months after its introduction by India, in 
November 1948, the deputy high commissioner in Karachi, Kirpalani, reported that 
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this had proved to be a cumbersome and mostly ineffective affair. He noted flatly 
that ‘The Permit System has not served its purpose’, and that ‘in practise it works as 
a police measure intended to keep out all Muslim Pakistanis who have no 
demonstrable business in India.’79 Kirpalani also pointed out that the process of 
issuing permits was ‘arbitrary’, and caused inconvenience and delay to those who 
wished to travel to India. Thus far, Kirpalani continued, some 16,052 permits had 
been issued by the High Commission- though none of these were ‘permanent’, and 
could be used for temporary visits to India. Moreover, their validity was often 
denied, or difficult to verify, in India. For example, the Office of the Commissioner of 
Police in Bombay noted that that it was possible for visitors to circumvent the 
provisions of their temporary permits, since the state authorities could not verify the 
terms of their permit with the issuing authority in time.80 The consensus thus was 
that the permit system was insufficient in effectively controlling cross-border travel. 
Yet, decisions to strengthen this were made slowly and both sides pondered over on 
both sides for many months before being put in place.   
In 1952, an inter-dominion passport conference was held, in which the modalities for 
control of Inter-dominion movement were worked out. Vazira Zamindar has argued 
that the introduction of passport brought about a ‘categorical closure’ in defining the 
nations of divided south Asia.81 Yet, it is necessary to remember that this was done 
on a reciprocal, and mutually consensual, basis. Both governments had a clear eyed 
understanding of its consequences for inter-dominion travellers, and, moreover, put 
these systems in place in consultation with one another. Moreover, there continued 
to be ambivalence about how strictly such a system should be imposed, even after it 
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had been set in place. In 1953, an inter-dominion conference on passports was held 
in New Delhi. In a note for the Conference agenda Badruddin Tyabji, a senior official 
in the Ministry of External Affairs in India, pointed out that imposing such a system 
along the eastern borders was in fact more disadvantageous to India. He argued that 
the Indian delegation could offer to abolish the requirements for passports and visas 
in the Eastern zone, and if the question arose, could offer to abolish the passport and 
visa system altogether for Inter-dominion travel.82 Delegates at this conference  
agreed to set up more offices to issue visas and passports in Shillong, and Bombay 
for Pakistan, and at Rajshahi and Hyderabad (Sind), for India.83 Finally, it was also 
decided that the applications for visa for inter-dominion travel would be categorised, 
and would have to be cleared from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which would 
consult the state governments of the places the visa was sought for.84 
The machinery for inter-dominion migration was thus complex and multilayered. 
Although there were a variety of disagreements with regard to inter-dominion travel 
and migration, it was nonetheless necessary to incorporate the infrastructure of the 
state into these. Both governments, moreover consistently worked with each other to 
keep these in place, and to use them as a means of controlling the uncertainties of 
inter-dominion migration.  
Propaganda and the No War Pact Correspondence  
Almost as important an issue as the signing of the minorities agreement, was the 
question of how it would be covered by the press. The two governments embarked 
on fairly substantial exercises for publicising their peace making overtures. The 
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aftermath of the Nehru-Liaqat pact for example, saw a flurry of activity on both sides 
to utilize the improvement in atmospherics to bring about some lasting changes in 
media portrayals of each other. A dispatch in the second half of April 1950 from the 
Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore wrote of an ‘an almost unbelievable 
change’ that came around with ‘open and enthusiastic talk of close and cordial 
relations between India and Pakistan on every side’85. What also comes across 
strongly is the impulse to utilise the limited machinery of the government in 
highlighting the achievements of the Nehru-Liaquat pact: 
 
‘The following further action has been undertaken: One lakh copes in 
Bengali and 50,000 copies each in Urdu and Hindi of a booklet containing 
the Agreement as well as extracts from the speeches of the Prime Minister 
in Parliament and his broadcast to the Nation, and of the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan’s speech in Pakistan Parliament and his broadcast have been 
issued for wide distribution. State governments have also been requested to 
bring out regional language editions of this booklet.’86 
Moreover, a delegation of editors from Pakistan was invited to visit India, in the 
aftermath of the Nehru-Liaquat declaration. After his interaction with the president 
of the Pakistan Newspapers Editors Conference that , Nehru noted delightedly that 
‘It is evident that the Pakistan Editors have been powerfully affected by their visit to 
Delhi. Their old conceptions have changed and they are going back full of the 
determination to preach peace and cooperation. I have no doubt of the sincerity of 
their present feeling’.87  
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Changing the tone of the press coverage on India-Pakistan relations, thus offered a 
powerful incentive for the leadership on both sides. In December 1949, at the height 
of the refugees’ crisis, Nehru had sent a draft declaration of a No War Pact to Liaquat 
Ali Khan. The declaration would state that both governments were committed to 
‘maintain good relations between the two countries, and advance the cause of world 
peace.’88 According to such a declaration, both governments would commit 
themselves to the position that neither would declare war on the other in the first 
instance. The governments of India and Pakistan would therefore resolve all their 
disputes by negotiations, arbitration, and mediation, and renounce the use of war as 
an instrument of state policy. Nehru wrote to Liaquat saying that signing to such a 
declaration would ‘lessen the unfortunate tension that exists between our two 
governments, and produce an atmosphere which is more favourable to the 
consideration and settlement of particular disputes.’89 The two then embarked on a 
lengthy and voluminous correspondence -- more than two hundred letters and 
telegrams were exchanged -- on what the exact terms should be in the text of such a 
declaration, and the exact procedures of arbitration could be used to settle the 
outstanding disputes between the two countries. 
Sir Girija had summoned the Pakistani high commissioner to India, and opened 
negotiations on what the exact wording in such a declaration could be, in December 
1949. The high commissioner, Zahid Hussain, replied that existing disputes relating 
to Kashmir, Junagadh, the Canal Waters, and Evacuee Property ought to be settled 
first, but promised to explore the matter further with his government. What was also 
recognised from the outset was that the real question was not of persuading the 
other of the righteousness of giving up of force as a tactic, so much as the extent to 
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which agreement could be reached on the kinds of means to be employed for 
resolving outstanding disputes.90 Such a declaration, in itself, would not have 
guaranteed that India and Pakistan would never go to war again. Indeed, what is 
relevant to note about the correspondence is that this was almost entirely an issue 
about propaganda.  
Once in motion the correspondence was thoroughly publicised by both 
governments. It attracted a great deal of speculation in the press, and was reprinted 
in newspapers in both countries as the exchange continued. It was important for 
both governments to show that they had made genuine efforts towards lasting 
peace, and that failure towards this object was not due to a lack of flexibility on their 
part. Both Nehru and Liaquat, moreover, stood in their Constituent Assemblies to 
report on the progress of the exchanges, and weathered questions from challenging 
political opponents on its outcome. An editorial in the Dawn newspaper claimed 
that the proposal had ‘lit up considerable hope and expectation in the hearts of all 
men of goodwill in Pakistan and Bharat’.91 At a speech at Gilgit in February 1950, 
Liaquat declared ‘as far as Pakistan was concerned, I have repeatedly made it clear 
that we do not desire any conflict with India, which is bound to end in the ruin of 
both countries.’ In India, it became necessary for ‘our line to be communicated to 
individual press correspondents’, since, ‘unless we release our own proposals, the 
Indian press as well as the world outside would only know of Pakistan’s counter 
proposals.’92 The correspondence carried on for almost a year, across the period of 
the Bengal crisis, as well as during the subsequent signing of an inter-dominion 
agreement to jointly undertake to protect the interests of minorities.  
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The crux of the correspondence concerned the methods of arbitration and mediation 
which both sides could agree on. While Pakistan argued for more detailed processes 
of mediation to be clearly incorporated into the text, India preferred a more general 
declaration which renounced war, but which left the methods of mediation 
unspecified. Nehru was initially unequivocal in his advocacy of signing such a 
declaration -- he wrote to G. S. Bajpai, arguing that the outstanding disputes between 
India and Pakistan should not ‘come in the way of the declaration. If the questions 
could be decided without the declaration, no need for the declaration arises. It is in 
order to ease the situation between the two countries and help in creating an 
atmosphere of peaceful settlement of disputes, that we have made our proposal.’93 
He added ‘This would be a further step which would be difficult for the Pakistan 
government to refuse to take… [and] in any event, will be helpful to us in different 
ways.’94 With these incentives, Nehru urged his cabinet to consider accepting 
arbitration by external bodies on the question of the Evacuee Property, and Canal 
Waters disputes. At a press conference he went on to argue that a declaration of no 
war, would allow the possibilities of direct negotiation, and failing that, reference of 
that problem to a judicial tribunal could be applied in the various Indo Pakistani 
disputes.95    
In Pakistan too, the possibilities in the declaration were quickly pared down to its 
concrete implications. One key implication from such a deal was that Pakistan 
would acquiesce to the current status quo in Kashmir. Liaquat wrote to Nehru 
saying that his government would welcome a No War agreement with India, but 
that it should contain in its wording specific bodies of arbitrators in the disputes, 
whose decisions would be binding, and a time frame within which they could settle 
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the disputes. Liaquat pointed out, both India and Pakistan were members of the 
United Nations, which in itself implied that they had renounced war like means for 
the settlement of disputes. For a declaration to have any weight, argued Liaquat, it 
would need to contain ‘concrete and precise suggestions regarding the procedure to 
be followed in the settlement of disputes.’96 Liaquat declared in the floor of the 
Assembly that ‘even if these disputes could not themselves be settled at least the 
procedure for settling them could be laid down by agreement in precise terms so 
that both parties entered into firm commitments which would in the course of time 
definitely lead to resolution of disputes.’97 What the Pakistani Foreign Ministry 
argued for in the No War negotiations was for a commitment to a standing position 
on these issues; such a declaration would, Liaquat agreed, be welcomed in Pakistan, 
as well as in the United States.   
It was clear, however, from fairly early on in the correspondence that this declaration 
would not materialise. The idea was examined, and then unravelled, quickly, within 
the space of three months. But it was critically thought through by officials in both 
governments. By August 1950, the tone of Nehru’s letters in the correspondence had 
altered, and the possibilities of having mechanisms of arbitration included in the text 
were withdrawn. Nehru wrote to Liaquat, saying that although his government had 
given careful consideration to the matter of having a detailed plan of arbitration in 
the text of the agreement, it was felt that such a plan would not work. He maintained 
that a straightforward declaration stating that neither would resort to war would be 
sufficient. But the Indian government had eventually balked on counting the cost of 
Liaquat’s suggestions for the No War declaration, and, on the whole, felt it was 
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unwise to commit to these provisions. Recognizing the role of other mediators in the 
settlements they suggested for the Canal Waters and Evacuee Property dispute was 
not a position that the Ministry in Delhi felt comfortable with. Losing an exclusively 
bilateral footing with Pakistan would be a disadvantage, and a declaration that 
officially committed them to accepting the awards of international mediators- that 
may well not be in their favour- was therefore not acceptable. There was no need to 
give up as much ground on the various outstanding disputes; a commitment to 
arbitration, it was argued, would only limit options. Moreover formally ceding so 
much ground on the issue of arbitration would not necessarily lead to yield to 
correspondingly positive results, particularly when there were a number of 
potentially serious problems which could later arise in the relationship anyway. The 
Times of India was approving. An editorial in November 1950 noted that the failure of 
the correspondence in producing a declaration should ‘leave no room for wishful 
thinking in New Delhi.’98 Moreover, the editorial continued, ‘At a time when the 
cold war interferes violently with the independence of judgement of most nations, 
India… cannot afford to surrender its vital interests to third party judgement.’99 
Counting the cost of the No War declaration, therefore, took the ministry further 
away from consenting to signing the declaration.   
A joint declaration renouncing the use of war never materialised from this 
correspondence. Yet, the progress of the correspondence in 1950 reveals a variety of 
agendas under complicated circumstances. What is significant about the No War 
correspondence was that it acknowledged, and vocalised the possibility that India 
and Pakistan could have a stable coexistence. Although the ways in which the two 
could gain a stronger position visavis the other were consistently explored, the India 
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Pakistan dynamic was also based on the necessity of needing to be clearly separated 
from one another. Such a situation allowed for a fairly elaborate smoke and mirrors 
game being played in both countries, although an examination of the concrete 
decisions made with regard to one another do reveal very pragmatic calculated, and 
inherently stable approaches on the positions to be adopted. While it never 
materialised, the possibility of having such a declaration made, did, nonetheless, 
need to be articulated. What the exchanges also reflected was the basis of mutual 
recognition of both sides being sovereign, and separated, entities. Such a separation 
needed to be cemented, and the correspondence revealed a consideration of one way 
in which this could be asserted. 
Interestingly enough, the correspondence also coincides with a period when Nehru 
had threatened to resign, over the issue of troubles in Bengal. To Krishna Menon, he 
wrote ‘There is far too much friction and pulling in different directions and 
intrigues.’100 He had had a detailed discussion with Sardar Patel on the issue, and 
had argued that their approaches to Pakistan, and the issues of minorities were too 
wide to scale: ‘There is a constant cry for retaliation and of vicarious punishment of 
the Muslims of India, because the Pakistanis punish Hindus. That argument does not 
appeal to me in the slightest. I am sure that this policy of retaliation and vicarious 
punishment will ruin India as well as Pakistan.’101 The initiation of the 
correspondence by Nehru thus also simply reveal his attempts at regaining control 
over the making of policy with Pakistan—something that was frequently challenged 
by a variety of actors within and outside the government.  
Agreements between governments renouncing the use of war had been repeatedly 
undertaken during the inter war period in Europe, as a means of trying to preserve 
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the existing balance of power. For example, the Briand Kellogg Pact had been signed 
in Paris, in August 1928 between fifteen states, including the United States, 
Germany, and France. All the signatories of this Pact agreed to outlaw war as an 
instrument of national policy; and to settle their dispute by peaceful means. This had 
mainly been envisioned as a pre-emptive measure by the United States, to address 
growing concerns in France about the need to contain Germany’s strength and to 
retain the balance of power in inter war Europe. In applying such a concept in his 
dealings with Pakistan, Nehru was defining the Indo Pakistani relationship as one 
that was admittedly, tense, but one which could also be negotiated in the 
frameworks of international relations which were in place. It was necessary to give 
India and Pakistan identifiable faces in terms of an international dispute, and one 
which could also be addressed within these parameters.  
By May 1950, when the pressure of the East Bengal refugee movement had 
somewhat abated, Liaquat met with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, Gordon Walker to argue that in the event of such a military build-up 
again, the Commonwealth pledge to give concrete assurances of support against the 
aggressor. Indeed, in his despatches, the British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sir 
Lawrence Grafftey Smith, had advocated that the United Kingdom support a 
guarantee to maintain the territorial integrity of India and Pakistan; and moreover, 
and that the Commonwealth pledge their support for defence against the aggressor 
in the event of an Indo- Pakistani war. These recommendations, were however, 
rejected for the moment in London. Gordon Walker, replied to Liaquat, that it would 
be difficult to make such a pledge; and it was difficult to decide who the aggressor 
was.  
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Yet, what is also striking about the reports from the Commonwealth Ambassadors 
over the buildup of troops in the Indian side, is the temperateness of their 
suggestions for response. Sir Archibald Nye, the British High Commissioner in India 
advised his government not to make formal contact with Nehru for the moment over 
the East Pakistan question. In a memo to the British Cabinet, he argued that the 
government wait longer for events to unfold, rather than many any direct 
interventions for the moment. The two Prime Ministers themselves were already in 
close touch, and Liaquat Ali Khan was due to arrive in Delhi in a few weeks. 
Moreover, attempts at direct intervention by the British in the past yielded limited 
results. When the High Commissioners of Canada, Australia and the American 
Ambassadors to New Delhi met with Archibald Nye, to discuss the buildup of 
tension over minorities in East Pakistan, their consensus was to send a tempered 
account of the political developments in South Asia, to their respective governments. 
‘Our joint impression was that there is unlikely to be any substantial amplification of 
Indian troop dispositions before Liaquat arrives to Delhi’.102  
Similarly, Loy Henderson, American Ambassador at Delhi at the time, while 
responding to the question of Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani representative at the 
United Nations, also advised his government to take no formal action over the troop 
movement. Although he would convey to Bajpai, the concerns expressed by Pakistan 
to the American government, and urge them towards signing the joint declaration, 
his telegram also noted ‘If either the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers were to 
actually refuse to a meeting, this would then bring much to the fore whether the 
situation should be brought before the Security Council.’103 This was also endorsed 
by the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Relations Office, in a telegram to the 
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Australian Foreign Ministry, pointed out that ‘while the tension between the two 
countries may be extremely grave, we do not think we should be precipitate in 
deciding to refer yet a further dispute to the Security Council.’104  
Thus the logistics for various possible solutions in relieving the India Pakistan 
tensions had been worked out from a very early date; and the possibility of viable 
means of settlement were always available as plausible options. What is significant 
about the India Pakistani negotiations was not the lack of a solution, or the 
unawareness about its benefits, as much as the ways in which both governments 
chose to follow policies which differed. Yet, what was also implicitly recognised, was 
the descent into outright war between the two countries was not, in fact, a headlong 
and impulsive calculation. What was apparent to those concerned with matters 
relating to the India Pakistan dispute was that the question of either side resorting to 
war on an impulse, and without careful calculation of the consequences, was not a 
likely possibility.  
By October 1950, although the no war correspondence still continued, its urgency 
had been lost. In a letter to Nehru, Liaquat noted that the course of the No War 
correspondence had shown that ‘the crux of the difficulty is the reluctance of your 
government to substitute on any issue, impartial arbitration for threatened and 
actual use of force.’105 Nehru denied this, and argued that the mechanisms for 
resolving outstanding conflicts had in fact been put in place. The correspondence 
ended with the two briskly trading allegations over the various failures in reaching a 
settlement on the Canal Waters dispute, Evacuee Property and Kashmir. However, 
in a speech to parliament in November 1950, by which time hopes for such a 
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declaration materialising had been shelved, Nehru maintained that every attempt 
had been made by his ministry to persuade Pakistan of the benefits of the pact. 
‘India’s will to peace’, he continued ‘is no less than that of Pakistan’s, and I can give 
a common assurance that we shall continue to work for peace with our neighbour.’106 
Although the correspondence failed to materialise in a declaration in 1950, this was 
not the only time that such a possibility had been examined. The possibility of a such 
joint declaration tempted the leadership of both countries at various junctures in the 
India- Pakistan relationship Nehru would renew his offer again in 1956, and 1962. In 
1959, Pakistan made a ‘joint defence proposal’ to India, and, some twenty years later, 
a ‘No War’ offer was made by President Zia.107 The proposals moreover were not 
rejected in instinctive and hasty reaction to the idea of compromising with Pakistan. 
They offered a powerful incentive, as a way to try and change the moment, as well 
as the advantages of the international approval this could bring. This was taken note 
of, in an editorial in the Dawn in September 1950, which pointed out ‘the Pakistan 
Prime Ministers’ oft repeated views that a war between India and Pakistan would be 
disastrous to both is echoed by everyone; and an intransigent attitude by the 
government of India may not impress impartial observers about Bharat’s earnestness 
in first seeking an agreement with Pakistan.’108  
What these exercises also reveal are the attempts at asserting the disentanglement 
between two new state structures. Although the possibility of resorting to war over 
the refugees’ issue was a live one, it was nonetheless important to assert that these 
were the manoeuvrings of two separated and sovereign state structures. Both 
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governments attempted to harness their machineries towards strengthening the fact 
of the partition. Although this frequently manifested itself in a vocal campaign 
against the various malpractices of the other country, it nonetheless also called for a 
cooperation which recognised the need for crystallising this separation. This basis for 
agreement, thus, gave India-Pakistan relations a greater degree of stability than is 
frequently recognised.  
Developments in East Pakistan 
Developments in East Bengal were closely watched by the external affairs ministry 
in Delhi. Its large Hindu population, as well as its significance to trade and economic 
activities in eastern India necessitated this. Moreover, officials in the Indian mission 
in Dhaka were frequently in close touch with leaders of the minority community, 
over their reaction to political developments in the country.  The question of having 
easier access to India, moreover, was an important political issue during the 
elections of 1954, and strongly advocated by leaders in the United Front Coalition.  
In the aftermath of the Nehru-Liaquat agreement, J. N. Mandal, a Hindu Scheduled 
Caste leader from East Bengal, severely criticised his government over its policies 
towards Hindus. Mandal, an active member of the Muslim League since the early 
1940’s, had been a member of Jinnah’s cabinet in the dominion government, and was 
currently minister for law in Liaquat Ali Khan’s government.109 In October 1950, 
however, he sent a strongly worded resignation letter, which was published 
subsequently in both the Dawn, and Anand Bazaar Patrika. His letter castigated the 
Government of Pakistan for being unsympathetic to the position of the minorities. 
Mandal asserted that the recently concluded Minorities Pact was ‘treated as a mere 
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scrap of paper alike by the East Bengal Government and the Muslim League’, and 
that in fact the future of Hindus in East Bengal as a result of the Delhi Agreement… 
is not only unsatisfactory but absolutely hopeless.’110  
Liaquat responded to these allegations in a speech to the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan. He argued that the pact had brought about significant changes, and in 
particular, succeeded in reducing the figures of migration across the border. He 
pointed out that the pact had been signed as a means of preventing a situation of 
war, since the alternatives to this step, which Mr. Mandal now seemed to be 
advocating, were an exchange of the minority populations of both countries. This 
scenario, warned Liaquat, could only culminate in outright war between the two 
countries, and ‘would bring anarchy and chaos to this whole subcontinent’. He 
added that the ‘Delhi Agreement… is the only path of sanity and peace’, and that, 
furthermore, ‘whatever resentment might be felt at the conduct of an individual, it 
should never be allowed to affect our national policy and our duty towards the 
minorities.’111 Such episodes were carefully noted in despatches back to the ministry, 
and show that the politics of this region were carefully watched in Delhi. Yet, what 
this exchange also shows is that in order to assert a separate and sovereign existence, 
it was necessary to acknowledge that the concerns of minorities had to be 
incorporated into the machinery of the bilateral dialogue.  
In February 1952, the controversy over Bengali as a state language in Pakistan came 
to a head. The Bengal Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution 
recommending to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, that Bengali be adopted as 
one of the State languages of Pakistan. Yet, this was vehemently opposed by 
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politicians in Karachi, who attempted to argue that this was a ‘foreign’ language.  
Indeed, agitators in favour of Bengali being made into a national language were 
frequently accused to have received help and encouragement from across the border. 
On the 21 February, the government opened fire on students from the University of 
Dhaka, and thus, Acharya noted, immediately ‘sealing the significance of the 
movement into a martyrs’ cause’.112 By 24 February, the East Bengal Legislative 
Assembly proceedings were prorougued, and several Hindu MLAs were arrested, 
along with leaders of the Muslim opposition group, and staff from the University of 
Dhaka. Manoranjan Dhar, a member of the legislative assembly, and other minority 
member of the East Bengal Minority Commission was also arrested on the 25 
February.  
Acharya argued that the approach of the government of Pakistan towards the 
language movement was that senior, and Urdu speaking bureaucrats had been 
advising the Pakistan government against making concessions for the agitators. 
Moreover, he stated that many newspapers, such as the Morning News routinely 
flouted the terms of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact: ‘It is astonishing how Government 
allows such material hostile to a country at peace with them and entirely contrary to 
the spirit of the Prime Ministers’ Agreement to be published’. He also claimed that 
the Morning News received tacit support from the government, although it claimed to 
have disassociated itself from such propaganda. Acharya was thus arguing that the 
language movement created conditions which were hostile towards the minorities, 
who were uncertain about their position in the country.  
Acharya argued that since the East Bengal Minority Commission could no longer 
function, the arrest of Manoranjan Dhar constituted a breach of the Prime Ministers 
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Agreement of 1950, and therefore the Prime Minister of India should take up the 
issue with his counterpart in Karachi.113  In a report delivered to the Ministry late at 
night on the 28th of February, he said that ‘since the charges against the Hindu MLAs 
are baseless, and since their arrests will undoubtedly defeat the purpose of the Prime 
Minister’s Agreement, there is a good case for lodging a against these arrests at the 
highest level’.114 Acharya argued that ‘the intention was obviously to find some 
support for these repressive measures by exploiting anti Hindu feelings. But this 
manoeuvre has not succeeded. Many Muslims are taking a leading part in the 
opposition to Government’s policy.’115 The deputy high commissioner also reported 
ministry in Delhi, that the arrest of Hindus over the language issue had been 
encouraged by the Provincial Government, to lend colour to their suggestion that the 
movement was also being stoked by outside agents.  
Following a meeting in Calcutta in March 1952, between Nehru, C. C. Biswas, the 
Indian minister for minority affairs, and with R. K. Nehru present, it was decided 
that Biswas should voice his concern over this matter to his counterpart, 
Azizizuddin Ahmed. Biswas thus wrote Ahmed, protesting against the arrest of 
Hindu leaders, and urged him to ‘look into the facts of each case and satisfy himself 
personally that the arrest of the Hindu leaders was justified’.116 Biswas however 
acknowledged to Nehru that this would probably not lead to any satisfactory 
response. For the time being, Nehru decided to not take any further action. R. K. 
Nehru argued that nothing further be done at present: 
‘We should not, at this stage, make a formal protest to the Pakistan 
government. There is obviously a great deal of local opposition to the 
steps taken by the East Pakistan government. There are many Muslims in 
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opposition. We might play into the hands of the East Bengal Government 
by making a more formal intervention in a matter which is essentially one 
of domestic jurisdiction, although the object is to divert attention from the 
repressive policy by exploiting communal feelings. I think we should 
continue to watch events a little longer’.117  
In 1954, the United Front coalition came to power in East Pakistan, buoyed partially 
by support in favour of the language movement. ‘There could be no doubt,’, 
Acharya declared, ‘that such a victory will affect not only ‘local’ politics in East 
Bengal, but also the Constitution and the policies of the Central Pakistan 
Government’118. It was a decisive victory against the Muslim League, which had 
been in government since its victory of the province in 1946. Moreover, the verdict 
seemed to favour greater regional autonomy, and had rejected the support which the 
League enjoyed in Karachi. The scale of the United Front victory, moreover, certainly 
came as a surprise in Karachi. Mohan Singh Mehta, then the Indian High 
Commissioner, reported from Karachi that the expectation was that the League 
would win in East Bengal. He pointed out that enormous sums of money had been 
devoted to a frenetic campaign in that province, and that the party had, albeit 
belatedly, conceded the principle of Bengali being adopted as a state language.119    
The question thus arose, as to how Delhi should react. The coming of the United 
Front to power was seen as an opportunity. On the face of it, it seemed that a verdict 
against the Muslim League in East Bengal would be a verdict in favour of looser 
control over the border with India, more trade, and more economic cooperation. In 
particular, Suhrawardy as well as Fazlul Haq had been emphasising that if the 
United Front came to power, they would abolish the Passport system, and would 
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remove restrictions on trade with India’120. The economy of East Bengal, it was 
thought, was particularly dependent on trade relations with India. Yet, New Delhi 
was hesitant about appearing too eager to partner with the United Front. Mohan 
Singh Mehta, then High Commissioner at Karachi, cautioned that ‘nobody in 
authority in India should make any comments on these Elections until things have 
taken shape in Karachi and Dhaka… it would give a wrong and unnatural direction 
to public opinion in Pakistan.’121 It was also noted that ‘The present leaders of the 
United Front… are very anxious to come to some sort of arrangement with the 
centre, because the implementation of most of these requires some action on part of 
the centre…’122 In a letter to Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, Nehru noted that the 
situation in Pakistan seemed to be ‘fluid’, but that he was unsure whether these 
results would bring any substantial changes in Karachi.123 That language and the 
desire of East Bengalis to have a separate government would be critical issues facing 
the Pakistan government was certain; yet it was still unpredictable as to how the 
results would play out.  
Nonetheless, while it was hoped that the election results of 1954 would change the 
balance of power in Pakistan to India’s advantage, the prospect of a paradigmatic 
shift in favour of better relations with India was never anticipated. Certainly, what 
was recognised by all parties at the time, was that a mere provincial election result -- 
no matter how decisive -- could not materially alter the nature of bilateral relations. 
It is however interesting that even when given a mandate as decisive as this no party 
was willing to follow through to set up arrangements which materially altered the 
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balance of power of India or Pakistan. All concerned wanted, and continued, to work 
within the paradigm of existing relations, rather than change it, even when given a 
mandate from which it could be conceivably argued that relations between India and 
Pakistan could be improved, or at least changed in some aspects.  
On both the Language question in East Bengal, as well as the elections, most of those 
concerned with policy with Pakistan, from Nehru downwards, had detailed 
knowledge and opinions, yet, on the surface, at least, were unwilling to upset too 
drastically the balance already in place with West Pakistan. Thus, decisions 
regarding how this exchange should be facilitated or hampered tended to be made 
in Delhi and Karachi, and often contrary to the recommendations of their missions. 
Secondly these decisions were crafted while giving more weight to the positions in 
Karachi and Delhi, rather than the developments in East Bengal.  
At the same time, both governments had realised that their entanglement with the 
concerns of minorities across the border was inevitable. It was therefore necessary to 
set in place structures of the state through which these engagements could be carried 
out. This would provide for a clear separation between the states of India and 
Pakistan, even while they continued to be, paradoxically, intimately involved with 
the concerns of minorities across the border. Such an exercise moreover required a 
substantial amount of bilateral cooperation, for if the two new states were to have 
sovereign, and separated existences, then it was necessary to put in place the 
apparatus of two states into the concerns of those who sought the protection of both.   
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TRADE AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
Indo- Pakistani trade was one of the earliest -- as well as most lasting -- issues that 
emerged in the making of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. A 
very substantial, and vital, flow of commodities, which included jute, cotton, coal 
and cement, was carried out within the subcontinent, regardless of the partition. Yet, 
relatively after 1947, the governments of India and Pakistan made it their object to 
create, at least the semblance of separate and independent economies. Both 
governments strove to differentiate their economies from each other- and regulate 
and quantify relations between them- from a very early date in their independent 
existence. This task was carried out with a view to fashion the two newly 
demarcated territories into sovereign and self sufficient entities. An exercise in 
disentangling a hitherto single economic structure which had operated over 
territories which now formed India and Pakistan was complicated, and impacted 
many areas of governance, as well as economic activity. Both countries imposed 
regulations on foreign trade, domestic production, and began to explore avenues of 
state involvement in economic activity.  
In this context, crafting policies on trade between India and Pakistan could not be an 
exercise independent of other economic and political trends in both countries. 
Policies on the Indo Pakistani relationship were however influenced by a variety of 
economic, as well as domestic and international political concerns which 
preoccupied the leadership in both countries However, such exercises were also as 
much a testament to what the role of government was conceived as in this period, as 
it was about an act of demarcation from one another. These policies were not driven 
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only by the need to define the economic positions of India and Pakistan as opposed 
to each other, but also part of an exercise that had to be carried out regardless. 
Policies on Indo Pakistani trade were thus heavily influenced by these wider over- 
arching aims that both governments adopted after 1947, to demarcate their 
economies as clearly as possible. The pattern of Indo- Pakistani trade in the first 
decade of independence was also a reflection on many other political and economic 
concerns that prevailed at the time, as it was on the state of relations between the 
two countries. The early economic policies followed by the government of India and 
Pakistan also had to be contextualised as a means of trying to control the dangerous 
economic situation in both countries, impacted by the second world war, new 
negotiations of how the sterling balances were to be settled, attempts at utilising 
opportunities from international economic conditions, as well as shaping a coherent 
economic structure at home. This chapter will explore how the crafting of policies on 
bilateral trade – an activity that was impossible to completely stop anyway – were a 
reflection on the development of the economies of India and Pakistan, as well as 
being impacted by the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan. I argue that 
neither government was particularly happy about its dependence on the other, and 
worked consistently to try to overcome these. Inter-dominion trade was closely 
monitored on both sides, and both governments closely regulated this activity. At 
the same time, however, in the decade following the partition, a fairly substantial 
degree of exchange of commodities was inevitable, and the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries was an important tool for negotiating the terms in which 
it could be carried out, as well as monitoring its extent.  
Shaping Two Self Sufficient Economies 
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Both governments placed a high premium on strengthening their economic 
standing, as well as making them into self sufficient entities. Such ambitions could 
be seen in a range of activities of the new government in both countries. In India, the 
setting up of institutions such as the planning commission and the economic 
committee of the cabinet, would provide the basis for the subsequent 
characterisation of the era as that of the heyday of socialistic state intervention in the 
management of the economy, and the height of the ‘Nehruvian State’.1 The economic 
committee of the cabinet included many seasoned faces in leadership positions both 
within and outside the Congress. Key members of the committee numbered J. M. 
Matthai, Jagjivan Ram, K. C. Neogy, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, and S. P. Mookherjee. 
It was of paramount concern to them to build a strong Indian economy, and one in 
which, moreover, the state held an important stake in heavy industries. Their 
deliberations covered a variety of issues, such as the advantages of deregulation of 
some aspects of trade in the economy, as well as ways of positioning the economy in 
the broader backdrop of the conditions of the American, Far Eastern and European 
economies in the aftermath of the War, and subsequently, the Korean crisis. Their 
recommendations were not, however, unanimous, and did not constitute an easy or 
even universally agreed upon course. Indeed, there was a substantial amount of 
dissension and critique of the various economic policies of the day from both within 
and outside the government; and the nature, and decision- making about the extent 
of state intervention in economic activity was in fact contingent, and consistently 
questioned, from various positions in the government.2 At the same time, the 
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differences in the principles of Nehru’s economic policies, varied fairly substantially 
with the ways in which they were translated on the ground.3  
Similarly, the government of Pakistan adopted a proactive role in the development 
of its economy from an early stage. Import Substitution was a key concern in 
Pakistan- the Industrial Policy Document published in 1947 by the Government of 
Pakistan, highlighted the need for industrialisation policy geared at reducing 
dependence on imports. By 1949, control of industrial development was made into a 
central subject.4 A ‘Council of Industries’ was constituted, which consisted of 
representatives of strategic industries, trading interests, and members from state 
governments. This Council would advise the government on its Industrial policy, 
such as target setting for various industries, and regulations to be imposed by the 
centre. By 1950, the government of Pakistan had set up boards for the regulation of 
production and export of its key commodities, such as cotton, wool and jute5. 
Similarly, the Industries Development Corporation Act was passed in 1950, 
according to which a Corporation would be set up for the promotion of those 
industries considered vital to well being of the national interest. These industries 
included jute, paper, heavy engineering, heavy chemicals and fertilizers.6 The 
provincial governments also directed their efforts at rehabilitating refugees by 
providing support for industrial and commercial ventures.7 Organisations such as 
the Pakistan- Punjab Refugees Council were key beneficiaries of government efforts 
to revive the economic wellbeing of that province.  
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Policies to wean off dependence on provisions from across the border were self 
consciously adopted by both sides. While agreements on coal, jute iron and steel 
could not be avoided, both countries nonetheless also conducted in parallel the 
search for these supplies from other sources. For instance, after a bilateral trading 
agreement was signed in 1949, the economic committee of the cabinet issued a 
directive to the Ministry of Agriculture to ‘devise plans for the expansion of 
production of cotton of the varieties imported from Pakistan, so as to make India 
independent of Pakistani cotton within a period of two years’.8 These considerations, 
then, also tempered the negotiations on trade between the two countries. By 1952, 
one of the most important commodities in Indo- Pakistani trade, jute, had become 
less relevant in the negotiations: ‘… Indian mills are not attracted towards Pakistani 
jute as there is still a large disparity between the prices of Indian jute and Pakistan 
jute. It is therefore clear that it will not be necessary in connection with the new 
agreement to barter away some concessions for the sake of securing sufficient jute 
supplies from Pakistan.’9 Both countries, therefore deliberately embarked on paths 
that disrupted the hitherto unitary economy in the subcontinent.  
At the same time, both the Indian and Pakistani economies were in fact heavily 
dependent on one another after the partition, and questions relating to how this 
trade could be regulated while at the same time promoting measures for greater self 
sufficiency within both economies needed to be carefully chalked out. These 
dilemmas had been explored in a variety of contexts in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. The questions of how trading policies could co-opt, subvert, or 
strengthen the sovereignty of multiple nation states had been entered into great 
detail in Europe, after the Allies victory over Germany. The questions of how free 
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trade areas could be crafted had gained greater prominence, as a means to contain 
the economic and military might of Germany. This induced a greater liberalisation of 
trade regulations within Europe.10 The creation of the Free Trade Area in Europe, 
and the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 indicated possibilities of the shifting, 
and even subjugation of the sovereignty of a single nation to that of a larger 
economic zone.  
Both India and Pakistan were also now signatories of the General Agreement of 
Trade and Tariffs. Both India and Pakistan had trade delegations at the second 
round of talks of the GATT in 1949, which took place in the scenic settings of 
Annecy, in the south of France. The object of these agreements was to reduce barriers 
for international trade, as a means of preventing further warfare between nations.11 
At the same time, such agreements were frequently side-stepped by many countries 
in the crafting of their international trading policies.12 David Yoffie has argued, for 
instance, that such agreements -- such as the provision of the Most Favoured Nation, 
according to which all countries were to be treated equally in international trade 
relations -- were based on ideal conditions of liberal economics, which could not in 
fact be realistically applied to the political and strategic concerns that accompanied 
most patterns of international trade.13 At these meetings, the Indian and Pakistani 
delegations raised the matter of the collection of excise duties. Pakistan argued that 
the terms of the MFN clause were being violated, because excise duty was still 
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charged by India on the inflow of goods from Pakistan.14 India’s object of entering 
into a commodities agreement with Pakistan, as discussed at an inter- ministerial 
meeting, in May 1949, was to ask for an arrangement whereby the import and export 
controls for commodities flowing between India and Pakistan could be removed; 
given that both countries could specify the quantitative limits for allowing the flow 
of goods.15 Yet, the fact that trade between India and Pakistan was addressed 
according to these terms is significant. Decisions on the controls over Indo- Pakistani 
trade, and whether certain rebates or tariffs need be abolished or not, were a way of 
changing the terms of trade from what they had been prior to the partition,  and 
ensuring that they were brought into the realm of international trade, and therefore 
regulated by the two governments.  
Principles governing Indo-Pakistani trade were also based on the prevalent 
economic wisdom of the time. For example, Albert Hirschman, an influential 
developmental economist in the fifties, argued that all international trade was 
carried out according to the logic of states in the pursuit of their own strategic self 
interest. One argument made at the time about the objectives of foreign trade was 
that this should be based on considerations of the ‘supply effect’ and ‘influence 
effect’ of foreign trade.16 Foreign trade could either be a tool by which to consolidate 
military might, by importing the goods which were likely to strengthen the country. 
Such trade would be more profitably carried out with countries that were in a 
weaker position, or with whom there already existed friendly ties. A second effect of 
foreign trade, argues Hirschman, was the influence effect; through which the foreign 
trade of a country might become a direct source of power.  
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At the same time, both countries were aggressively searching out other markets for 
the sale of their produce. In 1950, for example, the government of Pakistan had some 
650,000 tonnes of surplus wheat for export, and it was necessary for her to find 
international buyers for her products. At a meeting between Aziz Ahmed, the chief 
secretary of east Bengal and the British treasury secretary in London, on 30 January 
1950, Mr Ahmad enquired about the British capacity to purchase Pakistani wheat. 
He was informed that the percentage already purchased in Britain could not be 
exceeded, and, moreover, that the prices charged by Pakistan exceeded the amount 
laid down by the International Wheat Agreement. Aziz Ahmed replied that the 
government of Pakistan was also attempting to sell wheat to the government of West 
Germany, but admitted to difficulty regarding the price.17  
The two countries were also eager to increase their share of dollar reserves. This was 
a complicated task, since both the Indian and Pakistani currency were backed by the 
sterling, would entail a net loss of sterling reserves. The Sterling balances consisted 
of the share of expenditure of the government of India on mobilisation of armed 
forces during the Second World War. In principle, the sterling balances were to be 
drawn on by India and Pakistan for their developmental needs. It was hoped that the 
sterling debt could be used for development projects in the Commonwealth, but the 
‘balances’ were notional, and were to be supported by the existence of a certain 
amount of reserve in the British economy which could support this withdrawing. 
These issues also impacted on their patterns of trade with the rest of the world. The 
United Kingdom High Commissioner, for example, noted in a telegram to the 
Commonwealth Relations Office:  
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‘We are much exercised about the problem of Pakistan seeking from 
overseas supplies which she ought to get from India… The Pakistan 
delegation said that if their normal requirements of coal could be 
guaranteed them from India or elsewhere they would try to get out of the 
obligation to take the further 120,000 tons from the USA… We propose 
therefore, at this stage to try to maintain the attitude that we will not 
provide exchange for any purchases of coal and sugar by Pakistan from 
overseas beyond the 80,000 tons of coal and 20,000 tons of sugar already 
committed and that they would have to come to some sensible agreement 
with India on these and other similar matters in the forthcoming trade 
talks between them.’18  
Under the sterling balances arrangement, India owed a substantial sum to Pakistan 
in sterling, which, Indian negotiators hoped, could be reduced by exporting the 
equivalent value of goods to Pakistan. Thus, in the initial years after partition, 
principles guiding the negotiations for the commodities agreement held in Karachi 
would have to revolve around these goals.19 In 1948, the fact remained however, that 
certain essential goods had to be secured from the other side of the border; policy 
would have to be geared towards these goods being secured, and for the time being 
India was in the weaker bargaining position. The crucial commodities, that impelled 
India and Pakistan to sit on a negotiating table were, jute, coal, cotton, tobacco, iron 
and  steel, and mustard oil. It was also in Indian interests to liberalise her exports to 
Pakistan on as large a scale as possible, to try to improve her balance of payments 
position.20   
The bilateral trade policies of 1949- 1952 were thus impacted by this environment 
and crafted accordingly. Trade negotiations were structured according to the 
                                                
18 Telegram from U.K. high commissioner in India, 11 February 1948, File No. E(B) Coll. 50/4, 
‘Sterling Balance Negotiations: Question of Sterling/ Dollar Sources of Raw Material’, IOR, BL 
19 Ibid  
20 Extract from letter of Indian Government Trade Commissioner in Pakistan, dated 27th May, 1949; 
File number File No. 15(27) ECC/49; Cabinet Secretariat File, NAI    
Trade and Financial Relations between India and Pakistan 
 121 
patterns of demand in each country: in India, the principle adopted was of a quid-
pro-quo with regards to trading with Pakistan.  For instance, if Pakistan agreed to 
import on a larger scale Indian cotton textiles, then India would consider releasing a 
larger supply of coal, or cement. Yet, the report of the Indian government trade 
commissioner noted that ‘All elaborate plans for the expansion of the Indian textile 
industry will receive a serious setback if we were to lose a substantial portion of the 
cotton market in Pakistan.’21 Similarly, he recommended to Delhi in May 1949 that 
the regulations for trading with Pakistan should be reduced. He argued that ‘It is 
true that the Pakistan government have used recently a portion of their foreign 
exchange for the importation of certain capital goods and a variety of consumer 
goods. The view usually put forth by the Pakistan government is that they have had 
to embark on substantial imports from other foreign countries because they could 
not get the required goods from India in time’.22 Moreover, he pointed out, that this 
situation would not be improved unless there was a reduction in the import and 
export duties for goods from Pakistan, accompanied with a simplification of import 
and export regulations.   
Yet, there was disagreement with these kinds of policies being adopted. This could 
be seen, for example, in a letter from Sardar Patel to Nehru, counselling him that 
‘discussions on trade, tariff policy, customs and economic control be carried out in a 
more ‘coordinated’ manner, particularly when they concerned Pakistan.’23 He 
argued that the ‘barter agreements’ which had been concluded with Pakistan, 
providing for an exchange of cotton cloth for cotton, and wheat for rice, would, in 
the long run, endanger India’s positions of advantage with regard to Pakistan. 
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Agreements concluded in isolation of the complete picture, would, he argued 
present [a] ‘…substantial danger of our sacrificing the bargaining advantage which 
we undoubtedly hold in certain matters and of Pakistan securing advantage over us 
in certain others in which we are in a comparatively weak position.’ Therefore, he 
suggested, a committee should be set up in Cabinet ‘to coordinate all our dealings 
with Pakistan on fiscal, financial, economic and other matters’. He also suggested 
that future negotiations with Pakistan be presided over by the ministry of external 
affairs. This Committee would include secretaries of all ministries concerned in 
negotiations with Pakistan, such as the Food, Relief and Rehabilitation, and Industry 
and Supply. Patel also recommended that H. M. Patel, and H. V. R. Iengar, senior 
civil servants, who had had experience in dealing with matters arising out of 
partition, be placed on the Committee. In accordance with this suggestion, such a 
committee was then set up, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, 
the Commerce Minister the Minister for industry and supply, the minister for relief 
and rehabilitation and the minister for food. Thus, although trade relations between 
India and Pakistan did continue, they were also certainly impacted by other disputes 
within the relationship.  
At the same time, inter-dominion trade relations had to be governed with the 
objective of making both states in fact self sufficient from the goods of the other. 
Regulation of inter-dominion trade was strictly monitored by both governments, and 
anxiously controlled. Indeed, the crafting of policies on bilateral trade were also a 
reflection of the separation of the economic trajectories of India and Pakistan, both of 
whom were eager not to rely on the other for the development of their economies. It 
was necessary, however, for India and Pakistan to firmly uphold the principles of 
their separation and sovereignty, particularly in setting out the terms of inter-
dominion trade.   
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Trade relations between India and Pakistan quickly became another arena in which 
to delineate the internal and the external; and, by extension, the place for claiming 
the right to decide internal reaction, to ‘external’ decisions. Nonetheless, trade policy 
could not be cut off from the political compulsions, and commercial concerns in both 
countries. The Secretary for Food in the government of India also argued, in May 
1950, that ‘we shall need all we can get from Pakistan during the period the new 
agreement with Pakistan is likely to cover…to my mind, therefore import of grain 
from Pakistan is essential’.24 In November 1950, the Economic Committee of the 
Cabinet in India held a meeting to ascertain just how much steel could be exported 
to Pakistan, and whether this quantity could be increased. The meeting was also 
attended by representatives from the Tata steel company. It was decided that while 
Pakistan’s demand of … tonnes could not be entirely met, a certain proportion of 
that demand could be sent across.25 Policies on trade between India and Pakistan, 
were thus hesitantly made, both countries being anxious to develop their trading 
patterns in different directions. Since bilateral trade could not be stopped, it was 
necessary to change its terms to reflect the fact of the partition, and that India and 
Pakistan were now two entities.  
Sterling Balance Negotiations and the Devaluation Crisis 
The financial assets of both countries included the sterling balances, and one set of 
negotiations between India and Pakistan examined the ways in which the sterling 
balances could be utilised for financial transactions between the two. The Sterling 
Balances of India and Pakistan, were thus also largely a notional debt, which could 
be used to guarantee the expenditures of both government with regard to their 
foreign trade. The developments in the sterling area were significant to the 
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economies of India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan were both members of the 
Sterling Area -- countries that traded with each other based on the standard of the 
pound. Both the Indian and Pakistani currency, moreover was backed by the 
sterling.26 The Sterling Balances therefore were an important consideration in the 
framing of economic policy and external trade relations, at least in the early stages of 
their economic planning. The Sterling area offered an opportunity to define the 
shape of the role of the Commonwealth, as well as an avenue of positioning the 
economies of India and Pakistan within it.    
In 1948, India had proposed that a currency exchange control be worked out 
between the two governments. Pakistan had argued that the trade with India be 
valued, and paid for, in terms of sterling; and the extent to which this could be 
agreed to by India was the subject of many of her discussions on the ‘Payments 
Agreement’ with Pakistan. Pakistan was, moreover, owed some £6 million sterling 
under the allocations of the Sterling debt.27 In India, however, it was argued:   
‘It is not possible to consider the Commodities agreement in isolation, as 
our payments liabilities would be an important determining factor for our 
general as well as particular import and export control policies in regard to 
Indo- Pakistani trade. If our views on the payments question are not 
accepted by Pakistan, our objective should be to import from Pakistan only 
the minimum quantities of essential commodities and export to that 
country Indian goods as liberally as possible, in order to reduce our deficit 
in the balance of payments position.’28  
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Payment of the sterling balances from the United Kingdom to the governments of 
India and Pakistan took place in various forms: as securities for the issue of Indian 
currency, in the supply of ‘essential goods’ from Britain on the Open General License 
under various Trade Agreements with India and Pakistan, and as funds released for 
developmental expenditure in the two countries under various arrangements with 
the Commonwealth. A large share of the concerns relating to the framing of Trade 
Agreements between UK and India and Pakistan related to outstanding sterling 
balances. In 1948, the impasse on arrangements for payments for trade between 
India and Pakistan were, similarly, of concern to Britain, since, ‘In these 
circumstances our only card of entry seemed to be to put the matter to the Indian 
delegation on the grounds that the dollars, involved in Pakistan’s being compelled to 
buy coal from the USA, if her economy were not to come to a standstill, were an 
alarming and unnecessary drain on the control Reserves’.29  
One way of giving shape to the sterling balances of the colonies was to harness them 
for development plans in the commonwealth. In 1950, the Columbo Plan was 
finalised, according to which India, Pakistan and Ceylon would utilise a planned, 
annual drawings on the balances for the development expenditure in these 
countries. The Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Conference in London in 
November 1950 also floated the idea of the balances being used as a base for 
development of the Commonwealth area. Yet this was largely unsuccessful, since 
most countries opted to utilise the sterling balances for their own development, 
rather than as a collective resource.30 It was difficult to get agreement from all the 
members of the Commonwealth as how to how the balances could be used 
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collectively. Yet, what was also increasingly discussed was how the claims on 
sterling could be settled with contributions from dollar based reserves.    
Negotiations between India and Pakistan and the United Kingdom began 
immediately after independence, and continued till the end of 1948. Since the debt 
was notional, negotiations on the balances were aimed at limiting the extent to 
which Britain would be liable for the sterling debt, a weight that Britain’s post war 
economy could not support. It was argued that the unstable ratio of the Sterling 
reserves against the Sterling Balances would adversely affect the stability of the 
economy. The vision of the commonwealth as a ‘third force’ briefly entertained in 
the Foreign Office during the war were not destined to be fulfilled. Britain’s 
professed intentions of maintaining ties with India and Pakistan through the 
Commonwealth; and her priorities of utilising of the Commonwealth as a means of 
influencing events in these countries were eventually suborned to her aim of 
remaining an influential power after the havoc of the war. 31 As far as Britain was 
concerned, the sterling debt was seen as a hindrance to her post war economic 
recovery, regardless of the arguments made by those who saw the settlement of 
these debts as a ‘moral responsibility’.32 However, these discussions can also help to 
clarify the extent to which the subcontinent, and Britain’s ties to the Commonwealth 
were negotiable with her other strategic concerns. B. R. Tomlinson points out that 
economically, the subcontinent’s position as a strategic asset drastically declined 
after the war, and therefore a resolution of the Balances question was not seen as 
critical to British strategic interests.33  
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At the same time, difficult relations between the governments of India and Pakistan 
would also hamper the sterling balance negotiations, since the two countries would 
have to resort to importing essential items from other countries, and draw on their 
sterling reserves to do so. For instance, the sterling balances delegation was 
instructed to ‘discuss with India and Pakistan the possibility of further dollar saving 
by the stepping up or the redirection of their own exports and the restriction of 
imports in certain cases’34. A meeting of the ‘Overseas Negotiations Committee’ in 
February 1948 noted that ‘It was difficult to judge the merits of any proposals for 
dealing with India without also considering the treatment of Pakistan. If we gave 
India less dollars than they had planned to spend, the Indian government might 
succeed in redressing their balance at the expense of Pakistan, in which case we 
should find it difficult to refuse additional assistance to Pakistan.’35   
Yet, the importance of the Sterling Area as an economic unit steadily had reduced in 
the decade following 1947, with a corresponding increase with their engagement 
with dollar based economies. The team of British negotiators on the Sterling Balance 
question was headed by Jeremy Raisman, an erstwhile member of the Indian Civil 
Service, and who had held a variety of posts in his career in the government of India, 
including Finance Member of the Governor General’s Council during the war.36 
Much of the correspondence between the Treasury in London, and their 
representative in Delhi, Sir Raisman was on means by which to beat down the Indian 
and Pakistani claims on the sterling reserves. An anxious telegram was despatched 
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to Sir Raisman as concerns about India’s expenditure from the sterling reserves 
increased: ‘The basic fact is that we are not in a position to afford the continuance of 
drawings by India upon reserves of Sterling Area in order to finance her dollar 
deficit, and we should find difficulty in accepting any agreement which does not 
start from this postulate.’37 Yet, he also pointed out that ‘there will be great difficulty 
in getting the Indian Ministers to agree to any proposals definitely limiting their 
dollar drawings on the sterling pool in the first half of 1948. The leader of the Indian 
Delegation told him privately that if this was forced upon them, the Indian 
government might have to dollar invoice the United Kingdom for essential goods 
such as jute.’38 Moreover, the balances were also linked with the quest for dollar 
reserves, which became an important economic objective for both countries, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Korean War.   
The issue of dollar- based imports acquired increasing significance in terms of trade 
in the sterling area. Converting sterling balances into dollar purchases became an 
increasing worry to policy makers in Britain, as it was feared that, if uncontrolled, 
this would put pressure on the sterling to be able to maintain its standard. In 
September 1949, Sir Stafford Cripps, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced 
that the pound sterling would be devalued by 30%. One explanation offered for this, 
was that the sterling at its un- devalued rate, would be unable to support the claims 
on it from the commonwealth area.39 Moreover, it was argued that the artificially 
high rate of the sterling as a currency with which to trade in the Sterling area, was 
also impeding the development of the British domestic economy. Sterling 
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devaluation was also welcomed by the United States, as this was thought to be a step 
in the direction of freer trade interests.  
The decision to devalue the Indian rupee with the sterling, moreover, was largely 
seen as unproblematic. For example, B. N. Ganguli, faculty at the Delhi School of 
Economics, and then a member of the Fiscal Commission in the government of India, 
for instance, argued that in view of the failure of (the inflationary policies of the 
government with regard to currency exchange), there was ‘no option’ but to devalue 
along with the sterling.40 Similarly, C. D. Deshmukh wrote that ‘Devaluation was 
forced on India by economic circumstances; its allegiance to and participation in the 
Sterling Area only influenced the timing of her decision.’41  
Nine other countries in the Sterling Area -- Australia, New Zealand, India, South 
Africa, Ireland, Norway, Egypt and Israel-- followed suit, and devalued their own 
currencies accordingly on the same day. Pakistan announced its decision not to 
devalue her own currency. This announcement was met with consternation and 
anger in India, and led to apprehensions of lasting damage to the economies of both 
countries. It effectively became more expensive for India to trade with Pakistan. This 
decision found a great deal of support from business and trading lobbies, and was 
stridently defended by the Dawn.42 Moreover, the Economist noted, for instance, that 
the decision was based on reasonable concerns:   
‘First, Pakistan’s balance of payments with the rest of the world, 
including the United States, is favourable. Secondly, Pakistan has 
embarked on a process of industrialisation and therefore needs to import 
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capital goods as cheaply as possible. Thirdly, Pakistan government 
believes that its exports have inelastic demand. Finally, Pakistan wants to 
bring about a fall in domestic prices.’43 
The new rate of exchange would entitle Pakistan to a larger supply of coal, cotton 
textiles, vegetable oils, steel and tobacco from India, while being on an advantageous 
position in the balance of trade with India.44 But even at the time of the devaluation 
crisis, it was impossible to close off the economic links between India and Pakistan. 
In a conversation with the British high commissioner in India, Ambegaonkar the 
Indian finance secretary, stated that with regard to the International Monetary 
Fund’s acceptance of Pakistan’s exchange rate, ‘Although in fact India would have to 
accept whatever parity was approved by the IMF, (or cease to be a member of the 
fund), it was impossible on political grounds for her to give such assurances in 
advance.’45 Moreover, C. D. Deshmukh conceded, that trade in the commodities 
listed in the July 1949 Agreement would have to carry on even without an agreement 
on an India-Pakistan exchange rate. This would have to be done, with ‘one or more 
barter arrangements covering the commodities or groups of commodities to be 
supplied by each side.’ At the same time, Deshmukh warned of the difficulties in 
arriving in such arrangements, and ‘was not hopeful of a successful outcome of the 
proposed [Columbo] conference.’46 
Bajpai met with Grafftey-Smith, the U. K. high commissioner on 22 September 1949 
to discuss the devaluation crisis. He argued that while Pakistan had ‘shown a most 
regrettable lack of commonwealth solidarity’ in her decision not to devalue, and, 
finally, he concluded India, had ‘in this, as in so many other matters, shown herself 
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to be a reliable member of the Commonwealth, and a true friend of the United 
Kingdom’. Nonetheless, Bajpai went on to argue, that India would be able to procure 
the items hitherto received from Pakistan, such as jute and cotton, from other 
markets, such as Egypt, and Uganda, and Australia.’47 Thus, although the trade and 
financial relationship between India and Pakistan were often potentially damaging 
to each other, the attempts to build separate trajectories of trade with other countries 
were also consistently sought. India was thus fairly willing to continue trading in the 
sterling area. In a speech on All India Radio following the devaluation of the rupee, 
Nehru argued ‘The Sterling Area is important to us in our international economic 
relations. A great part of our international trade is with this area. Most of our export 
markets are also in this area, and it is important that we should not only maintain 
but improve our export position.’48  
At the same time, the devaluation crisis did have an adverse impact in some sectors 
of industries on both sides. As a despatch from the British high commissioner in 
Delhi, in February 1950 noted, ‘As a result of the continued economic deadlock 
between India and Pakistan, the steamer companies that ply between East and West 
Bengal are suffering heavy losses’. In India, another sector which suffered heavy 
losses in this period was the Bombay textile industry. The high commissioner’s 
report noted ‘… this has so far caused the complete closure of 15 mills, the partial 
closure of 20, and what a Press Note issued by the Bombay government describes as 
“widespread unemployment”’.49 In his budget speech of 1950, the Indian Finance 
Minister, John Matthai argued that, in view of the discrepancy in the currency of the 
two countries, no tangible result could be gained from negotiations with Pakistan 
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over trade, unless the two sides could negotiate on an exchange ratio and prices. 
However, this position was not held for long: as the speech itself recognised, ‘key 
industries, namely cotton and jute, had been affected.’ The Indian government 
repeatedly complained of their supplies of jute, that had been paid for, being held up 
in East Bengal. A despatch from the U. K. high commission in December 1949 noted 
that ‘if India does not get satisfaction over the release of jute… she will suspend 
operation of inter-dominion commodities agreement, and cut off supplies of coal to 
Pakistan.’50  
The ‘deadlock’ ensued in Indo- Pakistani trade for seventeen months, since it was 
feared that trading with Pakistan at the prevailing rate of exchange, would disrupt 
India’s economy. The question was discussed between Ghulam Muhammad, the 
Pakistani Finance Minister, Nehru and the British Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, during the Columbo Conference of Finance Ministers of 
the Commonwealth in January 1950. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, had a meeting with Nehru and Ghulam Muhammad over how this 
question should be addressed. The Secretary for State even pointed out that ‘he had 
made considerable efforts to get rid of regulations for trade in Europe, and that 
considerable results had been achieved.’51 He pressed ‘continuation of conflict within 
the Commonwealth would be unfortunate from everybody’s point of view’. 
Although both Nehru and Ghulam Muhammad agreed with this, there was no 
substantial change in the position of either with regards to the devaluation question. 
Indeed, although the problems relating to trading with Pakistan, and her policies on 
devaluation, were loudly aired, both sides were also attempting to craft their 
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economies in ways that would be insulated from decisions made across the border. 
Moreover, the actual trade between India and Pakistan did continue regardless, over 
this decade, although the ways in which economic ties between the two could be 
severed were also consistently explored. While the devaluation crisis was loudly 
publicised by both governments, in effect their policies carried on as before. It led to 
neither government in fact to change the nature of their policies with regard to inter-




Cutting off trading links entirely, however, was not as simple an option as may have 
been hoped. It was nobody’s case that all trade between the two countries ought to 
bought to a complete halt -- indeed this was impossible. Meetings of the economic 
committee of the cabinet began to consider options for damage control, if trade to 
Pakistan should suffer, in the wake of the devaluation crisis. In fact trading had not -
- indeed could not be -- completely stopped. C. C. Desai was another erstwhile 
member of the I. C. S., Secretary in the ministry of Commerce in 1949, and who had 
also advocated greater de-regulation by the government of rationed commodities for 
the past year. Nonetheless, he pointed out, cutting off coal supplies to Pakistan, even 
after the devaluation, should only be carried out once the consequences of such an 
act had been apprehended as much as possible. ‘It is not expected that in any such 
situation only Pakistan will be harmed. Naturally both countries may have to suffer 
hardships, but the final decision will depend on the relative degree of hardships and 
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the comparative power of endurance.’52 Moreover, a note from the Ministry of 
Commerce pointed out that the import of cotton seed from Pakistan, would also 
have to continue, though if possible this should be secured at pre-devaluation 
prices.53  
Opportunities to revive the trade ‘deadlock’ between the two countries were thus, on 
the lookout for. The Deputy High Commissioner in Dhaka urged that this would be 
a desirable course of action, arguing ‘A year ago, a suitable Trade Agreement could 
have been made for all goods without political considerations. Today, it is possible, 
but difficult. In another six months, to a year, Pakistan would attach political 
conditions to the resumption of trade. We have much to gain from a long term 
arrangement… 54 What was also generally recognised in most files regarding Indo- 
Pakistani trade talks, was that India could not afford to be intransigent over 
Pakistani demands for coal, cement, and steel; her own jute and textile industries 
would correspondingly suffer. Furthermore, Pakistan’s cooperation had to be 
secured if goods were to flow to Indian enclaves in East Pakistan, as well as to states 
such as Tripura, which could most easily be reached by crossing the border. 
In the annual report for inter-dominion trade in 1950, the Indian trade commissioner 
in Karachi noted that ‘Pakistan was in a happy position of having consumers at her 
door prepared to buy jute and cotton, practically at any price’55 International 
demand for jute and cotton sky- rocketed in the wake of the Korean War which 
created endless demand for raw materials for munitions. In 1950, C. D. Deshmukh, 
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the Indian Minister for Finance approached the Pakistani high commissioner at the 
Commonwealth Conference in London to explore possible compromises.56  In 
February 1951 a Trade Agreement was completed between India and Pakistan, 
according to which, exchange transaction would be permitted on the basis of 
existing value of the Pakistani currency. The terms of the February 1951 trade 
agreement were, moreover, not to India’s advantage in the post devaluation 
financial context. India agreed to trade with Pakistan on the basis of the non- 
devalued Pakistani rupee; Rs. 100 (Indian) would be the equivalent of Rs. 69 
Pakistani; such transactions could moreover be converted into sterling by the other 
country.57 It was agreed that India would export coal, steel, pig iron, cement timber 
and textiles to Pakistan, and import from Pakistan jute, cotton, food grain, hides and 
skins. 58    
The trade agreement of February 1951 was seen all over the world as a triumph of 
economic common sense over politics. The agreement had been reached despite the 
differences in the value of currency after devaluation. Such an agreement was 
moreover also seen as a climb down on India’s part since she had agreed to trade at 
the non- devalued rates. Many countries, including the Soviet Union, France, and 
Italy, sent in their congratulations to the Ministry of External Affairs for the 
conclusion of the treaty. Yet what this shows is not in fact the victory of a 
‘conciliatory’  approach to bilateral relations over those who advocated a tougher 
approach, as much as simply bringing into the fold of both governments, an activity 
which would have carried on anyway. Secondly, once this was accomplished, 
neither government went out of their way to ‘facilitate the process of bilateral trade’, 
but in fact created, and implemented various restrictive regulations, such as permits 
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for entry, for the carrying out of trade. Moreover, this policy had been more or less 
consistently adopted by both governments within a short period of their gaining 
independence.  
In 1947, the Partition Council had convened an Expert Committee to consider the 
prospects of what would become Indo-Pakistani trade.59 The Committee 
recommended a Standstill Agreement be put in place, according to which existing 
lines of trade would be allowed to continue until March 1948. These agreements 
concerned a variety of items, the most important of which were jute, cotton, and 
coal. Even before this term expired, however, the notion of this system being allowed 
to continue unchanged was challenged. In particular, the matter of who had the right 
to claim duties on raw jute quickly became an issue. S. Bhootalingam, a former 
student of economics at Cambridge, and the first finance secretary in India, 
submitted a note on the forecasted changes that the termination of the Standstill 
agreement would bring: ‘The effect of the termination of the present so- called 
standstill arrangement with Pakistan will be that Pakistan will become like any other 
foreign country for the purposes of our trade. Our exports to Pakistan will earn 
foreign currency, while our imports will be paid for in foreign currency.’60 Payments 
for the supply of coal into Pakistan were made from the balances Pakistan continued 
to hold in the State Bank in India61. Bhootalingam however ended his note warning 
of the dangers of hasty changes made with regard to trading conditions with 
Pakistan. For instance, he argued, ‘We have to be extremely cautious before taking 
any steps to rashly to increase the production of raw jute in India which would 
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merely have the result of a fall in all jute prices. In the long run both India and 
Pakistan gain by ensuring that their combined production of jute is not greater than 
the world demand.’62 
Regarding the movement of raw jute from Pakistan to India, the government of 
Pakistan argued that it should be given a share in the revenue earned from the 
export duties in Calcutta port.63 In December 1947, Sri Prakasa, received an aide 
memoire from the government of Pakistan. The note argued, for instance, that in the 
case of excise duty on goods exported from India to Pakistan, the government of 
Pakistan was not currently entitled to collect her rightful share. Under the present 
provisions, the note continued:  
‘no refund or rebate of excise duty is being granted on goods exported 
from India to Pakistan. On the other hand, cotton and other commodities 
produced in Pakistan are being exported to India without any payment of 
duty. The Pakistan government therefore consider that for the period of 7 
½ months ending on 31st March, 1948, Pakistan should be given a 
reasonable share of the total central excise revenue, on the basis of the 
quantity of excisable goods consumed in Pakistan territory.’64      
The two governments concluded a series of treaties on the terms of bilateral trade. 
They were usually divided into ‘schedules’ of goods, classified into goods that could 
be exported and imported within certain limits; goods that were exported and 
imported in any quantity, though taxes may be imposed on them on arrival; and a 
separate schedules of goods which were permitted under the heading of ‘border 
trade’. Interestingly, goods included in the first schedule, such as manufactured jute, 
mill made cloth, iron and steel, were also the ones which were associated with 
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powerful trading lobbies, which would push for higher taxes to be imposed on 
competing products that were imported. Goods in the second schedule included 
fruit and vegetable, betel leaf, herbs, medicine, coir yarn and betel leaf, coir yarn and 
mustard oil’.65 A large number of items in the second schedule were predominantly 
exchanged at the border- and the flows of these items indeed pre dated the border. 
The Schedules were thus an attempt by both governments to arrive at controls which 
encompassed the exchanges of goods; an attempt by the state to recognise a system 
of exchange which would, necessarily, have continued anyway.  
A great deal of this trade was conducted via East Bengal, and was vital to the 
economies of eastern India. One aspect of the trade negotiations concerned the 
logistics of transport: the railway wagons by which commodities were to flow 
between India and Pakistan were the subject of debate, as the Eastern India railways 
had to be divided between India and Pakistan. Similarly, the Chittagong port also 
became the object of discussion as to which vessels were to be allowed into the port. 
At the same time however, cross border trade was also accompanied consistently by 
what became the ‘illegal’ flow of goods across the border.66 Trade along the border 
continued, whether sanctioned by the government or not, simply because it had 
done so for many years pre- dating partition.  Indeed, between September 1948 and 
April 1950, when there was supposed to have been a complete deadlock in trade 
relations, it was reported that more than three lakhs bales of jute were smuggled into 
India from East Bengal.67  
In June, 1949, India and Pakistan had ratified an agreement stating that both would 
grant rebates to excisable items that they exported to each other, provided that this 
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was done on a mutual basis. In a telegram exchange between Ghulam Muhammad 
and K. C. Neogy, regarding the terms of tariff and rebates, Neogy argued that 
Pakistan’s proposals that ‘impairment should not result from any action taken by the 
Dominion granting the rebate only, and not the other Dominion will detract from the 
scope of the agreement as a while which is designed to increase Inter-dominion 
Trade. For example if Pakistan imposes an import duty on an excisable commodity 
at a level which would handicap our exports to Pakistan, the spirit in which the 
informal talks took place would be lost.’68 However, this agreement did not extend 
to jute or cotton- amongst the most important trading commodities for India and 
Pakistan, causing the Indian minister for Industry and Supply to observe that 
without these items within the purview of the agreement, it would be reduced to a 
‘façade of little value.’69  
The trade treaties between India and Pakistan were revised annually, and when the 
two delegations met for discussion in February 1952, the talks broke down. By that 
year, India’s own reliance on supplies from jute had diminished somewhat, and a 
greater quantity of jute had been grown within the country. The question of trade 
along the border provinces, however, proved to be the major stumbling block.70 A 
key issue was obtaining permission from Pakistan for the transportation of goods to 
other parts of Indian without circumnavigating the long border between India and 
East Pakistan. For instance, one bottleneck in the transport of goods into Tripura 
occurred in Akhaura -- a railway station in East Pakistan, where goods headed for 
Tripura from the rest of India could most easily be off loaded -- where they 
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encountered East Pakistani customs barriers.71 The Tripura Merchants Association 
made several representations to the government of India, as well as to the Ministry 
of External Affairs in particular to take this matter up at Indo-Pakistani forums.  
In a meeting with the Pakistan High Commissioner, H. V. R Iengar, the Commerce 
Secretary argued that there would be ‘serious difficulty in persuading the state 
governments that a trade agreement was of any value if it did not settle the problem 
of border trade.’72 Border communities on both sides, particularly in the hill districts 
of Assam and Tripura, were dependent on supplies of fish, salt, kerosene, and a 
certain amount of food grains from the other side of the border.73 Items on the Open 
General License for import into India included ‘fish- fresh and dried to be allowed 
into East Pakistan’. In return, the quota for trade of cattle into East Pakistan was to 
be fixed.74  
Mohan Sinha Mehta had also written separately to the Prime Minister, in the 
aftermath of the breakdown of the trade talks between India and Pakistan, 
complaining of the petty interests and mutual suspicion that led to the breakdown, 
even though there was no disputing that the economies of India and Pakistan were 
complementary. Yet, the Commerce Secretary, C. C. Desai, argued against this, 
complaining that ‘he was at a loss to understand the approach of our High 
Commissioner’. Desai had argued that provisions for trade along the border were 
crucial to any success of a trade treaty between the two countries. This, he felt had to 
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be incorporated into any treaty, although Mohan Sinha Mehta repeatedly found that 
this was difficult to push through.  
The subject of border trade was addressed in successive trade talks. Synonymous 
with setting up the paraphernalia of cross border trade, occurred the phenomena of 
‘smuggling’ in the Indo- Pakistani context. A report from the Committee on Border 
Trade, compiled for the trade conference of 1953, concluded ‘… a certain amount of 
[illegal] trade continues to take place even as things are. By regularising it and 
properly defining its scope there was much less danger of smuggling and other evils 
than by driving it underground.’75 Items which were not sanctioned by both 
governments to be available for trade in both countries were thus illegally brought 
across the border. While regulations on cross border trade deemed a large volume of 
traffic between India and Pakistan to be illegal, both governments were at least 
partly complicit in allowing such traffic to continue. Border officials on both sides 
were actively involved in such arrangements, and regulations made in Calcutta, 
Delhi and Karachi were not necessarily implemented on the borders. The very 
paraphernalia of the state -- represented in check points and customs posts brought 
about a qualitative difference in the system of exchange of goods across the new 
border. Moreover, there was a connection between the regulation of trade and the 
state’s attempt to territorially define itself; to reassure itself that its boundaries were 
clearly demarcated.76 Willem van Schendel points out that although both states were 
keen to promote self sufficiency in their economies, they were also eager to reap the 
benefits from cross border trade, in terms of collecting taxes, as well as by securing 
goods and commodities that would ultimately benefit their own economies.77  
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Policies on bilateral trade were also an engagement with the attempt to firmly fix the 
border, and display the ability to control movement of goods, labour, and commerce 
across it. At the same time, however, the illegal movement of goods across the 
border was as frequent an occurrence as that which was ‘sanctioned’ by both 
governments.     
Such uneasiness -- with the unavoidability, yet undesirability -- of trade between 
India and Pakistan was manifested most clearly in the position of those traders and 
businessmen who actually held contracts to carry out the trade. In August 1953, M. 
H. A. Fazalbhoi, an influential solicitor, and from a powerful Bombay family himself, 
submitted a memorandum to the MEA on behalf of members of the trading 
community. He argued that Indian Muslim businessmen in particular were subject 
to suspicion and mistreatment by the Indian government. ‘Evacuee property 
proceedings have been started on the flimsiest of grounds making them incur the 
cost of extensive legal proceedings and otherwise…It is therefore necessary that 
trade between the two countries should not only be made free… but a mandate 
should be given against undue suspicion on the part of government officials and the 
policy of black listing merchants having business dealings with Pakistan.’78 
Fazalbhai went on to number the ways in which conditions of trade could improve: 
establishment of branch offices in both countries to facilitate exchange and 
movement of funds; facilities for prosecute dishonesty in dealings between traders in 
both countries; and greater ease in travel, for, ‘at present, if a person makes even a 
temporary visit to Pakistan, he has to face an enquiry from the evacuee officers’.79  
Badruddin Tyabji, by then Commonwealth Secretary in the MEA, and who had 
signed off on files relating to different aspects in the relationship with Pakistan for 
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some years now, headed a meeting to consider Fazalbhai’s memorandum. He 
argued that rules relating to trade and commerce with Pakistan, as well as the 
evacuee property rules, should be implemented keeping in mind that a long term 
relationship with Pakistan was unavoidable. Tyabji also pointed out that it was India 
who stood most to gain from open and extensive trade with Pakistan. Therefore, he 
argued, regulations such as the evacuee property laws should not be evoked when 
they would harm India’s commercial interests in the long run. This approach was 
insufficient in making any dents to the rapidly hardening stances taken in India with 
regard to dealings with Pakistan. A representative from the relief and rehabilitation 
ministry countered that ‘while the evacuee property laws admittedly had abnormal 
features, they were inevitable in the context of current Indo-Pak relations.’80  A letter 
from the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Karachi on this matter was even 
blunter: ‘It would be putting the cart before the horse because free trade between the 
two countries is quite obviously the result of good relations on the political sphere 
and it is meaningless to state that if there were free trade between India and Pakistan 
all the major problems that would have stood in the way of happy relations between 
the two countries would not have arisen.’81 
These decisions were not, however stuck to in absolute terms- they were constantly 
subject to re- examination and debate. On the process of granting licenses for the 
import of cotton seed, for instance, the Ministry soon received an indignant despatch 
from the High Commissioner in Karachi, observing ‘Several people are getting 
licenses from the government of India for importing cotton seed from Pakistan, and 
that they are, after profit making, selling them off to Muslims… [furthermore], if no 
import license was given, the price of cotton seed would fall further in Pakistan, and 
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would further deteriorate the economic position in this country..’82 In response, K. C. 
Neogy argued that ‘I am anxious that this matter should not become a scandal of any 
kind’, and so the economic committee of the cabinet should deliberate whether there 
was in fact, any pressing need for the licensing of imports of cotton seed.83  
By 1953, the situation had changed, and the terms that India and Pakistan could 
negotiate with had altered. Pakistan was in urgent need of wheat. Moreover her 
foreign exchange position had weakened, and it would have been cheaper to import 
rice from India. This agreement extended for three years, and also stipulated that 
India would supply coal to Pakistan at prices applicable within India, if Pakistan 
would reduce her export duties on jute to India. While all aspects of the Indo 
Pakistani relationship were to some extent interrelated, it is interesting to examine in 
this context, how both countries attempted to use issues in which they had the 
advantage at the time, as a way of gaining greater leverage for the other issues. At 
the same time, however, this nonetheless required a substantive and continual 
process of bilateral dialogue. Even when they were in the midst of disentangling 
themselves from the other, the requirements of asserting a complete sovereignty 
necessitated a dense, rich dialogue between the two.  
Thus, Indo-Pak trade policies were also informed by the fact that it was impossible 
for the flow of goods and commodities to come to a halt entirely.  So, although there 
was a great deal of discussion and debate about whether the negotiations over trade 
could, and should, be tied to other areas of India- Pakistan relations, such as the 
Evacuee Property dispute, the fact was that there did continue to be trade between 
the two countries. Yet, what the negotiations for trade do reveal was the constitution 
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of the basis of agreement between the two states, on the need to regulate inter-
dominion economic activity. If the exchanges of goods were to be carried out in any 
case, then it was necessary for both governments to enter into this activity and 
attempt to ensure that this was carried out on the basis of two separated states. A 
great deal of the correspondence in the MEA files on trade with Pakistan, were to do 
simply with the question of the logistics of the exchange of commodities, rather than 
curmudgeonly deliberations of whether or not to trade at all. Arrival at such 
agreements did not imply that there would be no room for further jostling in these 
matters. The ostensible granting of right of freeway for goods in transit across the 
border was not necessarily implemented on the ground. The implementation of such 
agreements leaned more towards attempts at establishing just where the nation’s 
boundaries were delineated.  
The larger question in all this is how, and why, the governments of India and 
Pakistan both decided to actively engage with the ongoing trade. Had they not, the 
case could be made that the ‘traditional’ routes of trade and economic activity would 
have continued undisturbed. Alternatively, the devaluation crisis could have 
conceivably provided a pretext to halt the trade entirely. Yet, for the time being, this 
was not possible. Asserting control over bilateral trade was also a means of 
displaying the state’s mastery over its territorial limits, as well as finalising the 
delineation of these boundaries. Finally, Indo- Pakistani trade was one of the issues 
that was at the heart of bilateral relations; and was thus an issue for negotiation 
between two governments. It became an additional bargaining counter in the overall 
framework of bilateral relations, subject to sudden disruption, but also tangible 
motive for potential gain.     








DELINEATING THE BOUNDARY LINE 
If two countries are to assert their separation from one another, then a borderline has 
to be clearly delineated. But for India and Pakistan, this task presented peculiar 
problems. The process of shaping the territoriality of India and Pakistan were not 
products of self-evident certainties, but of protracted negotiations and wrangling by 
the Congress and the Muslim League. The boundaries between India and Pakistan 
were drawn by a Boundary Commission, by processes that seemed arbitrary, and 
therefore open to question. The experience of emerging out of partition was certainly 
not conducive to fostering notions of the unquestioned fixity of the territoriality of 
the nation state. Negotiations on border delineations, therefore offer a valuable 
insight into how the questions of needing to present a inviolate and firmly fixed 
territorial shape to India and Pakistan were actually handled on the ground. I will 
examine the ways in which the boundary line was imposed, and how these 
processes are a lens through which the bilateral cooperation between India and 
Pakistan can be analysed.  
Along with giving an account of the complex processes by which the actual border 
was put in place, this chapter will examine how firmly that border was reinforced by 
officials on both sides -- many of whom, in fact, proved to have been  more open to it 
being a negotiable quantity than might be expected. It also examines how the 
assumption of a fixed border (and a more fixed sovereignty) was routinely tested by 
the governments on both sides. There remained a number of questions regarding the 
actual minutiae of how the boundary line between India and Pakistan could be 
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drawn, even after the Radcliffe Award. An additional set of Boundary Tribunals had 
to be assembled to decide the boundary line between Assam, Tripura and East 
Bengal; as well as between Sind and the Rann of Katch. Finally, considerations of 
how the boundary line fell made themselves felt most strongly in areas where the 
importance of assets that they cordoned off was the highest. Where the boundary 
line offered control over the head-works of the Indus Canals, for instance, it had to 
be asserted particularly forcefully. Both states were present in these areas, but  even 
here, their strength was not necessarily absolute.  
Many stretches of the Indo-Pakistan border were in fact not clearly demarcated. The 
boundaries between the states of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, and that of East 
Bengal were not clearly delineated on the ground long after the Radcliffe Award had 
been announced. These included uncertainties between Sylhet and Assam, the exact 
boundary line running through Dinajpur, Nadia, and Kushtia in Bengal, the line 
running through Patharia Hill Reserve Forests, and numerous other ‘smaller scale’ 
boundary uncertainties. Along the western border similarly, large stretches of the 
boundary line along the Sind province and the Rann of Kutch in India were also 
badly defined. Negotiations on how the boundary would lie was carried out 
between the two governments well into the 1950s, and, in many cases, still remained 
uncompleted. In the section on border delineation, I shall concentrate mainly on the 
problems in the eastern zone, as this was where the processes of dialogue were 
particularly indicative of the nature of cooperation in India-Pakistan relations in this 
period. My argument, however is that the ‘firmness’ with which the boundary line 
was imposed was mainly a factor of the value of the assets that it cordoned off. In 
fact, cooperation on delineating the boundary line was at its most flexible when it 
traversed areas which were not as valuable to either side. This chapter shows that 
the very ambivalence that the artificial imposition of a borderline created was not 
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only straight away recognized, but accepted, and sometimes actively and jointly 
exploited by the governments of India and Pakistan.1  
Creating a Boundary  
The Radcliffe Boundary Commission had a mandate to draw the boundary line ‘on 
the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority of areas of Muslim and non 
Muslims, [and] to take into account other factors.’2 But by all accounts, the Boundary 
Commission’s decisions were made in a hasty and politically motivated process. 
Details of the various possible awards were leaked as they were being drawn up, 
and both the Congress and Muslim League leadership loudly criticised the decisions. 
The leadership in both the parties had also deliberately sought to distance 
themselves from the Boundary Commission, since its awards were bound to be 
unpopular in any case. What is evident, however, is that there was nothing 
immutable about where the boundary line was drawn: where the boundary line fell 
was subject to many contingencies, and was not a faithful representation of the 
numerical distribution of religious communities. This would lead to a lasting 
suspicion that the drawing of the boundary line had not been removed from the 
concerns of politicians and statesmen who would reside in the newly demarcated 
countries.3    
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali,  Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1955-1956, and during 
the partition, in the very thick of events as representative of the Muslim League in 
                                                
1 Van Schendel, W., The Bengal Borderland, Beyond Nation and State in South Asia, London 2005 
2 Partition Proceedings, Vol. VI, Reports of the Members and Awards of the Chairman of the Boundary 
Commission; NAI 
3 For more on the Radcliffe Commission, see for example, Chester, Lucy P., Chester, Lucy P., Borders 
and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab, 
Manchester, 2009; Chatterji, Joya, The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe line and Bengal’s 
Border Landscape, 1947- 1952’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1999; Tinker, Hugh, 
‘Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab, August 1947’, The Journal of 
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the Partition Council, and subsequently a High Commissioner for Pakistan to the 
United States, published his memoirs in 1967. In them, he argued that the Radcliffe 
tribunal had been skewed from the beginning against Pakistan’s interests.4 He 
claimed that the ostensibly impartial boundary commission was in fact subjected to 
pressure from Mountbatten and the Congress leadership, and thus prejudiced in 
many ways against the economic and strategic interests of Pakistan. The very 
composition of the tribunal was contrary to the proposals made by Jinnah, who had 
requested that three impartial English judges, on recommendation from the UN, be 
appointed to head the commission. The Commission that did come into being was 
headed by a lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, who would oversee and, in effect decide on, the 
boundary drawing process in both Punjab and Bengal. The awards of the Boundary 
Commission, moreover, left the state of Pakistan with many disadvantages and 
denied to it territories of vital economic and strategic interest. On the Punjab side, 
the Gurdaspur and Batala tahsils within Gurdaspur district, which were contiguous 
Muslim majority areas, were nonetheless awarded to India, giving her road and 
railway links into Kashmir. Finally, Radcliffe decided to give Ferozepur, which 
contained the headworks of the canal systems irrigating large parts of what would 
become Pakistani Punjab. By giving control of important canal headworks on the 
Sutlej and Ravi rivers to India, Muhammad Ali argued, Radcliffe ‘put the economic 
life of West Pakistan in jeopardy.’5 There were thus serious questions about the 
appropriateness of the Radcliffe awards, and it was conceivable that they would be 
challenged. Apart from Kashmir, the critical issues which the demarcation of the 
border impacted were the Canal Waters issue, and the borderline along the 
Chittagong hill tracts. Moreover, since he was chairman of both the Punjab as well as 
the Bengal Boundary Commissions, some impulses towards ‘balancing’ the 
                                                
4 Ali, Chaudhry Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, 1967 
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disadvantages of the awards of one side of the border by compensating in the other, 
could also have been in play. The decision to award the Chittagong Hill tracts to 
Pakistan was strongly contested by India. Radcliffe himself maintained, however, 
that this had not been the reasoning behind individual decisions in the award. 
Indeed, in March 1948 Pakistan contemplated the question as to whether Sir 
Zafrullah Khan should raise the issue of the justice of the Radcliffe Commission at 
the UN.6  
Sir Zafrullah had argued the Muslim League’s case in front of the Punjab Boundary 
Commission. Immediately after the hearing, his impression was that Radcliffe was in 
favour of allotting the Ferozepur district to Pakistan, although he was less certain in 
the case of Gurdaspur district.7 When the Boundary Commission awards were 
finally published, some ten days later, it was found, however, that both Ferozepur 
and Gurdaspur had gone to India. These were critical decisions, since the head-
works of the Sutlej Valley Canal systems were located just outside Ferozepur town, 
and therefore gave to India control over the head-works of the irrigation channels 
crucial for the agriculture of the Punjab province. The suspicion that Radcliffe’s 
boundary line in the Punjab had been changed at the last minute, and in favour of 
India, was repeatedly voiced in the months following the partition. Zafrullah Khan 
argued, ‘the inference is almost irresistible that Mr. Nehru must have approached 
Mountbatten to procure a modification of the award in that respect’.8 Zafrullah 
Khan, in his memoirs, recalls that on the Punjab side, the representatives of the 
Muslim League had been suspicious that Radcliffe was contemplating making an 
award which would adversely affect Pakistan. Justice Muhammad Munir, a member 
                                                
6 Mountbatten to Lord Ismay, 2 April 1948, Singh, Kirpal, (ed.), Select Documents on Partition of 
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of the Punjab Boundary Commission,and a representative of the Muslim League, 
told him that even prior to hearing the cases presented on the demarcation, Radcliffe 
had proposed to go on an aerial survey over the areas to be partitioned. The route he 
wanted to follow was along the boundary line as it was subsequently demarcated- as 
the river Ravi flowed along the plains of the Punjab, and following its course into 
Lahore district, and then to veer left towards Ferozepur.  
The deliberations of the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, as well as its 
consequences, have been fairly extensively researched over the last few decades. 
There had certainly been a substantial degree of jockeying for influence on how the 
boundary line was drawn. In the case of Bengal, Joya Chatterji has shown how, in 
the chaotic jostling to secure as much territory as possible, the representatives of the 
Congress and the Muslim League in Bengal presented arguments to the Boundary 
Commission for the maximum possible amounts of territory. The ensuing boundary 
line, was, on the ground, bewilderingly difficult to administer, as it zig-zagged 
across administrative units, and agrarian communities.9 Delineating the boundary 
line on the ground, therefore, was a hugely difficult task, and was not, moreover, 
seen as self-evident, by either side.  
Even in February 1948, it was still conceivable that the basis of the boundary awards 
could be challenged. Upon hearing that Zafrullah Khan had approached Phillip Noel 
Baker at a conference, and informed him of Pakistan’s suspicions of the Boundary 
award being ‘tampered’ with, Mountbatten wrote to Lord Ismay with his reaction. 
Mountbatten did not expect the matter to be seriously pursued, and, with 
characteristic complacency, added that Zafrullah was simply ‘trying this on’. In any 
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case, ‘there could be little evidence in Jenkins’ file to show that the award was 
tampered with’.10  
Yet it is significant that while the possibility of challenges to the boundary awards 
were raised well into the months following Independence, neither side in fact 
actively pursued a course of actually refusing to accept the boundary line. Once put 
in place, for all the opposition and grumbling about the awards, both countries 
decided to retain the decisions of the Radcliffe award, even while not observing it in 
uniform strictness throughout its course. Further questioning of the basis of the 
Radcliffe award though, once it had already been made, was a course from which 
both governments shied away.  
Nonetheless, sections of the boundary line continued to remain notoriously ill-
defined. Indeed, when it came to actually demarcating Radcliffe’s awards on the 
ground, the question of what the inter-dominion boundary would look like still 
presented numerous problems. The question of where exactly the border line could 
be drawn differed, in the opinion of the two countries, at several points from where 
Radcliffe himself had suggested.  
Managing the boundary was in fact a complex business, and there was no hard and 
fast rule as to how disputes relating to the boundary could be tackled. The Bengal 
borderline was not in any way obvious on the ground, and had to be imposed 
through the joint efforts of the provincial governments on either side of it. The 
question of how the geographical limits of India and Pakistan were to be delimited 
called for various kinds of cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, officials 
in East Pakistan realized by 1948 that large stretches of the Radcliffe line allowed for 
plenty of room for manoeuvring. Borders, were, in fact the subject of negotiations; 
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negotiations moreover, that did not only consist of an implacable adherence to a 
particular line.  
In December 1947, the question arose as to which province had jurisdiction over 
Char Sarandajpur, an island or sandbank in the middle of the Ganges, and which 
faced the town of Rajshahi in East Pakistan. The government of East Pakistan sent a 
telegram to the Indian side, complaining of the attempts made by authorities in 
Murshidabad to establish control over this piece of land.11 The letter recommended 
that this could be examined jointly by the two Directors of Land Records and 
Surveys (DLRs). In response, the government of West Bengal replied that the land 
under question was included within Murshidabad district, within India, and that the 
police forces of West Bengal had been posted there to maintain their possession. It 
was then suggested by the government of West Bengal that the two sides 
simultaneously withdraw their police forces from the area, the status quo be 
restored, and the position be examined by the DLRs without prejudice to the rights 
of either side. The production of a boundary line was an important concern to both 
newly independent governments; yet, negotiations around it also reveal how distant 
the actual proceedings were from the rhetoric of the integrity of the territory of the 
nation state. While concerns relating to the security of the border in terms of the 
prevention of illegal migration from across the border hangs heavy in the analysis of 
India-Pakistan relations, the actual processes of demarcating the border were in fact 
remarkably matter of fact. 
In December 1948, an inter-dominion conference decided to appoint an ‘Indo- 
Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal’, presided over by a former high court judge 
from Sweden, Algot Bagge. Judges from India and Pakistan, C. Aiyar and M 
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Shahbuddin respectively, were members of the tribunal.12 In a letter to Gopalaswami 
Ayyangar, Justice Kania, who had been invited to give his opinion as to who the 
Indian representative of the Boundary Commission should be, remarked:  
‘...The selection of the man on our side will depend on the scope of the 
reference. If the terms of reference of the Commission are to ignore the 
Radcliffe Award, and the subsequent inconveniences found in working 
it, the Commission would have to make fresh awards. Therefore, the 
Indian representative will need to be not only a lawyer, but someone 
with sound common sense and who is able to make the Pakistani 
nominee realize what is strong  common sense and the practical view.’13  
The Bagge tribunal would work within the parameters already accepted by the 
Radcliffe awards. Eventually, as mentioned above, Justice Chandrasekhar Aiyyar, a 
retired Judge from the Madras High Court, was selected for the position. Justice 
Shahbuddin, a Judge at the East Bengal High Court, was appointed as the 
representative of Pakistan; and Justice Algot Bagge, a 73 year-old judge in the 
Supreme Court in Sweden, was appointed as Chairman. The work of the Tribunal 
would begin in November 1949, and, it was expected that it would be completed 
within three months. Its instructions were to adjudicate on boundary disputes along 
East and West Bengal, and East Bengal and Assam. The delegates were instructed to 
carry papers regarding the maps and arguments that the Radcliffe Commission had 
considered; and present arguments as to why the physical demarcation of the 
boundary was difficult to implement.14 This was a complex exercise, since it also 
involved the logistics of travel for map-making officials, and had to be carried out 
with an eye on the weather conditions. In fact the work of the tribunal was delayed 
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by several years. A letter from the government of Pakistan to the Indo-Pakistan 
Boundary Disputes Tribunal in Sweden acknowledged that ‘the demarcation of this 
boundary is not likely to be completed by the 5th of February 1953, and the 
governments of Pakistan and India have therefore agreed that the Tribunal be 
approached for extending the time allowed for completing the demarcation’.15 
Subsequently, an agreement signed between Justice Shahbuddin and Justice 
Chandrashekhar Ayyar, on behalf of the governments of India and Pakistan, and 
Justice Bagge, allowed the time for the demarcation to be finalized to be extended to 
February 1953.  This system, moreover, continued to remain in place until February 
1954.16   
One decision reached at the end of the Inter-dominion conference held in Calcutta, in 
December 1948, was that decisions relating to the boundary be made at the Chief 
Secretary’s Conference.17 These conferences, attended by chief secretaries of the 
provinces of West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and East Bengal, were aimed primarily at 
addressing concerns about interactions between border provinces, such as economic 
transactions, transportation, and various means of implementing inter-dominion 
agreements. A frequently-discussed concern at these meetings was the demarcation 
of the borderline. At the 12th Chief Secretaries’ Conference in February 1948, the 
Survey Officers were issued instructions to settle the outstanding disputes along the 
border demarcation between Rajshahi and Murshidabad.18 This actual demarcation 
process was handled by Directors of Land Records and Surveys. The negotiations 
thus involved the provincial governments of the border provinces. Although 
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discussions over these issues were prolonged, and subject to numerous delays, they 
were also part of a machinery which allowed for both governments to work through 
the division of the Bengal delta. Although the process of division along this region 
presented a number of challenges to the settlement of the partition, it was necessary 
for both governments to insert their state infrastructures into this process.  
It had been decided that the Directors of Land Records and Surveys of East Pakistan 
and Assam would meet in October 1949 to carry out the actual demarcation of the 
border as far as it extended into these two provinces.19 Talks between these officials, 
however, broke down over the procedure to be adopted when delineating the 
border. The Indian side argued that the plan of delineation ought to be carried out 
first, and the basis of demarcation be agreed upon and records be exchanged 
accordingly, before the exercise was carried out on the ground. Their counterparts in 
East Bengal argued that the region be mapped first, and the basis for demarcation 
decided subsequently.20 The difference was a matter of how the Radcliffe award 
ought to be interpreted, and whether the boundary should consist of natural 
frontiers, including the river flowing in that region, or whether the administrative 
divisions would suffice. However, the issue continued to be raised at the conferences 
until the early fifties, and in the mean time, both sides agreed to allow the border to 
remain more notional than real. 
Border-making along many stretches of the boundary line was a remarkably languid 
exercise. It was frequently held up on account of simple inter- provincial bickering, 
or the vagaries of geography and climate. Such a state of affairs, moreover, was 
allowed to continue by a de facto recognition by both sides of the necessarily 
uncompleted nature of the task. This was partly motivated by a desire on both sides 
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not to further disrupt local economies based on criss-crossing the region divided by 
the Radcliffe line. Secondly, there was also plenty of resistance put up by the 
provincial governments situated along the border, which were disinclined, and often 
simply unable, to part with records relating to the administration of areas along the 
border. Studying such arrangements alongside the very serious conflicts in the 
broader India-Pakistan relationship, therefore, allows us to consider the possibility 
of two states willing not to escalate disagreements that could, after all, have been a 
far more fiercely contested.  
The Directors of Land Revenue carried out their work well into the 1950s. At a 
meeting between the Directors of Land and Revenue Records of East and West 
Bengal in March 1952, it was decided that work on the border along Tripura would 
begin in October that year, and since the government of Tripura was unequipped, 
the DLR, West Bengal, ‘also agreed to supply the necessary subordinate staff to carry 
out the work’.21 At a conference in Dhaka in August 1952, the Directors of Land 
Records and Surveys of East Bengal and West Bengal agreed to undertake the 
demarcation work along the Tripura, Sylhet, and Tipperah State. Thus bilateral 
negotiations on this question were carried out with the assumption that there was, 
and would be, a great deal of dialogue on this at the level of the state governments. 
Since a final demarcation of the boundary line was often simply impossible, 
moreover, it was necessary for the provincial governments to come to a series of 
interim agreements relating to how this could be dealt with.  While there were 
numerous differences between officials on both sides regarding the processes of 
demarcating the border, this took place within a framework where the boundary line 
could, nonetheless, remain undefined.  
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The demarcation work was held up on account on differences on the two sides with 
regards to the methods to be used for carrying out the land surveys. In June 1948, the 
District Magistrates of Rajshahi and Murshidabad, however, signed an agreement to 
the effect that the Choukidari arrangements in the disputed areas would be the basis 
of administration over these areas. Subsequently, however, the East Bengal 
government dispatched a notice to West Bengal stating that this arrangement could 
not be recognized by the government.22 Moreover, the telegram pointed out, that 
since the District Magistrate of Rajshahi possessed the records relating to the revenue 
collection of that area, it was he who could determine how the jurisdiction over the 
areas in dispute would fall. Yet getting the state governments to part with their 
revenue records was a nearly impossible task. What remained in the interim, 
however, with regard to cases of straying across the border, were a series of ad-hoc 
arrangements between provincial officers on both sides.  
One implication of the boundary line was that revenue and administrative records 
for districts that fell on the other side needed to be exchanged. In order to be able to 
effectively administer the areas falling within their side of the border, officials 
required copies of administration records of the districts or ‘thana’ units which had 
been divided by the partition. Such records included maps, police registers, and, 
most crucially, revenue records of these areas. A ‘mini-separation council’ set up for 
the administrative tasks of the division in Bengal, also ruled, ‘records which relate to 
the entire district, or two or more thanas which have fallen in the two different 
provinces should be copied, and each Province should have copies of these 
records.’23 Thus, in the case of the borderline with West Bengal, the records of the 
newly divided districts -- including 24 Paraganas, Maldah, Nadia, West Dinajpur 
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and Jalpaiguri in India, and Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Kushtia and Jessore, in East 
Pakistan—had to be divided. Yet, these transactions were frequently delayed. For 
example, revenue records relating to the Kushtia district had to be transferred from 
the Nadia collectorate in West Bengal. The matter was delayed, because the collector 
of Nadia, in West Bengal refused to hand over records such as touzi rolls and ledgers 
relating to estates that now lay in Kushtia, East Bengal. The collector of the district 
argued that the records need not be handed over, until the boundary disputes 
between Nadia and Kushtia districts were settled. This compliant was brought up at 
the next chief secretary’s conference, but, for the time being, the file also noted that 
this was not necessarily a disadvantage:  
‘If the government of West Bengal desire that they would not part with the 
revenue records now in dispute with regard to the Kushtia Nadia border, 
the division of records in the Matabhanga area in Daulatpur thana can be 
kept in abeyance now’.24  
This was also the case in the correspondence between the government of Assam, and 
East Bengal. The division of records between these two governments had been 
carried out to some extent, but remained incomplete. One reason that was often cited 
by district officials was that the border demarcation had to be finalized before 
relevant revenue records could be transferred to the other side. While the Assam 
government pressed for the transfer of those records relating to undisputed 
territories, East Bengal argued that the records not be transferred until the 
demarcation of the boundary, including the Patharia and Kasuriya hill tracts, was 
completed. They met with varying degrees of success; although some records 
relating to estates that fell exclusively into Assam were transferred, officials also 
noted:  
                                                
24 File No. PIII/54/19382/2, ‘Indo- Pakistan Boundary, Demarcation of Assam- East Bengal Sector’; 
MEA Archives, New Delhi 
Delineating the Boundary Line 
 161 
‘this will involve considerable time… Many bundles require handling 
several times- first in taking records of the disputed areas, and then in 
taking remaining records of Assam estates, and the Assam records 
relating to the common estates relating to disputed areas…’25  
Both sides were hesitant, and occasionally simply unequipped, to part with records 
relating to these boundary divisions. At the Chief Secretary’s Conference held at 
Shillong, in August 1955, it was acknowledged that the process of exchange of 
records had not been speedy. The Chief Secretaries promised to instruct the Deputy 
Commissioners of Cachar and Sylhet to see that the work of delivering the records 
be completed by December 1955.26 Yet, what these exchanges also show is that in the 
more remote areas of both countries, finalising the demarcation of the boundary was 
not necessarily a high priority. Delays in the process of demarcation amounted to a 
tacit understanding between the two countries about not having clearly defined 
borders in more remote areas. It was also recognised moreover, that it was in fact 
impossible to completely seal off sections of what was, in fact a very porous region. 
What both decided, however, was to embark on a process of cooperation that would 
enable sections of the border to be a boundary-in-progress, rather than finalising a 
irreversible sealing off.    
The demarcating of the boundary line between India and Pakistan reveal how 
notions of the sacrosanct territoriality of India and Pakistan was subject to a certain 
kind of skepticism in both governments: and this allowed for extensive lengths of the 
boundary line to be left unidentified for a substantial period of time after the 
partition. The ways in which the physical demarcation of Radcliffe’s boundary line 
was undertaken by both governments, reflect, moreover, a more conciliatory attitude 
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towards delineating the border than might be expected. Indeed, the extent, and 
nature, of cooperation on this issue are symptomatic of the larger impetus which 
propelled the bilateral relationship forward.  
Implementing the Boundary Line 
The ways in which India and Pakistan undertook to implement the boundary, 
therefore reveal not only how they developed the structures to ostensibly assert 
absolute authority over certain spaces in conjunction with one another; but also, how 
the authority of such structures was simultaneously left quite open-ended. While 
both governments repeatedly made their cases in terms of how the border should lie, 
as well as raising the numerous instances of trespass across the border, it was also 
recognized at the Chief Secretary’s conference that it was in fact impossible to 
impose an irreversibly ‘firm’ boundary onto the inhabitants of these areas. These 
meetings and conferences acted as a pressure valve in reducing the potential for 
more serious conflict arising from these differences. The proceedings of the Chief 
Secretary’s Conferences over 1948 – 1950, for instance, are filled with dispensing of 
incidents relating to problems along a badly delineated border. The physical 
drawing of the boundary line along stretches of East Bengal boundary line, for 
instance along Murshidabad- Joynagar, was less fraught than a depiction of two 
states hyper-sensitive about their security from one another would suggest. The 
question of inter- governmental dispute over the village of Joynagar was raised in 
the Chief Secretary’s Conference of May 1950.27 The main issue, in this case, came 
down to the railway lines that passed through the village of Joynagar, situated along 
the border in the Kushtia district. Both governments made cases for their jurisdiction 
over the village. The two sides’ case over who could claim jurisdiction over this area 
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hinged on who had previously exercised police jurisdiction. The report on this 
matter argued that ‘though the village Joynagar is actually included in thana 
Damurhuda of East Bengal according to the thana notification in force immediately 
before the partition, it has been under the actual control of West Bengal after the 
partition.’28 For the moment, however, the conference concluded, until the 
demarcation was carried out by the Directors of Land Revenue, both the state 
governments would accept the status quo with regard to the administration of the 
village. A similar decision was reached a few years later for the border along 
Goalpara and Rangpur. At the Chief Secretaries’ Conference in April 1952, the 
question of the as yet incomplete border demarcation between Goalpara and 
Rangpur was brought up. The Chief Secretaries agreed that until the boundary was 
properly demarcated, neither side would attempt to disrupt the status quo, or 
occupy by force any territory, whether disputed or not.29 Thus state officials on both 
sides were hesitant in disrupting a viable pattern of administration, even when such 
acts could technically be construed as being a violation of the others’ sovereignty. 
Physically demarcating a clumsily drawn boundary-line in more remote areas along 
the border, thus, were often simply left undone. Yet, it is important to note that such 
decisions were mutual and consensual.  
The other major topic of concern at the meetings related to the flow of traffic along 
the border, and the ways in which both governments ought to regulate this. ‘Border 
incidents’, when parties of cultivators would cross the border and try to seize goods 
and cattle from the other side, were also frequently topics of discussion at these 
meetings. The area north of the Piyan river, which acted as a boundary between the 
Khasi and Jaintya Hills in Assam, and Sylhet in East Pakistan, and where millet was 
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grown in large quantities, were a frequent site of such contestations.   In January 
1952, for instance, it was reported that crop reaping activities in this localities had 
been interfered with by ‘Pakistani armed forces’.30 The report alleged that ‘15 
personnel from the Pakistan armed forces in the Masimpur camp, accompanied by 
50- 60 Pakistani nationals of Gamirtola, Masimpur and Kandapara trespassed into 
Ulonngkuna, a village within Indian Union territory, and looted the properties of the 
whole village, worth Rs. 1,549.’31 Later that year, in December 1952, an instance of 
cow slaughter led to violence in the border district of Mankachar in Assam. A group 
of police men attacked nine Muslim men, and, in the nearby bazaar, further scuffles 
broke out. The Chief Commissioners’ report on the incident noted that ‘some local 
people got panicky and ran towards the border, but eventually returned’32. C. C. 
Biswas, the Indian Minister for minority affairs received a telegram about this 
incident from Azizuddin Ahmed, and ordered that the State Minority Commission 
visit the area. S. K. Datta in the government of Assam, in a letter to the center, noted 
that with regard to such incidents, the ‘local Army Commander has made it quite 
clear that our military forces are under strict orders not to get involved in such 
incidents.’33 Nonetheless, he added, incursions of such kind had been reduced after 
‘manning of our border posts this year with armed police and the infliction of sharp 
punishment to Pak armed trespassers in one or two places.’34 Yet, in general such 
incidents were  not dealt with, or actively pursued by either side. Indeed, a report on 
the frequency of such incidents noted: ‘It is observed that out of the 39 incidents on 
the borders of Assam- East Bengal reported during the year 1951, only 11 cases were 
taken up with the government of East Bengal by the government of Assam.’35 The 
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machinery for bilateral cooperation, thus allowed for such incidents being isolated 
from the larger matter of the sovereignty of either state.  
In 1953, the Government of Bihar suggested that restricting the use of firearms to 
prevent shooting in the border areas within a specified perimeter, be examined as a 
possible measure by the other state governments. While the state governments of 
Kutch, West Bengal and Punjab were in favour of this suggestion, Assam and 
Tripura argued against it. The Assam government felt that this would ‘interfere with 
the duties of their patrols along the border’, while the Tripura government argued, 
in view of the dependence of their inhabitants along the border regions on game 
from the forests resources, and ‘in the view of the absence of any natural features 
marking the boundary line, it will be difficult to determine the points in the border 
areas beyond which shooting was prohibited.’36 Moreover, the Home Ministry also 
noted that ‘this might be worth taking if we were faced with a situation where 
incidents of this nature were numerous, but, for the moment, they are not…’37 
Yet ‘border incidents’ continued to arise. In July 1951, the District Magistrates of 
Murshidabad, in West Bengal, and Rajshahi, in East Pakistan, met to discuss the 
recent case of ‘unripe paddy being cut and forcibly carried from lands falling in the 
Indian Union.’38 The two heard complaints from local residents, regarding the 
difficulties that arose from the ban on movement of paddy across the border, 
particularly for those who resided in one dominion, and cultivated lands in the 
other. Such appeals largely went unaddressed, and the ‘interim’ state of affairs was 
largely allowed to continue. Similarly, in February 1952, in the Char Narendrapur 
district in Murshidabad, another altercation over possession of a piece of land across 
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the border broke out, in which ‘a Pakistani national, with a cart and seven heads of 
cattle was arrested on the spot by Indian nationals’39. The letter from the government 
of West Bengal over this incident registered ‘a strong protest against such deliberate 
violation of Indian territory’.40  
Yet at a meeting between officials of Tripura State and the government of East 
Bengal, in January 1949, it was, agreed that ‘no useful purpose will be served by 
discussing such [border incidents] in detail, as both sides had a long list of 
complaints against the other and that joint enquiries may be if necessary conducted 
into major incidents only.’41 This was reiterated a few years later, at a meeting 
between the Pakistan Interior Minister and the Indian Home Minister in 1955. It was 
pointed out that a large number of border incidents were due to the indefinite nature 
of the boundary -- a situation which would improve only when the boundary was in 
fact finally demarcated. As an interim measure, however, it was also decided that 
the numbers of police posts along the border of both sides be adjusted so that they 
corresponded with one another, as this would correspondingly reduce the number 
of border incidents on either side.42  
Neither side wished to exhaustively pursue relatively minor cases of trespass across 
the border. Yet this also necessitated the establishment of a machinery for dialogue 
and cooperation for handling such cases. Putting such machinery in place allowed 
for both states to assert their control up until the boundary, yet curiously, at the 
same time also required a tacit agreement between the two sides on their inability to 
secure the more remote areas of the border. The machinery for bilateral cooperation 
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thus offered a means by which the incomplete nature of the border could be jointly 
papered over.   
Complaints regarding the unwarranted search and detainment of migrants of the 
minority community are an interesting example of the way in which the border was 
shaped. Check posts along the border, and the practices of customs and border 
officials, were subjects of lengthy bilateral discussion. In 1952, the branch secretariat 
in Calcutta had been in correspondence with the government of Pakistan regarding 
an ordinance passed by the latter, providing for more stringent measures to be taken 
to prevent smuggling. The Indian High Commission informed the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Karachi that the latest ordinance was ‘a unilateral violation of the 
existing agreements reached at the inter-dominion conference held at Calcutta in 
April 1948 and at New Delhi in December 1948’.43 Another letter from B. K. Acharya 
to the MEA in Delhi noted that the 1948 inter-dominion agreement had included 
provisions against unwarranted searches, inserted at the time at the insistence of the 
government of Pakistan, which had protested against the measures taken by the 
West Bengal government to prevent large scale smuggling of cloth.  The Chief 
Secretary to the Assam government complained to his counterpart in East Bengal, 
Azizuddin Ahmed, that ‘these armed forces stop the trains, busses, private cars etc 
near the border and conduct searches  even after the usual customs check by the Pak 
Customs staff…’.44 Similarly, in a letter written to I. A. Khan, Deputy Secretary of the 
Government of East Bengal, N. N. Chatterji, his counterpart, argued: ‘Ever since 
these border searches began, the evidence of oppression and harassment has 
mounted so alarmingly as thousands of frightened men and women and children 
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pour into West Bengal all along the border.’45 He added that ‘since great anxiety 
prevails in this State over this matter it is necessary from time to time to inform the 
people that this government are in urgent communication with the Government of 
East Bengal in order that such harassment and oppression might cease.’46 The 
government of Pakistan argued that smuggling had escalated to ‘scandalous 
proportions’ in the year 1951-2, and the provisions of the agreement were not 
intended to curtail either government to take preventive measures against such a 
‘menace’.47 Countless numbers of migrants complained of having been delayed and 
harassed by border officials on suspicion of smuggling jute, or cotton. Concerns 
about smuggling, thus, were an important factor in giving firmer shape to the 
border. At the same time, however, it was also recognised that border could not be 
effectively sealed off completely, and the flow of traffic from one side to the other 
needed to continue. This provided for a basis of cooperation and dialogue along the 
border, even while both sides protested against depredations by the other.  
The everyday lives of ‘borderlanders’ offer a prism through which to study the ways 
in which the authority of the state can be challenged, since the border areas are 
frequently found to lack sufficient infrastructure with which to assert the absolute 
authority of the state. That the imposition of an international border could have 
ambivalent meanings in the everyday lives of those living in the border area is a 
phenomenon which has been described in detail by a number of scholars looking at 
the evolution of boundary- lines into borders across the world.48 However it should 
also be recognized that the state itself is equally versatile in incorporating within 
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itself potential challenges to its functioning, and is as an active agent in the crafting 
of trans-national and   international identities.49 The very vagaries in how a border is 
formed, therefore, can also be indicative of, not merely the weaknesses of the reach 
of state infrastructure in these areas, but also its deliberate positioning with regard to 
how these ambivalences may be jointly controlled.  What is striking about the 
discussions on the border in this area is that they were less explosive than might 
have been expected. This allows us to consider the possibility that the actions of a 
state in delineating a borderline were not necessarily only geared towards 
perpetuating a violent relationship.  
Much of the rhetoric around the construction of the border also reveal the ways in 
which, what Krishna Shankaran has called the ‘cartographic anxiety’ of the nation 
state is constituted.50 Shankaran  has argued that the process of depicting maps of 
India, and the necessity of having this embossed on to the ‘national consciousness’, is 
constitutive of a cartographic anxiety of the nation state. Furthermore, such 
manifestations are also indicative of the very uncertainty of the state over the fixity 
of its territory. Yet, the manifestations of anxiety over the security of the border, and 
concerns about infringement into border areas, stand in marked contrast to the often 
messy ways in which these were delineated and imposed. For the India-Pakistan 
relationship, therefore, the boundary areas required the maintenance of a certain 
fiction: while both needed to assert their authority over the entirety of their 
territories, the ways in which their authority ended at a particular point were left 
unclear. Delineating a boundary line was undoubtedly critical to the notions of 
sovereignty of both countries. Yet, neither state was equipped to effectively man one 
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of the longest boundary lines in the world. Thus it was necessary for both to set in 
place structures which could take into account the vagaries of such a line, while at 
the same time protecting the notions of territorial integrity.  A mechanism for 
bilateral cooperation, thus was crucial for both states, even while they voiced 
vociferous accusations a each other for violating the boundary line. Cartographic 
silences and anxieties about this, thus, were mutually constituted.  
The Indus Water Dispute: A New Interpretation 
As has been seen, neither government in fact chose firmly to impose a border over its 
more remote territories. But their concerns about strictly delineating the boundary 
line were acute when the assets that they cordoned off were of perceived to be of 
great value.   
In Punjab, a key implication of Radcliffe’s boundary was its effect on the water 
supply and irrigation in the region. From the outset, both governments recognized 
that as a result of how Radcliffe’s boundary was drawn, they would need to 
negotiate over how control over the water supplies would be exercised. Effectively, 
the decade long negotiations over the Canal Waters were an act of border 
demarcation. The negotiations involved both sides making a case for how the waters 
could be divided for their separate uses. At the same time, although the Indus 
Waters treaty was signed only in 1960, a de-facto system of usage of sharing the 
canal waters had been set in place by 1948. Thus the Indus waters negotiations 
shared the characteristics of other boundary negotiations: an interim system had 
been put in place, while a formal decision was postponed.  
The Arbitral Tribunal had decided that the canal systems would be valued, and that 
both the provinces would pay a proportionate share of interest for its benefits. It 
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ruled that the government of West Punjab pay a tax for the waters received from the 
Indus canals, since the development from this irrigation had taken place mainly in 
areas that now fell in Pakistan.51 Similarly, in March 1948, the Tribunal attempted to 
decide how the financial settlements between the two Provinces, in terms of the 
division of assets and liabilities, could be worked out.52 The ratio upon which the 
financial settlement could be worked out, was however disputed between the two 
sides, with the East Punjab side trying to secure a greater sum of compensation from 
the other side. What became clear in the immediate aftermath of partition, therefore, 
was that the fact of the boundary line would necessarily change the terms in which 
access to irrigation systems would operate. Control over the irrigation systems 
would necessarily have to be negotiated through the additional minefield of India-
Pakistan relations.  
Preserving the unity of the irrigation canal systems of the Punjab had obviously been 
an overriding factor in the logic of drawing the boundary line across Ferozepur. 
Radcliffe noted that ‘…there are factors such as the disruption of railway 
communication and water disputes that ought in this case to displace the primary 
claims of a contiguous majority.’ He concluded by urging the two Dominions 
towards an ‘agreement … for some joint control of what has hitherto been a valuable 
common service… where the drawing of a boundary line cannot avoid disrupting 
such unitary services as canal irrigation, railways, electric power transmission.’53 It 
was almost immediately apparent, however, that this would not be the case. 
Agricultural cultivation in West Punjab was heavily dependent on irrigation plying 
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from ‘Bari Doab’ and ‘Dipalpur’ canal systems, whose headworks were located at 
Ferozepur, now in India. In November 1947, the Arbitral Tribunal, which oversaw 
the division of assets between the two Dominions heard a case submitted by Sardar 
Harnam Singh, Advocate General of East Punjab, and G. N. Joshi and Gurdev Singh 
from East Punjab.54 They argued that since West Punjab would continue to benefit 
from the irrigation canal system which been constructed by the province as a whole, 
‘East Punjab was entitled to a financial adjustment on the basis of capitalized profits 
from irrigation system of Punjab Province.’55 In December 1947, a ‘Standstill 
Agreement’ between the two Punjab governments was signed, to the effect that the 
provisions for irrigation across both states would continue as they had prior to the 
partition, upto 30 March 1948. This agreement would expire on the day the term of 
the Arbitral Tribunal ended.56  
The apprehension that, once the control of the head-works came to India, she would 
prove unwilling to equitably share the waters from the canal systems was justified. 
On 1 April 1948, a day after the term of the Arbitral Tribunal expired, the 
government of East Punjab cut off the supply of water going into West Punjab, on 
the grounds that in order for the water to continue to flow, the agreement would 
need to be formally extended. The East Punjab government argued that their actions 
were intended to clarify their exclusive ownership of the Upper Bari Doab Canal. 
They argued that, in the absence of any formal agreement, if East Punjab had not 
closed the water supply, at least temporarily, this might have led to West Punjab 
acquiring legal rights on the UBDC, for the benefit of the lower section of the Canal, 
                                                
54 ‘Select Documents on Partition of Punjab- 1947, India and Pakistan’, ‘Award of the Arbitral 
Tribunal on Reference of the Punjab Partition Committee’, pp 585 
55 ‘Award of the Arbitral Tribunal on Reference of the Punjab Partition Committee Reference No. 1’, 
Singh, Kirpal (ed.) Partition of the Punjab, 1947: India and Pakistan, p. 584 
56 For a discussion of the chronology of the Indus Waters dispute, see Michel, A. A. The Indus River: A 
Study of the Effects of Partition, New Haven, 1967
Delineating the Boundary Line 
 173 
now in Pakistan.57 Nehru’s letter to Gopichand Bhargava on the issue was 
disapproving: he was ‘greatly worried’, at the stoppage of canal water into Lahore, 
‘as there is little doubt that this act will injure us greatly in the world’s eyes’.58 
Moreover, he pointed out, such an action was, after all in the short term quite futile, 
since ‘water will have to be allowed in future because such stoppages cannot occur 
normally unless there is actual war’.59 Yet, the provincial government’s action was 
not unequivocally condemned by Delhi. It was generally accepted that although the 
water flow could not be stopped to Pakistan, such access would need to be 
determined on the basis of an agreement.    
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, a team was dispatched from Pakistan to 
work out a settlement for continuing water supply from the Upper Bari Doab Canals 
(UBDC) and other canal systems. This included the Finance Minister of Pakistan, 
Ghulam Muhammad, and two ministers of West Punjab, Shaukat Hayat Khan, and 
Mumtaz Daultana. An agreement was signed, on 4t May 1948, according to which 
Pakistan would have access to the water flow, and water was restored to the 
Dipalpur and UBDC canals. However, the agreement also specified that the West 
Punjab government seignorage charges to India for the cost of transporting the 
water. In addition, India would gradually diminish water supplies flowing into 
Pakistan, so West Punjab would have to tap alternative sources eventually. This 
agreement was fiercely criticized in Pakistan. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali asserted 
that its delegates had been forced to sign it because of the urgency of the 
circumstance, but was, as such, greatly against Pakistan’s favour. The agreement, 
Muhammad Ali continued, was laid out in front of Ghulam Muhammad, who was 
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‘asked to sign without changing a word or comma’.60 Yet although the government 
of Pakistan repeatedly criticised the treaty, and attempted to introduce modifications 
to its provisions, it remained the main basis of water sharing over the next decade.      
Ghulam Muhammad, who in 1948 had come to Delhi as a delegate for the conference 
regarding Indus Waters, visited Nehru. It was clear that the Agreement discussed 
was not to Pakistan’s satisfaction. Ghulam Muhammad pressed for a ‘provisional 
agreement might be arrived at so that water should be paid for by the East Punjab 
government, and supplied by the West Punjab government.’61 Nehru was, however, 
clear that ‘After the provisional agreement which ended on 31 March, and the 
Arbitral Award, the rights in the canal head-works and the water vested completely 
in East Punjab.’62 In a famous interview, he told the journalist Nicholas Mosley, 
‘What India did with India’s rivers was India’s concerns.’ In 1953, the site of the 
Bhakra dam construction, moreover, moved Nehru sufficiently enough for him to 
declare that it was ‘something tremendous, something stupendous, something which 
shakes you up when you see it. Bhakra, the new temple of resurgent India, is the 
symbol of India’s progress’.63  
The Indian Prime Minister, for all his concerns about peace with Pakistan, was in fact 
fairly easy to persuade for putting on a strong defence of the Canal Waters issue. The 
use of the water to prioritise India’s development was, not in the end, something 
which that could be compromised. His concerns mainly related to how adversely 
India would be affected in the world’s eyes over the sharing of the waters. He noted 
wearily write to Gopalaswami Ayyangar ‘I do hope that there is going to be no 
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cutting off the water supply on the part of East Punjab. This will give a great outcry 
against us all over the place’.64  
Although the agreement of May 1948 formed the basis for further negotiations, it 
was also clear that it would not be unquestioningly adhered to, by either side. Just 
how this treaty could be defined, however, posed further questions. One option was 
to register the May 1948 Agreement with the United Nations, thereby formalising it 
into an international treaty. This debate, however, opened up a veritable hornet’s 
nest with regard to India-Pakistan relations. The main advantage for registering the 
agreement was so that it could later be cited as justification, when, as was widely 
expected, Pakistan would bring its case on the Canal Waters dispute, to the 
International Court of Justice.65 Nehru was, however, unimpressed by this logic. He 
argued ‘it is exceedingly doubtful whether such interim agreements can be 
considered international agreements of the kind referred to Article 102 of the UN 
Charter. It is certainly not a treaty... I see no particular good coming from 
registration, and it may well result in complications and needless troubles for us.’66 
He also argued that by this logic, all the scores of inter-dominion, and inter-
provincial agreements that had thus far been signed, would have to also be 
registered by the United Nations. Formalising the agreement in itself was not 
particularly appealing to New Delhi: the major incentive that the Indus Waters 
Treaty had offered was the opportunity of funding from the World Bank.  
So the positions that India and Pakistan took with regard to the Indus Canal dispute 
had been more or less set in the first few months of its arising. India and Pakistan 
embarked on separate courses of development almost immediately following 
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Independence, and, within a few years of Independence, were firmly committed to 
for projects for the separate utilisation of waters of the Indus Basin. Yet, given such a 
potentially serious cause for conflict, revolving, after all, around access to a very 
basic commodity—what is notable, is that the bilateral relationship was able to 
encompass it without resorting to war.  
Although the agreement was renewed at various intervals, its terms were strongly 
disputed by Pakistan. There was disagreement with regard to the sum for the 
‘seignorage charges’.67 Furthermore, water was not restored to some of the smaller 
distributaries flowing into Pakistan.68 Muhammad Ali was the leader of the Pakistan 
delegation at an Inter-dominion Conference held in Karachi in March 1950. 
Although alternatives to the current arrangements were explored, such as building 
additional storage dams(jointly funded by India and Pakistan) were discussed, these 
plans were shelved fairly quickly in favour of continuing the terms of the Delhi 
Agreement. From India’s perspective, moreover, a series of interim measures 
regarding the water share, worked out between the provinces, would have been a 
sufficient answer. Nehru wrote to Gopalaswami Ayyangar: ‘On the whole I do not 
see why we should  worry greatly... the 4 May Agreement entitles us to use the 
water progressively for East Punjab, [and] take any other steps that we might 
consider desirable.’69 The agreement of May 1948, was indeed, repeatedly referred to 
by India in their subsequent negotiations with Pakistan over the Canal Waters issue.  
The government of East Punjab, however was particularly insistent that any 
agreement with Pakistan was to be done on terms that would secure India the right 
to access the share of water required for her own uses. In September 1950, C. M. 
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Trivedi wrote to Nehru on the issue of the upcoming Inter-dominion Conference to 
discuss the Indus Waters. He argued that Pakistan’s proposals that no further 
irrigation works be embarked on pending further arbitration on the matter would 
not be satisfactory to India. This would imply that the work on the Harike and 
Bhakra Projects would be halted.70 He argued that it was essential for the conference 
to come to the understanding that ‘there can be no question whatever of stopping 
the works at Bhakra or Nangal.’71 The provincial governments of both the Punjabs, 
thus, were critical in shaping the Indus Waters negotiations, as well, indeed, as the 
interim sharing of the river waters.  
As the summer of that year wore on, both countries embarked on irrigation projects 
which contradicted the ‘Standstill Agreement’. In May, Nehru learnt of an irrigation 
project being embarked on in West Punjab, by which waters from the Sutlej, hitherto 
flowing from the Ferozepur and Dipalpur headworks, would be diverted. This 
could, Nehru wrote to Sri Prakasa, ‘render the headworks at Ferozepur itself 
useless’.72 Work also began in Pakistan on the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River, as 
part of the effort to have a secure water supply.73 Nehru dispatched cables to Liaquat 
and Zafrullah Khan, on 18 May, warning that this would adversely affect the supply 
of water in India: ‘Should West Punjab complete this work it would cause a disaster 
for the Ganga Canal Colony in Bikaner State. East Punjab government would not be 
able to feed their canal throughout the winter… and possibly, even during the 
summer.’74 The reply from Zafrullah Khan on this was unapologetic. In view of their 
recent experience, Zafrullah asserted, ‘you will agree that the government of West 
                                                
70 C. M. Trivedi to Nehru, 2 September 1950, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945- 1950, Vol 10,  
Chp. 15, p.427 
71 Ibid 
72 Nehru to Sri Prakasa, 16 June 1948, SWJN, SS, Vol. 6, p. 74 
73Ali, Chaudhry Muhammad, Emergence of Pakistan, p. 324. The Thal project was also commenced, 
which also provided employment and opportunities for settlement for refugees in West Punjab.  
74 Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, 18 May 1948, SWJN, SS, Vol. 6, p. 66 
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
 
 178 
Punjab are fully justified in taking precautionary measures.’75 Moreover, he argued 
the government of West Punjab would continue to take precautions to ensure a 
secure supply of water within its own territory, ‘subject to saving our full legal rights 
and any final agreement.’76 It was thus clear from a very early stage that irrigation 
works based on the utilization of the Indus Canals would have to be carried out for 
the separate purposes of India and Pakistan.  
The provincial governments continued, however, to limp along in an awkward and 
unwilling cooperation. In September 1948, the Chief Engineers of both sides met at 
Wagah to talk over further details with regard to the water sharing system. Over the 
question of payment by West Pakistan, N. D. Gulhati, leader of the Indian delegation 
in the World Bank negotiations, and an irrigation engineer, noted that the 
agreements had been arrived at by the provincial, and not central, governments.77 
This agreement—technically unrecognized by both central governments—allowed 
for a certain fixed quota of water share for both the provinces78. The amount that the 
West Punjab government was liable to pay for the irrigation waters was in dispute. 
Water continued to be supplied, however, on the condition that the disputed 
payment continue to be made to an ‘escrow’ account- one which could not be used 
for India’s purposes79. Indeed, when a letter of complaint arrived from M. R. 
Sachdev, Chief Secretary of East Punjab arrived at the Ministry of External Affairs, 
arguing that ‘Pakistan has refused to make any ‘disputed’ payments… even though 
it continues to enjoy the benefits of canal water’, Y. K. Puri at the Ministry replied 
saying that, in strictly legal terms, ‘a mere denial of the validity of the agreement, 
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and refusal to deposit the disputed sums are not in themselves enough to invalidate 
the Agreement of 1948.’80 Thus, New Delhi was largely in favour of allowing the 
continuation of the 1948 canal waters agreement, although the government in Punjab 
argued that it was entitled to more compensation from Pakistan.  
Meanwhile, the MEA received a letter from the Foreign Ministry in Pakistan relating 
to the everyday maintenance of the ‘left marginal bund at Suleimanke’, which would 
require permission by Indian officials to allow entry to Pakistani engineers.81 The 
letter argued that more facilities should be afforded to Pakistan for its engineers to 
visit, and carry out maintenance works at the left marginal bund at Suleimanke. In 
any case, it continued, ‘The owners of the head-works in either case are interested in 
the proper upkeep of the marginal bund located in the other country.’82 It was 
quickly retorted that this would be contingent on Indian engineers having access to 
dam controls in Ferozepur, which were located within west Punjab. ‘The only 
practicable arrangement’, noted S. K. Banerji in the MEA, would be for the engineers 
of the Indian and Pakistani Punjab to come to an informal understanding that dam 
controls operative to the other country, but located on this side of the border, would 
be maintained on either side. However, it was also repeatedly argued that it would 
be unwise to commit to formal arrangements with Pakistan regarding the 
maintenance and upkeep of the canal systems which might imply any surrender of 
its own control over them. What was recommended regarding these questions, in 
terms of how strictly the boundary should be laid down in view of these 
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considerations, was that a series of ‘informal arrangements’ come into being with the 
state governments across the border.83  
It became clear relatively quickly, however, that any system of joint usage of the 
basin would be impossible to achieve. Such development would entail a 
specification by either country of the amount of water it was liable to lose. All 
construction however had to be carried out without foreign aid. India and Pakistan 
had applied to the World Bank – then known as the International Bank fro 
Reconstruction and Development -- for funds, but were refused on the grounds that 
the World Bank could not fund development works which were disputed 
internationally. In December 1950, India received some bad news from the World 
Bank over an application it had made for financial and technical assistance over its 
projected Bhakra Dams, owing to concerns that this could exacerbate further the 
tensions between India and Pakistan over the canal waters. In 1951, the Bank did, 
however offer to mediate between the two sides over the canal waters question. In a 
letter to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Eugene Black, the President of the 
World Bank, offered his offices for mediating in the dispute. Solutions which ‘meet… 
the requirements of both countries for expanded irrigation though cooperative 
construction and operation of storage dams and other facilities [would] be financed 
in part, perhaps by this Bank’. Although both sides accepted, certain premises laid 
out by the Bank already caused unease. One such cause was a committal to the 
‘future needs’ for water and a matter of debate whether this could be categorically 
fixed, within a system of joint usage.84  
By 1952, it was decided that the  ‘eastward’ rivers, of Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, which 
were flowing within India, would be for the exclusive use of India; while the 
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westward rivers of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were for the use of Pakistan.85 Yet 
this seemingly simple solution took nearly ten years to finally formalise. The 
completed agreement, finally signed in September 1960, would be successfully 
implemented only when both countries would receive massive funds, not only from 
the World Bank, but other aid-giving countries, to be able to fulfil their sides of the 
promises. The Treaty was worded to avoid mention of the Kashmir dispute, and 
provided for, moreover a set of back-up mechanisms for any situations likely to arise 
that would contravene its functioning. The agreement on the Canal Waters was also 
therefore an act of border demarcation: of a division which had been recognized in 
practice over a considerable length of time, and the agreement was a means by 
which this was officially recognized. At the same time, however, both sides had 
continued to tap the water as they required. There was unwillingness, moreover, on 
both sides to formally sign away right to use of waters from rivers that flowed in the 
other country.  
It is worth exploring, then, the reasons why either country chose to enter into the 
treaty.86 The terms of the treaty provided for the setting up of an ‘Indus Basin 
Development Fund’ to which the World Bank, as well as other countries would 
contribute a sum of some 640 million dollars to construct replacement works in 
Pakistan, as well as additional water resource development projects in India. The 
government of East Punjab was strongly in favour of signing the treaty, and had 
welcomed the prospect of funding and investment from the Bank. The solution that 
                                                
85 For a discussion of the World Bank negotiations for the waters treaty, see also Nehru, B. K. Nice 
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both sides chose to grasp at, moreover, was one that provided a lasting division of 
the water supplies, and prospects for the perusal of divergent policy directions with 
respect to the development of the Indus Basin.87  
The Indus Treaty was not hailed in either country as a triumphant success. 
Accepting it meant that possibilities for the optimal development of the Indus Basin 
were given up by both sides. Had the initial proposals of the World Bank for joint 
usage of the Indus Canals been accepted, benefits immensely valuable to two 
poverty-stricken countries, such as the development of hydro- electric projects, 
would not have been foregone.88 Critics in both countries felt that the other stood to 
gain more from the Treaty. Pakistani critics of the treaty argued that she ‘sold’ the 
waters of the Eastern Rivers to India, and had received inadequate compensation in 
return. Similarly, in India it was felt that the provisions of the Treaty had been too 
lenient with Pakistan, who obtained from it, a better position for potential 
development.  
Yet those in favour of the treaty felt that it presented the best outcome possible 
under the circumstances. Muhammad Ayub Khan, who had come to power in 
Pakistan by the time the treaty was signed, writes in his autobiography ‘… The only 
sensible thing to do was to try and get a settlement, even though it might be second 
best, because if we did not, we stood to lose everything… while there was no cause 
for rejoicing at the signing of the treaty, there was certainly cause for satisfaction that 
a possibly very ugly situation had been averted’. 89 This argument is echoed in an 
article by Jagat Mehta, who had argued that while the opportunity costs that were 
                                                
87 Undala Z. Alam, Water Rationality: Mediating the Indus Waters Treaty, Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of Durham, 1998 
88 Mehta, J., Mehta, J., ‘The Indus Water Treaty: A Case Study in the Resolution of an International 
River Basin Conflict’, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 12, No 1, Feb. 1988  
89 Muhammad Ayub Khan. Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, London 1967 
Delineating the Boundary Line 
 183 
given up in terms of a joint development of the Indus Basin were immense, the 
Indus Treaty was the best solution under the circumstances.90 
The India-Pakistan border, therefore, was always a negotiable quantity. The process 
of implementing the boundary line was often based on a series of interim 
arrangements, rather than a sudden snapping. The negotiations about the border 
demarcation revolved around what best terms could be secured for both countries 
with it in place, rather than a contestation of how the awards were made in the first 
place. Even given the many problems with what the borderline was, as well as the 
daunting complexities in actually imposing it, the decisions made in both countries 
was to proceed with this borderline – in some places, simply notionally, but in other 
places, with grim precision.. The process of implementing this borderline required a 
certain kind of agreement on the part of the two new governments. Bilateral 
negotiations on the physical demarcation of the borderland revealsome areas of 
fierce contestation over the securing of as much territory as possible, and much as a 
matter-of-fact consideration of the extent to which the boundary could actually be 
imposed between the various border provinces of India and Pakistan. This called for 
a variety of approaches, yet it was consistently agreed by both sides that a bilateral 
mechanism was necessary to come to terms of agreement as to how an often 
‘invisible’ boundary line could be translated into the division of rights and 
responsibilities in the areas that it cut through. Such cooperation was necessary for 
maintaining the de facto notions of sovereignty of both sides, but also had implicit 
within it a tacit agreement of the need to jointly paper over the de jure limits to such 
notions.    
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BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON EVACUEE 
PROPERTY   
 
The evacuee property debates in India and Pakistan took place at a critical juncture. 
They were had while Constituent Assemblies in both countries were sitting, and 
offered a critical opening into establishing firm positions on citizenship, and re- 
examining principles of the ownership of land. They also asserted control over the 
means by which inter-dominion contacts between refugees and their assets could be 
controlled.  
Decisions on the question of regulation of evacuee property were made, moreover at 
a time when both governments faced overwhelming demands from their new 
citizens for the use of abandoned evacuee lands. Evacuees in both countries looked 
to their governments to provide compensation for the assets they had had to leave 
behind. This was actively vocalised and pursued by various sections of the 
government on both sides, who pressurised in favour of greater resources being 
granted for refugee rehabilitation. In a letter to Nehru, a senior Indian refugee 
politician, Mehr Chand Khanna wrote, that as far as the evacuee property question 
was concerned ‘The average displaced person… though he may acknowledge that 
something has been done for him, he feels that his ultimate rehabilitation is largely 
dependent upon the liquidation of his own assets in Pakistan’.1 Similarly, these 
impulses also crystallised particularly clearly in the speeches of Tafazzal Ali, a 
member of the Legislative Assembly of East Bengal. During a debate on the 
measures the state could take to requisition evacuee land, he pointed out, ‘the 
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partition of Bengal was an unexpected event, and though I am sure it will be 
considered unfortunate by both Hindus and Muslims, the partition had to be 
accepted as a compromise. The partition lead to a great deal of speculation in lands, 
[and unless the authority of the state to requisition land is strengthened], it will give 
impetus to people to sell of their lands, which will lead to profiteering in lands…’2  
The whole question of refugee resettlement had led to a great deal of tension 
between the centre, and provinces, in both countries. Urban centres across the 
northern part of the subcontinent found themselves engulfed by a sea change in 
demography resulting from the scale of partition migration, which presented many 
critical tasks for both the governments. The most pressing of these were refugee 
rehabilitation. Provincial ministers regularly hurled accusations at the centre over its 
unhelpfulness in the matter of rehabilitation of refugees, as well as asserting their 
own inability to accommodate more numbers. This necessitated a form of 
cooperation between the two governments in order to decide how the evacuee 
property question on both sides could be utilised. The task of rehabilitation required 
cooperation with the other side in being able to produce land for refugee allotment.  
What was also remarkable about the progress of the evacuee property legislations in 
both India and Pakistan was that they were almost clean mirror images of each 
other, reciprocating increasingly restrictive control of the Custodian over property.  
The Civil and Military Gazette of May 1950 commented ‘The constantly growing 
mass of increasingly complicated rules and regulations, which the two governments 
have formulated for the control of evacuee property, apparently in keen competition 
with each other has caused H. E. the Governor of the Punjab to remark that 
government policy seems chiefly concerned with safeguarding this property against 
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its rightful owners.’3 Yet, although the negotiations on evacuee property were 
frequently portrayed as being mired in deadlock and non- compromise, it is 
nonetheless important to examine the dialogue that was carried out on this question, 
as well as to explore the considerable areas in which the two sides spotted 
opportunities for compromise. While negotiations on this question were consistently 
skewed against the interests of evacuees being able to exercise control over their 
lands while in the other dominion, the ways in which this was implemented was 
strikingly similar on both sides, and was, moreover, premised on a mutual 
agreement on the need to sever as much as possible, inter-dominion control by 
individuals, over assets.    
What evacuees attempting to re- establish control over their property quickly 
discovered, were the growing tentacles of the office of the custodian of evacuee 
property, and the restriction placed in the way of their individual transfer, sale, or 
exchange of the land. Yet, the process through which these decisions were enacted in 
both countries was remarkably consistent. Although the legislations passed with 
regard to evacuee property were not necessarily aimed at enabling a greater control 
of evacuees over the properties they left behind, it was nonetheless important to both 
governments to discuss the nature of these legislations, and to attempt their 
calibration. 
This was a difficult task, since the kinds of properties that this entailed, as well as 
their geographical spread, meant that there could not be a uniform approach by 
either government on how these could be regulated. Evacuees looked to their 
government for recompensation of assets both tangible and notional: their properties 
included various types of titles to land, bank account savings and pensions, as well 
as moveable assets whose worth was highly valuable, such as machinery and factory 
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equipment. The ways in which these assets could be sold or transferred was a critical 
task in the bilateral relationship between the two Dominions. Indeed, the very 
infrastructure required for the dialogue on evacuee property necessitated a 
significant expansion in the machinery of bilateral relations: both governments set 
up a huge number of offices to deal with the claims on property from the other side.    
Moreover, the story of the evacuees’ property was also closely linked with measures 
that both governments took for relief and rehabilitation of incoming migrants. What 
both governments repeatedly examined in their debates, were how the definition of 
the evacuee could be settled, and the corresponding arrangements of who would be 
entitled to rehabilitation from the state. It was recognised that measures which were 
too drastic in this regard could lead to further instability and volatility in the 
populations of both countries. So, the construction of the terms ‘evacuee’ as well as 
‘evacuee property’ entered the domain of Indo-Pakistani relations. Evacuee property 
laws in both countries were increasingly characterised in terms of their hostility to 
the minority community in both countries, and acquired the potential to drive out 
the minorities from their properties.  
This process, however, was not smooth, and there was consistently an articulate 
critique against the perils of excessive appropriation of evacuee land. Attempts to 
address such concerns, thus, formed the crux of the bilateral negotiations on evacuee 
property. The two governments wrangled extensively on who an evacuee was- and 
therefore whose land could be appropriated by the Custodian of Evacuee Property- 
and thus shaped, not only the contours of their own debates on citizenship, but also 
the measures adopted by both governments simply to acquire more land. Yet, this 
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was a hugely complicated undertaking, and which left a permanent mark on the 
structures of governance in both India and Pakistan.4  
Mechanisms determining exactly how land should be prized away from evacuees, 
needed to be decided, and evolved bilaterally. Indeed, evacuee property was a 
pivotal issue which shaped how relations between the two countries would proceed. 
Significantly, this was treated by both governments as a bilateral and diplomatic 
issue. This required an enormous amount of mutual exchange of rent records and 
details of land holdings of refugee claimants. The institutions for bilateral 
cooperation were at their most successful, for instance, in cases of retrieving the 
movable assets of evacuees, and transferring them between the dominions. Indeed, 
the very infrastructure built for mediating these negotiations- the conferences, the 
prominent position that diplomatic missions had for dealing with problems relating 
to evacuee property- gave additional weight to the diplomatic infrastructure that 
both countries established in their relations with each other. This chapter will 
examine how the debates on Evacuee Property were inscribed onto the bilateral 
relationship between India and Pakistan.  
The ways in which the transfers of populations shaped the nature of politics, and 
patterns of land ownership in both rural and urban settings have been recently 
examined in localised, as well as on wider basis, by several prominent historians of 
post colonial south Asia.5 They have shown that patterns of refugee resettlement 
were critical in fashioning the urban demographics and politics of both post colonial 
nation states. The rehabilitation of refugees was critical in fashioning the narrative of 
legitimacy to both nation states. Moreover, as Sarah Ansari has pointed out, the 
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tussle between the muhajir population and original settlers in the province of Sindh 
was crucial in how the politics of that province evolved. Similarly, in ‘The Long 
Partition’, Vazira Zamindar argued that the tussle over evacuee property was one of 
the lengthy – and unresolved – shadows that partition left behind. Zamindar 
demonstrates how the hierarchy of prioritisation of who could own land took shape 
after the partition:  In India, Hindu males were ideally placed, while Muslim 
property owners struggled to retain control over their lands. Zamindar demonstrates 
how the Office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property shaped the politics of 
minorities rights in the two post-colonial states.6 The process of being named an 
‘evacuee’, and therefore potentially being divested of ones’ land, were critically 
bound to the logic of the Custodians’ office.  
However, the mutual inter-referentiality between the two governments in fashioning 
the rules around the control over evacuee property has been studied in less detail.7 
In her recent work, Joya Chatterji has shown how the evacuee property legislations 
were mirrored on both sides of the border, and argues that this was a key component 
in the shaping of the nation states of India and Pakistan. These decisions on the right 
to own land were also part of an attempt in both countries to make this an exclusive 
decision: it was not possible to own land in both countries. In this sense, cooperation 
on the issue of evacuee property was a most essential task, since it entailed the clear 
assertion of the directions that both governments wanted to adopt, on the question 
of laws on the ownership of property. Yet, neither Chatterji nor Zamindar have 
explained how this ‘mirror image’ actually came about through diplomatic dialogue. 
Nor do they take into account the fact that this was also a fairly contingent process, 
and there was a good deal of dissent and criticism voiced in both governments over 
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the progress of handling the evacuee property question. Thus, the question that this 
chapter seeks to address is: if it was always inevitable that the property of evacuees 
would be appropriated by the state, then why were there a series of conferences on 
evacuee property? This chapter will, therefore highlight how the element of bilateral 
cooperation was necessary in the making of evacuee laws, since not only was the 
acquisition of assets for rehabilitating refugees crucial to both governments, it was 
also necessarily to effectively sever the trans- dominion ownership of property.   
Office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property 
The situation was discussed formally between the governments as early as August 
1947, at a meeting of the Joint Defence Council, chaired by Mountbatten. In 
September that year, a joint statement was issued, to the effect that all illegal seizures 
of abandoned property would not be recognised by either government and that 
Evacuee land would be temporarily put under the protection of a Custodian of 
Evacuee Property. The Office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property which was 
established as an emergency, and as a provisional measure, quickly came to be 
identified with a pressing need of the state: more land, for incoming refugees. In 
August 1949, T. B. Coeh, an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Karachi 
wrote to the Ministry of External Affairs protesting against ‘discriminatory laws 
affecting Muslims are enforced in areas in India in contravention of an Inter-
dominion Agreement, and in a spirit of revenge against Muslims’.8 The office of the 
Custodian placed increasing restrictions in the way of the individual transfer, sale, or 
exchange of land. Yet, these regulations were also the product of bilateral dialogue.  
The role of the Custodian’s Office, a circular noted in 1949, would include informing 
its officers of ‘all instructions, directives, copies of all inter-dominion agreements’; 
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and, moreover, ‘all instructions having a bearing on policy or inter-dominion 
relations shall be issued only in consultation with the ministry of rehabilitation.’9 
Furthermore, since the notion of ‘evacuee property’ became synonymous with that 
of rehabilitation, the acquisition of more property by the Custodian became a 
legitimate pursuit by that office, frequently regardless of the current location of the 
owner.  
The ways in which control over evacuee property was farmed out to the offices of 
the Custodian, and was to be integrated into the programs of rehabilitation in the 
country, had been defined by 1948. The Pakistan Protection of Evacuees Property 
Ordinance defined this as property that was obtained from an evacuee on or after 
the 1 August, 1947. The Rehabilitation Commissioner of the government of Pakistan 
was to repair the dislocation to the economic life of the Dominion, and authorised to 
undertake expenditure for ‘the management of abandoned property and dispose of 
movable property subject to directions issued by the Custodian of the Evacuee 
Property’. The Protection of Evacuee Property Ordinance of Pakistan, passed in 1948 
provided for the ‘appointment of one or more Custodians of Evacuee Property in 
such areas as may be specified by a notification.’ Moreover, in these areas, the 
Custodian was entitled to examine, and if necessary, revoke, leases for agricultural 
land granted after the 1 August 1947.10  
Once the offices of the Custodian of Evacuee Property were established in the 
Rehabilitation Ministry, their functioning required a separate logic. The task of the 
Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation evolved from being a temporary caretaker of 
evacuee property, into a more permanent entity within a few years of the partition. 
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The drive to acquire more land under the jurisdiction of the custodian became 
predominant. The working of this ministry was premised on the understanding that 
control over lands left behind by evacuees had to be better integrated within the 
working of the government, rather than left to open negotiation regarding questions 
of ownership. Indeed, the major preoccupation of the Indian Ministry for Relief and 
Rehabilitation in the early years after independence, was how control over Evacuee 
Property could be tightened. One letter from a Joint Secretary in the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Ministry, V. D. Dantyagi, to all state governments where the 
agreement would operate stated that ‘As the number of refugees to be provided for 
in the Indian Union is still considerable, it is requested that restoration of property to 
evacuee owners should be allowed only after obtaining the consent of this 
Ministry’.11  
In India, the office of the Custodian became increasingly concerned with limiting the 
sales of Muslim property holders, of what was potentially evacuee land. A letter 
from the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to the provincial governments 
included within the ‘Agreed Areas’ of the Evacuee Property agreement, urged that 
they take suitable steps to ‘prevent the frittering away of Muslim property by sale, 
especially to non refugees’.12 The means of privately disposing off of property by 
Muslims in India was certainly strictly restricted, and the Ministry of Relief and 
Rehabilitation went to considerable lengths to ensure that this be stemmed. A note 
from the Ministry of Rehabilitation to state governments stated ‘the government of 
India are anxious to have all available information regarding any attempts by 
Muslims to remove their property or its sale proceeds to Pakistan.’ To this end, it 
continued, ‘censoring communications between India and Pakistan, we have been 
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able to secure very valuable information leading to the property of Muslims, which 
had previously escaped undetected.’13  
The question of how this process could become more efficient became a foremost 
concern at the Ministry of Rehabilitation. For example, in July 1949, one proposal 
from the Ministry of Rehabilitation argued that it would be more efficient to make 
the administration of Evacuee Property into a Central (rather than provincial) 
subject. This, argued V. D. Dantyagi, joint secretary at that ministry, would ensure 
uniformity of legislation relating to Evacuee Property in all areas of the country, as 
well as enable quick action in a matter that was a subject of discussion with a foreign 
country.14 The issue of the expansion of lands under the control of the Custodian of 
Evacuee Property also entered into the dialogue between the two countries. Indian 
delegates pressed for the expansion of the area in which the writ of the Custodian 
would apply. This would imply that the amount of land under the control of the 
custodian -- and therefore more removed from complete ownership by evacuees--
could increase. This became increasingly central in the negotiations at the Inter-
dominion Conferences. 
In India, the issue of how the writ of Evacuee Property Law was to be extended, and, 
if it were centrally enacted, it could apply to the state governments of Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh, and, subsequently, Hyderabad, were also repeatedly considered. By July 
1949, less than a year after the police annexation of the state, discussions to extend 
the Evacuee Property Law in Hyderabad were underway. Extension of central 
legislation on administering evacuee property entailed that provisions of previous 
State law on the subject would no longer apply. The issue arose as to how an 
Evacuee would be defined in the case of Hyderabad, where large scale migration 
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had recently taken place as a result of the police action. In July 1949, a meeting of 
representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation, external affairs, and various 
State governments was held to discuss this question. The question of migration as a 
result of the police action should bear on a person being declared an evacuee was 
discussed. However this did not alter the definition of an evacuee, since ‘It was 
pointed out that the police action itself was a result of the setting up of the two 
Dominions and that the migration to Pakistan was also a corollary of that event’.15  
By August 1952, the possibility of the utilisation of evacuee property for the benefit 
of displaced persons in India had taken firm shape. In September 1952, a conference 
was held at the Central Secretariat Office in New Delhi, where the machinery for 
implementing such a re-distribution was held.16 The ministry of rehabilitation was 
contemplating the ways in which the claims of displaced persons from West 
Pakistan could be compensated. These advantages of various schemes were to be 
considered at a Secretaries conference, at which a representative from the ministry of 
external affairs would also be present.17 One option was that the ‘titles of evacuee 
owners would be extinguished by enacting special legislation so that permanent 
titles may be conferred on the buyers and allottees of evacuee property’.18 If such a 
course were to be taken, the matter would have to be handled carefully, and a 
meeting of the Cabinet took place on the 19th of August 1952 to consider its various 
dimensions. Those present included Nehru, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, by now 
Minister of Defence, and Ajit Prasad Jain, the Minister for Rehabilitation. Since a 
great deal of evacuee land was falling into disrepair and incurring unsustainable 
expenditure to the government it was argued, the best course would therefore be to 
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formally hand over such properties to refugees, and quash the titles that evacuees 
held over this land. At this meeting, it was decided that the ministry of rehabilitation 
would dispatch a note to the government of Pakistan stating that the Indian 
government would be happy to accept arbitration on the matter by a group of people 
agreed to by both governments, or by reference to an international court. 
Subsequently, the Indian prime minister could write to the Pakistan prime minister 
over this matter. At the same time, the ministry of rehabilitation would prepare a 
draft bill along the lines of their proposed measures with regard to Evacuee 
property. In his opening address at the conference for redistributing evacuee 
property, the Indian minister for relief and rehabilitation stated ‘While we are 
approaching the Pakistan government for a settlement of the evacuee property 
question, as you know, we cannot expect much from Pakistan. Perhaps, there may be 
some counter- accusations. Anyway, we have now decided to proceed in our own 
way, whether Pakistan agrees, or does not agree’.19 
 
Evacuee Property Conferences 
Inter-dominion conferences on evacuee property were held in quick succession over 
1948 and 1949. They were attended by a diverse cast of characters, who came from 
across the political spectrum in both countries, including Gopalaswami Ayyangar, 
the Indian Minister without Portfolio, Mehr Chand Khanna, an Indian minister for 
rehabilitation, and the Pakistani ministers for rehabilitation, Khwaja Shahbuddin, 
and Mian Iftikaruddin. These included several inter-ministerial and prime-
ministerial conferences, held at frequent intervals immediately after partition; in 
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Delhi in December 1947; in Lahore in March 1948; Dhaka in April 1948; Lahore in 
July 1948, and Karachi in January 1949, May 1949 and April 1950. Much of the 
exchange at the early Inter-dominion Conferences on Evacuee Property was, in fact, 
constructive dialogue on how this problem could be handled. But its premise had 
increasingly shifted towards the understanding that considerations of ownership on 
land in the other dominion were unviable. 
Negotiations on evacuee property concerned three kinds of property: that of 
agricultural property, urban immovable property, and finally movable property. The 
subject matter of evacuee property conferences concerned the terms of negotiation, 
the scope of agreement over the kinds of evacuee property laws to be constituted, 
who they would apply to, and where they would apply. The terms of these 
conferences concerned the disposal of evacuee property claims in ‘agreed areas’ 
which had been marked out in both countries. According to the proposed 
agreements, evacuee property, located within certain ‘agreed areas’ in both countries 
could be disposed off by their owners, by means of sale or exchange with other 
evacuees. ‘Agreed areas’ were those localities from which mass migration had taken 
place, and a large part of the negotiations concerned what could be done with these 
properties. While large parts of the Punjab had come under the agreed areas in the 
rehabilitation scheme after the partition, the continuing flow of refugees from other 
parts of the subcontinent, such as Bengal and Bombay, led to the decision to extend 
the custodian’s jurisdictions into these provinces.20   
Agreed areas connoted those from which evacuees had fled from under duress; and 
so were entitled to compensation from the government. In these areas, the 
custodian’s jurisdiction could apply; refugees could be settled in the property of the 
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custodian. At a conference in Lahore, on 22nd July, 1948, Indian and Pakistani 
delegates considered the expansion of areas where land could be declared ‘evacuee 
property’, and which would, in India’s case extend the arrangement to Ajmer 
Merwara, Malerkotla State, the Matsya and Rajasthan Unions, Saurashtra, the States 
of Jaipur and Jodhpur, and Western Districts of United Provinces.21 Yet, what 
increasingly happened, in both India and Pakistan, were enactments of legislation 
increasing the area where the writ of the custodian could apply, regardless of their 
commitments for restraint at the inter-dominion conferences. The agreements of 
1948, for instance, provided for ‘individual exchange’ of private property within the 
‘agreed areas’ in India and Pakistan. The possibility of exchange of urban property 
on either side of the border between individual owners was also examined, and 
generally accepted, at this conference. Finally, principles according to which 
compensation for the requisitioning and leasing of evacuee property were also 
agreed to.22  
Such an arrangement, however, was not sustained for the long term, and both 
delegations at future conferences argued that this agreement had been sidestepped. 
At the conference on Evacuee Property in January 1949, the Pakistani delegation 
continued to press for an agreement allowing property to be exchanged privately, 
between individual owners of corresponding pieces of property, on either side of the 
border. The Indian delegation however argued that such an arrangement would 
place owners of small pieces of property at a disadvantage. Instead, India asked for a 
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22 ‘Press Note on Inter-dominion Conference on Urban Immovable Property, January 1949’, File No. 
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‘government to government’ exchange, whereby the two governments would 
estimate the value of the property in their territories, and then settle the difference.23   
In India, the argument was repeatedly made that the government should  also 
requisition land outside the ‘agreed areas’, and the authority of the custodian of 
Evacuee Property should apply in areas such as, for instance, Bombay, which were 
outside the remit of the agreement. Developments such as these thus provided 
openings for accusations of non adherence to inter-dominion agreements on both 
sides -- a situation, however, that neither government in fact totally opposed. In 
applying the writ of the custodian beyond these areas, however, India was 
sidestepping the agreement. The conferences were, however, nonetheless necessary 
to calibrate the process. Yet, the coordination of these areas had to be calibrated 
carefully; expansion of rehabilitation into ‘non agreed areas’ was consistently 
resisted by both sides. Moreover, provincial governments in both countries 
vehemently protested against being slotted in the ‘agreed areas’ as this would tax 
their own budgets too far.24  
Notwithstanding the vocal exchanges of acrimony during many inter-dominion 
conferences on evacuee property, it is important to recognise that this was a 
machinery for agreement. Both sides could accuse the other of non fulfilment of their 
contracts on evacuee property, yet within this framework, there was in fact 
considerable room for accommodation. The need for modalities of disposal of 
evacuees properties, provided for areas of agreement on the ways in could be 
requisitioned, or exchanged. Although the removal of property from the hands of 
                                                
23 Schechtman, Joseph B., ‘Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 4, 
December 1951  
24 Ilyas Chattha has shown, for example, how the government of West Punjab was ambivalent on its 
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evacuees was consistently forwarded, the conferences were necessary for firming up 
the ways in which this was done in both countries. Moreover, it was necessary to 
secure agreement on the ways in which both states would operate in forwarding 
this. Although the ways of transferring the worth of the property to the other side 
was often hindered, bilateral negotiation was necessary to outline the extent to 
which it could be done.   
At a conference held in June 1949, in Lahore, it was also agreed that ‘an officer of the 
other dominion should be associated with the custodians of evacuee property of 
each dominion with a view to ensuring equitable management and early payments 
of rents due to evacuee owners’.25 A press note following the inter-dominion 
conference also stated that within certain provinces of India and Pakistan, owners of 
urban immovable property could arrange privately for the sale and exchange of their 
properties.26   
Yet, negotiations in this conference were mainly unsuccessful. N. G. Gopalaswami 
Ayyangar led the Indian delegation at the inter-dominion conference in Karachi in 
June 1949. Upon his return to Delhi, he called a press conference on June 27. The 
latest conference he said, had ‘resulted in nothing but an exchange of complaints’ for 
several reasons. Pakistan had argued that India’s enactment of legislation providing 
for the uniform administration of evacuee property throughout the country was a 
breach of the previous agreement. In particular, the Pakistani delegation had argued, 
the application of the evacuee property laws to Bombay, where considerable, and 
valuable, swathes of evacuee land were situated, was an  infringement on the rights 
of Muslims in that province. Yet, statements about deadlocks at such bilateral 
conferences should also be analysed against the grain: the evacuee property 
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conferences were necessary for both countries to calibrate the process by which their 
refugees were being rehabilitated. The conferences attempted to draw up the places 
where the writ of the custodian could apply, in a step-by-step process. 
At a discussion between Nehru and Khwaja Shahbuddin, which took place at the 
same time as the inter-dominion conference of 1950, the possible means of finally 
resolving the evacuee property dispute were examined, although it would take a few 
years yet for this to in fact ‘complete’. Later, in May 1950, Ayyangar despatched a 
telegram to the Pakistani minister for rehabilitation, Khwaja Shahbuddin, and stated 
‘We are determined to solve this evacuee property problem on the basis of the very 
friendly relations between the two governments brought about by the Nehru- Laiqat 
Pact’.27 One option was that all declarations of evacuee property could cease as of 8 
April 1950. The possibility was repeatedly examined by officials on both sides. 
Subimal Dutt, for instance listed out the merits of the suggestion of the Pakistani 
prime minister that declarations of evacuee property cease after a certain date. Dutt 
pointed out that if this provision were to be accepted, the urge towards pushing out 
members of the minority committee in order to claim their properties might reduce.28 
Dutt went on to argue that both governments should facilitate the process of sales 
and exchange of evacuee property where these could take place. Similarly, the 
provision for the collection of rent from urban immovable evacuee property, and 
exchanging the amounts on a government to government basis also soon ran into 
hurdles. The proposal for setting up a joint agency for the collection of income tax 
from immovable agricultural property, was, however, he felt unfeasible. The joint 
collection of revenue from evacuee property would have implied prolonging the 
uncertainty of ownership over this land. The right to claim rent from evacuee 
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property, thus, was consistently undermined in favour of finalising its transfer to 
new occupants.  
Moreover, possibilities for agreements on evacuee property, though conceivable, 
were not easy to put into motion. The question of urban immovable property could 
well have produced ‘satisfactory, agreed decisions between the two countries in the 
new atmosphere’29, at an inter-dominion conference scheduled for May, 1950. 
However, Nehru noted that though this was possible, the ‘main difficulty will be to 
carry our large population of displaced persons with us in any agreement we may 
come to with Pakistan.’30 The possibilities of satisfactory solution to the evacuee 
problem, thus were always accompanied by powerful hurdles in their complete 
implementation. Moreover, the terms of a solution favourable to evacuees, which 
would, after all, involve the loss of a great deal of revenue to both governments, 
were never completely embraced by either country. In May 1950, Mr. Mohammad 
Ali, Secretary General of the Government of Pakistan met S. Dutt, Commonwealth 
Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, and argued that although the 
government of Pakistan were amenable for facilities to be set up for the removal of 
movable properties, the question of a solution to rural immovable properties was 
tied up with  ‘a solution of the canal waters dispute and Kashmir Dispute… once 
these were settled, the Evacuee Property problem would present no difficulty’.31 
Compensation for evacuee property, thus, was relegated to a position of ‘unfinished-
ness’. It was not possible for either government to bring a lasting solution once and 
for all over this question; yet, the issue was to be melded into the infrastructure of 
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the dialogue between the two countries. Yet, this process also did leave room for the 
possibilities of new agreements.  
Propaganda against the various shortcomings of the other side on the question of 
evacuee property and refugee rehabilitation were certainly loudly voiced on both 
sides. This was important in the fight for legitimacy in refugees’ eyes, for both 
governments. The Indian side put forward a claim that ‘Hindu and Sikh urban 
evacuee property in West Pakistan at Rs. 525 crores and Muslim urban evacuee 
property in India at Rs. 125 crores.’32 It was argued that the value of the land left 
behind by those who had left Pakistan was some five times as that of land left 
behind in India.33 Yet, the nature of such a claim also reveals the extent of dialogue 
there was between the two sides regarding this question, and how it was to be 
settled. A fortnightly report from Mohan Singh Mehta, the High Commissioner in 
Karachi noted ‘Official circles in Pakistan have dismissed the estimates of Mr. Jain 
evaluating as a ‘propaganda lever against Pakistan’ and for the appeasement of the 
Indian refugees who are becoming uneasy at the non fulfilment of assurances given 
by Mr. Jain’s predecessor.’ Yet, the High Commissioner also noted, such statements 
were also ‘ignored’, at a time when ‘negotiations for an amicable settlement of all 
outstanding disputes were going on between the two Prime Ministers in an 
admittedly cordial atmosphere.’ 34  
The need for evacuees to be allowed to retain control over their land had initially 
formed the common basis for negotiations. The possibilities for a solution acceptable 
to evacuees seeking to retain control over their land had been known, broached, and 
articulated in the immediate months and years after the partition. Increasingly, 
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however, what also evolved alongside these negotiations was the tacit 
understanding that the implementation of these agreements would remain 
incomplete. Moreover, the writ of the custodian in extending his jurisdiction was 
increasingly being implicitly accepted in the negotiations. The seemingly 
straightforward solution of allowing evacuees to carry out ‘individual exchanges’  of 
their properties in agreed areas of their properties was examined at an early stage.  
Curiously, what provided the Indian authorities ostensible justification for retaining 
control over evacuee property were corresponding actions of the Pakistan 
government. It was frequently argued that agreements arrived at in Inter-dominion 
Conferences could not apply in India if they were violated in Pakistan. In November 
1949, a directive was sent round from the Office of the Custodian General stating 
that: 
 ‘The Government of Pakistan has not honoured any agreement on Evacuee 
Property. The policy of the government of India regarding sales so far, 
therefore, is not to allow any transfer of Evacuee Property in India and the 
same policy is to govern cases of exchange… [This] will not only reduce the 
pool of Evacuee Property in this country but may be used by Pakistan 
government as an argument against our demand for government to 
government settlement of the problem’.35  
The government of Pakistan pointed out in 1955 that ‘that almost every conference 
or discussion since held on the subject has broken down on account of the 
Government of India's insistence to settle the problem only on the basis of Govt.-to-
Government liability.’ Sardar Amir Azam, Minister for Rehabilitation in the Pakistan 
Government, argued that this could only be explained by the ‘desire of the 
government of India to obtain as large a compensation for the evacuee properties in 
Pakistan as possible in the course of what may be protracted negotiation spread over 
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several years’. The agreement of January 1949, moreover had been consistently 
disregarded by India by their permitting the extension of the rights of the Custodian 
of Evacuee Property.36 Finally, Amir Azam concluded, that in view of the actions of 
the Indian government already taken with regard to the evacuee property in their 
territory, and their subsequent invitation to Pakistan to ‘settle the manner in which 
compensation could be distributed as if the govt. of Pakistan have been party to or 
had approved the expropriatory action taken by the Government of India in utter 
violation of the Agreement of January 1949’, discussions on this basis could only be 
fruitless.37   
Yet, this process did not take place without any resistance. What was also commonly 
recognised across both sides on bilateral negotiations, and by many influential policy 
advisors and bureaucrats, was that too harsh an application of evacuee laws relating 
to property could only lead to further instability. Indeed, a key complaint at inter-
dominion conferences was that the processes of declaring ‘evacuees’ was leading to 
yet more landless, and dispossessed numbers streaming in from across the borders 
in search of compensation and rehabilitation. The vision of the relentless progress of 
the custodian of evacuee property systematically appropriating lands belonging to 
minorities and driving them across the border in unsustainable numbers, although 
frequently conjured by delegates at these negotiations, did not, however, ring 
entirely true. The course of the evacuee laws was not without obstacles, and there 
was consistently an articulate critique against the excessive control assumed by the 
office of the custodian of evacuee property. The dangers of the full implications of 
the process of the evacuee law were also clearly recognised even at the time, and 
attempts were made on both sides to stabilize this situation.  
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The question of how an evacuee, as well as his property were to be defined, were 
integrally connected to the practises regarding this in the other dominion. The 
evacuee property laws offered both governments the opportunity to define which of 
their erstwhile citizens could legitimately be termed evacuees. In April 1950, the 
constituent assembly debated legislation regarding evacuee property which would 
extend the date for migration for people to be declared as evacuees. The bill 
proposed that those who had migrated to Pakistan after August 1947 would be 
declared ‘evacuees’. The debate around these provisions highlights some of the ways 
in which the control over property of Muslim residents was sought to be tightened. 
Sucheta Kripalaani, a member of the constituent assembly, for instance argued that 
provisions related to remittances being sent across the border were too lenient. She 
argued ‘We know of cases where the head of the family has remained here, while his 
son or his nephew or his relations went over there; they bought Hindu or Sikh 
property for a song and carried on business there; gradually he liquidated his 
property here and smuggled all the money out to the other territory.’38  
At a Conference in July 1948, the Pakistan delegation proposed that migrants who 
moved from India to Pakistan after a certain date -- 30 September 1948 -- should not 
be declared as Evacuees by India.39 Gopalaswami Ayyangar had rejected this 
proposal, arguing that it would be unfair to those who had already migrated. Yet, 
the definitions of ‘intending evacuees’ were also being discussed in India, and 
introduced in the legislations on evacuee property in provinces such as West Bengal 
and United Provinces. The ‘intending evacuee’ was defined comprehensively:  
‘persons who have transferred their assets wholly or in part, or have 
acquired either personally or through any dependent relative any right to, 
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interest in, or benefit from any evacuee or abandoned property in Pakistan 
or by the execution of any document, or any other document in writing 
sought to effect exchange of the whole or part of the property in India with 
property in Pakistan can be declared as an intending evacuee’.40  
The circumstances in which the property of a person declared as an ‘intended 
evacuee’ could be acquired, were also listed out in detail, and eventually concluding: 
‘The person is not declared an evacuee, but his property becomes evacuee 
property’.41 The apparatus of the bilateral relationship, thus, was necessary to how 
the process of evacuee law could be drafted in both countries.  The process by which 
individuals could be named evacuees was carried out in consultation with 
legislation on the other side. Although this frequently led to accusations of how such 
legislations were driving out members of the minority across the border, it was 
nonetheless one that was carried out within the bilateral framework.  
In a note by Nehru on the forthcoming inter-dominion negotiations on this issue, 
Nehru stressed ‘The fact is, that in our application of evacuee property laws and 
rules, we have to be exceedingly careful in future and take up only special cases, 
which must be borne in mind by all the Custodians. Justice is to be done in all the 
cases, and where there is the slightest doubt, it has to be in favour of the person 
concerned’.42 Similarly, in September 1949, C. N. Chandra, a secretary to the 
government of India, wrote to the chief secretaries of the states, cautioning them that 
the indiscriminate application of evacuee property laws would be undesirable. He 
argued that 
 ‘it seems imperative for the officers charged with the duty of administering 
the law to realise that these powers must be exercised with the utmost care 
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and circumspection… [and] it must be always kept in mind that the 
evacuee legislation is an extraordinary piece of legislation which has been 
forced on us by circumstances altogether beyond our control’.43  
In a report compiled on this issue, by Mridula Sarabhai, she argued that the evacuee 
property problem did not elicit a uniform reaction among either refugees or, indeed, 
evacuees.44 Her report noted that the Muslim community in India was ambivalent 
about the idea of a government to government exchange, as this ‘would only lead 
nowhere, and to the perpetuation and increment in the scope of partition.’45 One 
feature of refugees’ sentiments on this problem, she argued, was that in the event of 
their being allowed to return in large numbers to their own properties in Pakistan, 
the two governments should not have snatched away their rights over their 
properties. At the same time, she noted, there was a great deal of support for the 
notion of ‘nationalising’ the evacuee properties within India, failing, or even 
accompanying, a government-to-government settlement of the issue.46 At the most 
extreme end of this spectrum, the RSSS, she noted, were ‘advocating their extreme 
theory of ‘Every penny from Pakistan/ Every penny to the Refugees’.47 But it would 
be rash, she argued, to force through a uniform legislation on evacuee property, 
since the question was so complex, and elicited so many reactions. While the 
rehabilitation of refugees was certainly a priority, the option of whole-scale 
requisitioning of evacuee land needed to be carefully considered.  
The long term disadvantages of the forceful requisitioning of land were thus clearly 
recognised even at the time itself. Shaping policy on Evacuee Property therefore, was 
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not just a blind reaction forced on by hordes of incoming refugees and fuelled from 
the bitterness of partition, but in fact a more painstaking series of developments. In 
1953, the question arose as to whether the titles of land-holdings of Muslim evacuees 
could simply be unilaterally quashed, as a means of simplifying issues of current 
land ownership. Badruddin Tyabji argued that the option of quashing the titles of 
Muslim evacuees who owned land in India, so that refugees from West Pakistan 
could be rehabilitated, was short sighted. He pointed out that to do so, would go 
against the International Court of Justice, which had ruled that a government could 
not, by means of its internal legislation, deprive a foreign citizen of their proprietary 
rights. This, he argued, would leave India vulnerable to action taken against her by 
the government of Pakistan in the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, he 
argued such an action would ‘… necessarily equate the claims of India and Pakistan 
to property left behind by their citizens, even though India’s claims to property in 
Pakistan is larger.’48 These objections were echoed in a note drafted by Sir B. N. Rau 
on the contemplated action on Evacuee Property, although he also noted that the 
prospects of Pakistan in fact raising this issue at the International Court of Justice, 
given that the proportion of Evacuee Property was greater in Pakistan, was 
uncertain.49 
Legislation passed by the government of East Bengal in 1952, to the effect that the 
rights of refugees who did not possess sale or exchange deeds for the property they 
currently resided on, would get validated. This however, ran counter to a 
declaration made a few months ago by the Ministers for Minorities for India and 
Pakistan which recognised that land transactions made during the disturbances may 
well have been unfair. By 1952, however, the State governments of Assam, Tripura 
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and West Bengal were asked to consider the merits of passing similar legislation in 
their own states. The West Bengal government argued that there was need for 
central legislation on this issue, although this ran counter to the view of the Central 
minister, who argued ‘any legislation should be enacted for the purpose of 
validating the transactions only if it appears that the sale or exchange had been on a 
fair basis. Otherwise the transactions ought to be set aside, and the parties should be 
put back in possession of their respective properties, with profits to each for interim 
occupation.’ What this exchange also shows, is that in fact, the shaping of policy on 
evacuee property was a more painstaking, and contingent series of events, rather 
than the vision of land being systematically appropriated by the Office of the 
Custodian, as was frequently asserted by delegates at the conferences.  
The ways in which a consensus ossified around whether and how evacuee land 
should be appropriated was thus very contingent, and not necessarily destined 
towards a vengeful end because of the bitterness that partition left behind. There 
was, consistently, an articulate critique of the dangers of enforcing the evacuee laws 
to their fullest extent, as well as the over-zealousness of the office of the custodian of 
evacuee property. Alternatives to these arrangements were also minutely examined, 
and, initially, had been actively pursued. Yet the consensus which eventually 
evolved in the case of evacuee land favoured those whom the state now had to 
rehabilitate, namely, the incoming refugees. The possibility of those who were now 
across the border to continue retain control over their land could not, however, be 
sustained indefinitely- this was contrary to the logic which propelled cooperation 
between the two governments on this question.   
This process had striking similarities in East Pakistan. The East Bengal State 
Acquisition Bill, by which the government would be entitled to convert into evacuee 
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property those who had left for India, was fiercely opposed  by Hindu MLAs, as the 
debate raged in the assembly in the 1949 and 1950 sessions. They were also a 
powerful opposition of the Bengal Zamindari Bill. These debates, and the State 
Requisitioning and Tenancy Act in particular, became very acrimonious, and was 
fought clause by clause by the Hindu MLAs of the assembly in sessions from 1947- 
1953. The State Requisitioning Act effectively transferred the interests of the—
substantially Hindu—rent receiving classes to the government. Nurul Amin had 
accused the MLAs of directing their speeches to an ‘inter national’ audience as the 
MLAs protested that the measure would further deteriorate the security of the 
minority community in the province.50         
Moreover, the process of passing legislation in favour of more requisitioning by the 
state of evacuee property was given similar justifications. Tafazzal Ali, a member of 
the legislative assembly who proposed a motion in favour of greater requisitioning 
argued: ‘A house on Sri Ramakrishna Road has been sold by the Hindu owner to a 
Muslim gentleman who now occupies it. Now the tactics adopted by that particular 
gentleman were merely a subterfuge in order to defy the requisition of that house so 
that he may make some gain by selling his house privately’.51 Brushing aside the 
objections of his opposition, who argued that places of religious worship or private 
charitable institutions ought to be exempt from this bill, Tafazzal Ali went on  to 
argue that ‘there may be cases where, even though a particular place is dubbed as a 
place of charitable institution or as a place of educational activities, it may be found 
on enquiry that this institution or place does not really serve any useful purpose, and 
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so in the larger interest of the State, even though it may cause inconvenience to 
some, is to requisition…’52  
That the question of evacuee property would have to be settled, and quickly, was 
recognised clearly by all sides. What was fascinating about the tussle on evacuee 
property was not so much working out the technicalities of the solution- which 
appeared to be obvious from a very early date; but the obstacles placed in its path. 
The modalities of viable solutions were also clearly detailed in the inter-dominion 
conferences, in terms of the recognition of the rights of evacuees to receive 
compensation, their entitlement to disposing of their land, and mechanisms that 
could be set up for collecting rents from evacuee property. The problem, thus, was 
not of a lack of solution, or the unawareness of its possibilities and advantages, as 
much as the hindrances placed in its path, and the choices made, coolly and 
deliberately, in favour of cutting off the links of those who had already left the 
nation, from their properties.  
Role of the High Commissions 
The High Commissions were frequently the primary port of information and 
assistance regarding these matters. The offices processed huge amounts of 
correspondence from displaced persons seeking advice on these matters. It was also 
the High Commissions that planned for, and created means of implementing the 
requirements of the agreements. Secondly, the question of how the governments 
could handle control over Evacuee Property, whether income tax would apply to 
such land, and the modalities of collecting rent on behalf of evacuee owners, had to 
be worked out. This gave the missions an unusual prominence and immediacy in the 
everyday lives of those distended by the partition. A despatch from the High 
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Commission of India in January 1949 pointed out that following the announcement 
of the January 1949 agreement, ‘a host of enquiries regarding the machinery which is 
being set up in Lahore by the Indian government to facilitate such sales and 
exchanges’.53 At the same time, the report continued, ‘It is felt that if the sale and 
exchanges is left entirely to the personal resourcefulness of property owners or 
Property Agents, much of the good that is expected to come out of the agreement 
will not materialise.’ The High Commissioner argued that for these transactions to be 
ultimately successful, the governments of both countries would also have to provide 
more help to evacuees. Finally, the despatch concluded, the working of the present 
permit system between India and Pakistan was a deterrent for owners of land in 
Pakistan to come from India, so ‘it was essential that both governments should agree 
to provide ‘repeated journey permits’ to bonafide property owners in either 
Dominion.’54  
Such recommendations were also endorsed by the Deputy High Commissioner in 
Dhaka, in 1949. In a fortnightly report in August 1949 S. K. Banerji noted ‘the 
promulgation of the Evacuee Property Ordinance in different provinces of India has 
worried many Muslim gentleman… They are making anxious enquiries from us in 
this respect, and enquiring whether there is any likelihood of the Ordinance being 
promulgated in West Bengal also’.55 Similarly, the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry 
of External Affairs in Calcutta often dealt with complaints from Pakistani citizens 
about the requisition of their land by the East Pakistan government. The Office of the 
Deputy High Commission in Dhaka also routinely forwarded complaints of forcible 
occupation of land, or land not being restored to returning Hindu migrants, to the 
Government of East Bengal. The work of the missions, therefore, very quickly 
                                                
53 ‘Implementation of Karachi Agreement of January 1949’, File No. 11(4)- Pak III,; NAI  
54 Ibid 
55 Fortnightly report of the Deputy High Commissioner for India in Dhaka, for the fortnight ending 15 
August 1949, File No. D2576- Pak A/49, MEA File, NAI 
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
 
 214 
became attuned to those who had concerns across the border. Yet, this infrastructure 
was designed to contain, and eventually remove such ties, rather than allow them to 
operate freely.  
An active role of the high commissions in questions regarding evacuee property had 
been envisioned from early on. Dealing with the question of evacuee property also 
brought about a growth in the size of machinery to facilitate dialogue at various 
bilateral levels. The infrastructure to deal with claims relating property allotment, 
verification of abandoned land, and channels of revenue collection were instituted 
by both governments from an early stage. The governments of both East and West 
Punjab, exchanged copious amounts of records relating to rent collection and 
methods of revenue calculation for the evacuee property in their territories. Work on 
the exchange of revenue records (jamabandis) began as early as July 1947, when the 
Rehabilitation Secretariat in Jullundar started to receive copies of the land ownership 
details of evacuees who were coming in from West Punjab.56 It was decided that 
agricultural evacuees from West Punjab would be resettled in East Punjab and the 
PEPSU states. This process carried on until the end of October 1948. Indeed, the 
volume of this work called for the increase in manpower at the Secretariat, which 
peaked at some 7,000 officials for carrying out the work of re-allotment of land57. 
This kind of work was particularly hectic on the side of the Punjab border in the 
months that followed partition, and the avenues of bilateral cooperation, especially 
in terms of exchange of information on refugees, was thus well established, and 
fairly dense.  
The Indian missions in Pakistan contained branches of the pertinently named ‘Office 
of Movable Property’. Yet, this was a potentially valuable source of evacuee 
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property, as it encompassed the bank account holdings of many evacuees now in 
India. Evacuees could petition their High Commission for the recovery of safe 
deposits in banks, deposits in courts, and pensions and provident funds. To this end, 
the two governments arrived at a Banking Agreement in April 1949.58 These were 
technically part of the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, and supposed to assist 
evacuees in India with the recovery of movable property that they had left behind in 
Pakistan. The Lahore branch was situated at 105, Upper Mall Road, and carried out 
the largest proportion of the work of recovery of movable property. In February 
1953, the Indian Minister for Rehabilitation recommended that the Office of Movable 
Property be closed down, due to ‘almost total non implementation of the Movable 
Property Agreement in Pakistan, [which] does not justify retention of separate 
Property Organisations’.59 The Indian Ministry of External Affairs disagreed with 
this suggestion, and maintained that the office should remain open. S. K. Banerji, 
Deputy High Commissioner for India, argued, that offices for such work had to 
continue, ‘if this Mission is able to justify its existence in the eyes at least of evacuees 
in India’. Badr-ud-din Tyabji pointed out that ‘this would result in an additional 
burden on our Pakistan branches… which will also not result in efficiency. Secondly, 
the burden of this work, considering its nature and implications, should not be laid 
on the diplomatic chanceries of our missions in Pakistan’.60 It was also noted that the 
Pakistan government would continue to maintain its own office for the recovery of 
movable property in Jullunder. Furthermore, Nehru pointed out, this would ‘cause 
embarrassment and hardship to our refugees, and this would give the Pakistan 
government the chance to accuse us of not carrying out the agreement arrived at’.61 
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Finally, he argued, the timing for closing down the property offices was not right: ‘A 
reply is shortly expected from the Pakistan government to the Government of India’s 
proposal regarding the two governments taking over the urban evacuee properties 
within their territories. This is hardly the time for closing down the present skeleton 
property organisation here’. In case an agreement could be arrived at, later in the 
year to settle the Evacuee Property question, moreover, ‘It is during the first month 
or two after signing of an Indo Pakistan agreement that its proper implementation is 
possible; thereafter differences begin to crop up on both sides which clog up full 
implementation. Much valuable time was lost after the signing of the movable 
property agreement in June 1950, and when the organisation got going in September 
1950, 2 ½ months of valuable time had already been lost’.62 Thus, it was argued that 
the office remain open, so that in periods of greater amity between the two countries, 
it would be able to access more property for evacuees in India. Thus, while the 
process of agreement worked frequently worked in fits and starts, the structures for 
these remained largely in place.  
In 1953, the office received some 6,780 letters from evacuees in India with details of 
the movable assets they had left behind, and where they could be recovered.63 
According to the Annual Report of this office in 1953, the approximate value of the 
movable property recovered by the Movable Property Office amounted to Rs. 
1,70,329/-. This office also carried a great deal of diverse and minute work relating 
to the concerns of evacuees in India, for instance recovery of buried treasure of those 
who had left, and the transfer of contents of their bank lockers. They dealt with 
claims relating to the verification of pensions claims, government provident funds, 
Leave salaries of displaced government servants, etc, on behalf of evacuees in India. 
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The Office of the Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore owned at bank account at 
Ferozepur in India, which contained the amounts recovered on behalf of evacuees in 
India. The amounts due to evacuee owners in India, received in Pakistani currency, 
were to be paid in the equivalent sum in Indian currency. These arrangements, 
however suffered a check in the form of objections from the Ministry of Finance, 
which argued that given the terms of the exchange control of Indian and Pakistani 
currency, it would not be feasible to make these payments to Indian evacuees. 
Eventually, it was decided that where the sums for payment were quite small, and 
less than Rs. 5,000/-, these procedures could be permitted. At the same time, 
however, such processes were also extremely lengthy. Mr. Gurditta Mal Bhasin, 
currently resident in Meerut, in Uttar Pradesh, and evacuee from Rawalpindi carried 
out an exhaustive correspondence with the office of the Deputy High Commissioner 
in Lahore, regarding the payment of Rs. 1,390/- which was due to him from his 
Provident Fund Account in Pakistan. He had applied for the payment of interest 
from his Provident Fund Account in Pakistan be transferred to him, through the 
offices of the Deputy High Commissioner. Although the Deputy High Commissioner 
was enabled, by an India- Pakistan Agreement on Moveable Evacuee Property to 
receive payments due to Indian evacuees, the question of currency regulations made 
it more difficult for these payments to be completed.64  
Delegates at the inter-dominion conference at Karachi in January 1949 decided that 
the high commissions of both countries would include an office specifically for the 
work of dealing with evacuees attempting to dispose of their properties. The inter-
dominion Agreement of January 1949, signed at Karachi, also that ‘It is the 
responsibility of the Dominion Government to … provide facilities to enable 
                                                
64 File No. PII/ 52/ 67237/201 
Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan, 1947- 1957 
 
 218 
transfers to be affected by sale, exchange or otherwise…’65 Questions relating to the 
implementation of these agreements would also be examined by a Commission on 
Evacuee Property, which would include high commissioners of both countries. This 
Commission was designed to speed up the process of its transfer, sale and exchange. 
The commission would meet bi-annually to compare the progress of implementation 
of its aims. There was a substantial amount of cooperation at these meetings, and the 
tasks of setting up and promoting avenues for completion of transfer and exchange 
of property were fairly thoroughly gone into. For example, the commission decided 
that the requirements for certificates of income tax clearance for the final disposal of 
evacuee property need not be mandatory. These were proving to be an additional 
hurdle to the transfer of property. At their meeting in New Delhi, in March 1949, it 
was decided that the period by which such certificates had to be produced could be 
extended.66 In many inter- governmental discussions on evacuee property, the 
willingness, as well as the means for straightforward solution were clearly 
articulated and explored. However, the means of derailing such agreements were 
also always easily accessible, and the likelihood of them being put into motion was 
also consistently strong.  
Following the agreement on evacuee property in January 1949, The high 
commissioner in Karachi issued ‘No Objection to Return’ certificates to many 
property- owners who wished to return to India. The high commission in Karachi 
was also instructed to issue ‘Stamp Paper’ which certified to the sale and exchange of 
Urban Immovable Property.67 It was noticed that large numbers of migrants were 
arriving in India to dispose of their properties. In a letter that the Under Secretary to 
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the Government of India, Mr. Y. L. Puri, wrote to the Chief Commissioners of the 
provinces, the undesirability of such action was highlighted. ‘I am to point out that it 
is extremely essential that Muslims coming to India on temporary visits are not 
allowed to dispose of their properties in India and that any property which is 
evacuee property under the law, is taken over by the Custodian concerned.’68 In a 
meeting on the extension of legislation of evacuee property to more States in India, 
on 25th July, 1949, it was noted: ‘Till recently, in a number if cases the authorities in 
the Provinces and States concerned very facilely issued ‘No Objection to Return’ 
Certificates. Our High Commissioner at Karachi, has therefore been instructed that 
such certificates issued before the 15th May 1949 need not be acted upon.’69  
In March 1955, C. C. Desai, Indian High Commissioner at Karachi, wrote to the 
Indian Minister for Rehabilitation, Mehr Chand Khanna, asking him to come for a 
visit to Karachi. Desai argued that conditions favoured the prospects of agreement 
with Pakistan on the more difficult aspects of the evacuee property dispute. The 
recently signed agreements on movable property, had been arrived at ‘with a desire 
to bury the hatchet after more than seven years of the partition’.70 Should Mehr 
Chand Khanna come to Karachi, opportunities for fruitful discussion with Ministers 
such as Iskandar Mirza and Khan Sahib to resolve outstanding points of difference. 
These, continued Desai, could even encourage evacuee property laws to be 
abrogated, as had been done by now in India.71 He concluded that ‘if we solve the 
problem of moveable property and evacuee law, we shall have gone a long way 
towards reducing the problem of refugees and rehabilitation’.72 Similarly, in April 
1956, Mehr Chand Khanna wrote to his counterpart arguing that the evacuee laws 
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had been abrogated in India now for more than two years, and expressed his hope 
that the Pakistan government could look at avenues to do the same. He argued that 
the law should not target the small Hindu population still resident in Sind.73 Mohan 
Singh Mehta noted that the actions of the government of India in auctioning evacuee 
properties to try and settle the long standing claims of the refugees in India, was 
causing some concern amongst government circles in Pakistan. It was being argued 
that evacuee property laws could be scrapped entirely ‘if only some satisfactory 
agreement could be reached between the two countries.’74 What such an action also 
pointed to, was recognition of the fact that the worth of property left behind by 
evacuees in Pakistan was, by and large, now lost. However, the continuance of 
evacuee law at this stage would no longer be as worthwhile, and the repeal of such a 
law, at this stage, might result in the greatest degree of stability.  
Finally, an examination of the progress of evacuee laws in both countries also show 
that the process of the progress of the Custodian of Evacuee Property acquiring land 
was in fact quite complex, and was faced a variety of criticisms. There was in fact, a 
great deal of debate on the pros and cons of the use of such an office. The dangers of 
the full implications of the process of the Evacuee Law were also recognised: they 
were not pushed through because of a blind frenzy against minorities in the country. 
It is important to recognise that the process of re-arrangement of the rights of land 
ownership were not in any way an accidental, or knee jerk reaction to even such a 
mammoth event such as the partition, but in fact fairly carefully thought out, and 
deliberately pursued by both the new governments.     
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The whole-scale requisitioning of evacuee land was not a unanimously agreed upon 
course. There was a fair amount of internal debate on this question, and consistently 
an articulate critique against the excessive application of the Custodian’s authority. 
Shaping policy on Evacuee Policy, therefore, was not a blind reaction forced on by 
hordes of incoming refugees, and fuelled from the bitterness of Partition, but in fact 
a more painstaking series of developments. If the structures of two nation states had 
to solidify, then the question of evacuees retaining control over their property across 
the border had to be discarded as completely as possible. Indeed, the evacuee 
property legislations, as well as the conferences and dialogue on this issue reflected a 
broader imperative: the control of the nation state of property within her territory 
had to be paramount. What the conferences had provided for was the insertion of 
state infrastructure into an area where the reach of the private individual across the 
border could not go unregulated. The wrangling over the question of the fairness of 
the evacuee property settlement was thus designed to mask a process through which 
the agencies of the government could secure the greatest control over potentially 














The bilateral relationship occupies a strange place at the heart of both nation states: 
even when events are at their most conflicted, its importance, if anything, increases. 
While the ties are frequently strained, the very infrastructure of separation acts as a 
deterrent from seeking the outright destruction of either state. This fact positions the 
state of the relationship on an edgy precipice, yet also gives it a curious stability. The 
bilateral infrastructure was established from very early on, and proved to be durable 
even at the point of serious inter-dominion tensions. Indeed, in order to be able to 
assert the differences between India and Pakistan, an infrastructure that established 
their separation was necessary. This gives the India-Pakistan relationship its unique 
texture.  
 
Thus, even as the two sides vocalised the differences between them from the 
beginning, it was essential for both to build an infrastructure which reflected the 
separation of India from Pakistan, and vice versa. Having been conceived of through 
a partition, it was critical for both states to uphold the consequences of this partition 
as far as possible. The two governments inserted the machinery of their states into 
issues that could potentially threaten the certainties of the partition. This could be 
seen in a host of situations, including the offices for the disposal of evacuee property, 
District and Provincial Minorities Boards, inter-dominion collaboration between the 
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Ministers for Minorities, as well as the role of the diplomatic missions. All these were 
institutions which were products of a partition, and served to highlight the 
separation of the two countries; they were also inextricably linked to the bilateral 
relationship, and could not be done away with by either side. Thus, even when 
India-Pakistan relations were at their most tense, the bilateral dialogue also 
encompassed these questions, providing a lasting, if paradoxical, basis of agreement. 
 
This logic displayed itself from the earliest days following the partition, and 
subsequently played itself out in a variety of different situations. The activities of the 
Partition Council in the immediate aftermath of partition were geared towards 
addressing the demands of two separated states, rather than to merely oversee a 
hasty division of the spoils. Futhermore, with regard to the minorities question, both 
governments put in place structures which established that the infrastructure of the 
state was the primary intermediary between individuals seeking to establish inter-
dominion contact; and, moreover, that such contact was determined on the basis of 
nationality and citizenship. Similarly, the question of evacuee property had to be 
determined on the basis of an exclusive nationality, and the need to terminate all 
possibilities of inter-dominion ownership of property. The same concerns were 
reflected in question of demarcating boundaries: while such a task has proved nearly 
impossible to complete, it was nonetheless necessary to evolve systems through 
which both states could establish their sovereignty based on their agreements on this 
exercise. With regard to inter-dominion trade, it was imperative for both countries to 
maintain their self sufficiency, and the possibilities of such trade were only 
reluctantly admitted. Indeed, the nature of this cooperation was that it often took 
place at the expense of those who wished to retain inter-dominion ties. Thus, in order 
to pursue separate, and often mutually hostile, trajectories it was necessary for the 
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two governments to enter into acts of cooperation that established with clarity the 
permanence of their separation.  
 
The cooperative impulses were not particularly warm; nor  did they arise out of a 
sense of nostalgia for the past, but arose due to a commonality in the areas that were 
mutually beneficial for consolidating the self-sufficiency of both states. Yet, such 
areas have proven to be durable, even when relations between the two countries are 
tense. In order to legitimise the sets of grievances that both states voiced with regard 
to one another, it was necessary to first establish that the structures of a viable 
existence were present on both sides. Moreover, the differences needed to be 
articulated in terms of those which threatened the sovereignty of either side, rather 
than reprisals for historic wrongs. The pursuit of the foreign policies of both 
countries was to secure a greater stability of their own states, and to this end, if 
possible, a stable coexistence. The bilateral relationship thus, arose out of the 
instincts of self preservation of both sides: in order to uphold their own sovereignty, 
India and Pakistan had to recognise each other’s. This played out in a variety of 
complicated ways in their dealings with one another on various issues, yet, the need 
for cooperation and negotiation also remained a constant, and consistent, factor in 
the history of the relationship. The ways in which this objective is deviated from is 
not so much a testimony to the acrimony between India and Pakistan, as to the fact 
that both do pursue their own self interest.  
 
The bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan served to reinforce the 
centrality of the state into the politics of India and Pakistan. It is necessary, thus, to 
contextualise this relationship in terms of the development and consolidation of two 
state structures, rather than one of unthinking religious animosity. The argument in 
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favour of bilateral cooperation, thus, was the same as that in favour of strengthening 
the state structure of the two countries. This was frequently a hostile relationship, 
yet, one which endorsed the fabric of both states. It was in order to gain legitimacy 
that the two countries undertook to cooperate to give shape to the certainty of 
partition. 
 
This account of the India-Pakistan relationship, however, differs from a conventional 
analysis of a rivalry based on power play. Although this was undoubtedly present in 
the relationship, it is also necessary to look behind these manoeuvrings to examine 
the deeper mainsprings of the relationship, and analyse why these acts of cooperation 
and dialogue proved to be so durable. While both pursued agendas which were 
hostile to the other, neither could do away with the bilateral relationship entirely and 
had to remain tethered to its concerns. At the same time, the sets of issues 
encompassed in the relationship were of vital interest in the politics of both 
countries, and were often shaped by factors critical to the legitimacy of both states. 
Thus it was important for both governments to be seen to be pursuing these issues 
with each other, even though this process frequently ran into ‘deadlocks’. Yet, the 
India-Pakistan relationship also put in place a series of ‘interim’ measures, which 
were in fact a way of securing a greater stability over these questions.  
 
Moreover, the India-Pakistan relationship was also a product of circumstances which 
‘sprung up’ from the ground. With regard to bilateral trade, and drawing the 
boundary line, for example, both states were also acknowledging the need to give 
shape to events which had already taken place on the ground. What is also 
fascinating is that this relationship was not one crafted solely by the leaderships on 
either side. It could not be simply addressed by a single policy directive from New 
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Delhi and Karachi, but rather, often took place irrespective of them. Indeed, in many 
instances, the cooperation that came about between the two sides was a function of 
having to catch up and, where possible, control, what was already taking place. 
These sets of concerns gave the India-Pakistan relationship its unique texture. The 
cooperation and dialogue between the leadership on either side was not only a 
matter of pursuing a desired foreign policy agenda, but also an inevitability which 
both sides were compelled to factor in.   
 
Bilateral relations were thus a process, rather than a single decision. Whether it was 
the case of a territorial dispute, or property or people, the approach that both 
governments took in forming their bilateral positions, were very consistent. 
Arrangements to prolong the various links across the subcontinent which had 
existed before the partition were consistently undermined by both governments. 
What emerged instead, were varied and numerous insertions of the state apparatus 
in areas where the certainties of the closure of partition could be challenging.  
 
Questions which arose in the bilateral relationship thus were frequently given 
flexible, and ‘interim’ answers within this framework, rather than those which closed 
off all possibility of future dialogue. What evolved in the first decade were a series of 
structures that remained as durable as the conflict. The process of establishing two 
sovereign states in the aftermath of partition, therefore, required a substantial degree 
of compromise and cooperation from both sides. Such cooperation was moreover, 
integral in maintaining the notions of sovereignty of both countries and, therefore, 
the nature of this cooperation was a permanent ingredient in the bilateral 
relationship. It is necessary to contextualise the violence and acrimony in the India-
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Pakistan relationship, thus, against the backdrop of the imperative of having to stay 
clearly separated.  
  
This kind of cooperation rests uneasily, yet with a curious logic, alongside the fact 
that the India-Pakistan relationship is crafted at so many levels of both governments. 
Structures of bilateral cooperation were dispersed all across the machinery of 
government on both sides. The set of issues which the India-Pakistan relationship 
encompassed was too broad to be handled by a single set of officials. This meant, 
paradoxically enough, that even while the two sought to disentangle themselves 
from the other, concerns about development across the border pervaded throughout 
the structures of the government of both sides. Yet, such a dynamic was, in fact, 
critical to the nature of the relationship: the task of upholding the sovereignty of the 
other implied complicity on the part of both governments. An analysis of India-
Pakistan relationship thus has to take into account the necessity of retaining the 
structures of government of both countries. In the immediate decade after partition, 
the leadership on both sides took measures to ensure that these structures remained 
permanent. This level of inter-governmental cooperation gives an added texture to 
the India-Pakistan relationship, which, indeed is integral to the making of both 
states. The necessity of undertaking such cooperation arose not necessarily out of 
concern for those who had, after all, belonged within a unitary government of India; 
but instead was vital to the continuing viability of both states.  
 
Finally, this thesis explores the machinations behind policy making within the two 
ministries, and argues that these policies were not self evident, but rather the subject 
of a great deal of debate, internal criticism, and questioning. It is thus difficult to 
predict the trajectories of India-Pakistan relationship at any given point, because of 
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the multiple alternatives and possibilities available to both sides.  The possibility of 
compromise and agreement has always been in sight in the India-Pakistan 
relationship. This is indicative of the fact that both states need to recognise the 
sovereignty of each other. While both frequently voice, and indeed pursue agendas 
which are hostile to the other, it is nonetheless within a parameter which cannot de-
stabalise the viability of the other. The history of conflict in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s must 
be looked for in that period, rather than to look further back to the deeper origins. 
The India-Pakistan story, thus, does not boil down to the bitterness of the partition, 
but is rather, in fact, a search by both parties to move beyond it. While this did not 
necessarily imply a secure, peaceful coexistence, it was nonetheless based on both 
parties acting on the basis of a viable state structure.  
Moreover, it is also important to recognise that the sets of agendas in India and 
Pakistan in shaping the bilateral relationship, were in fact very clearly a function of 
the contemporary timeframe rather than being easily traced back to the acrimony of 
the partition. Moreover, agendas which were hostile to Pakistan were directed more 
to the audiences at home, rather than to those on the other side of the border. It is 
necessary, thus, to examine all the pronouncements with regard to inter-dominion 
relations not merely as a statement of intent on the nature of the relationship to be 
pursued with the other, but with regard to political positioning at home. Concerns 
relating to India-Pakistan relations were clearly opportunities for a great deal of 
jostling on both sides, but it is necessary to historicise them in their specific contexts, 
rather than viewing them as being necessarily a direct fallout of the partition. India 
and Pakistan remain uppermost on each other’s agendas; yet even while this is so, it 
is necessary for them to be clearly separated from one another. Their concerns, 
moreover, relate as much with the strengthening of the state, rather than on the need 




At the same time, this thesis stops short of analysing the differences between India 
and Pakistan in terms of the differing ‘personalities’ of the two countries but argues, 
rather, that the bilateral relationship was crafted according to the needs of both post-
colonial states. Differences as well as commonalties arose in the India-Pakistan 
relationship not merely due to their differing approaches and personalities, but 
rather in ways that fulfilled the requirements of the two states from this relationship. 
The bilateral mechanism for cooperation, thus was often not necessarily a 
manifestation of the ‘differences’ between the two states, as much as one 
representing the possibilities of agreement between them. Moreover, while the 
indications of a serious -- and lasting – acrimony had been present in the India-
Pakistan relationship from the beginning, it was also necessary for both to counter-
fold this into a structure of cooperation that could, in fact, serve to uphold their 
differences. At the heart of the relationship, therefore, lies not a corrosive hatred, but 
a recognition of the basis of agreement.  
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I. Chronology of Major Agreements in India-Pakistan 
Relations, 1947- 1957 
  
15 August 1947 Division of the sub-continent into two Dominions, India 
and Pakistan 
29 August 1947 A conference of the Governor Generals and Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan with their Military 
Commanders in Lahore to devise means to stop 
communal rioting in Punjab 
08 September 1947 Joint Statement issued by Prime Ministers Nehru and 
Liaquat Ali Khan warning that armed bands in West and 
East Punjab would be punished by separate governments 
18 September 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan arrives in Delhi to discuss the question 
of Minorities 
20 September 1947 India and Pakistan issued a Joint Statement for the 
establishment of peaceful conditions in both countries so 
that the minorities could live in security 
08 November 1947 Governor General Mountbatten and Nehru meet 
Governor General Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan at the 
meeting of the Joint Defence Council in Lahore 
10 December 1947 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of 
income between India and Pakistan 
12 December 1947 Financial Agreement between India and Pakistan 
announced in Indian Parliament. Pakistan to get Rs. 
750,000 from the balance of the cash of undivided India 
22 December 1947 The Joint Council of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi 
and considered matters arising out of the partition of the 
armed forces 
11 January 1948 Joint Defence Council meet in Lahore and discuss the 
division and delivery of arms and equipment of the old 
Indian Army 
19 April 1948 India and Pakistan sign a charter intended to protect the 
Hindu Muslim minorities in both countries. It was agreed 
at a joint conference that both Dominions should stop 
mass exodus and encourage refugees to return.  
04 May 1948 Joint Agreement between India and Pakistan on canal 
dispute between East and West Punjab governments 
issued 
23 June 1948 Air Transport Agreement signed between India and 
Pakistan 
22 July 1948 Inter-dominion conference on Evacuee Property; 
Agreements reached on ‘Agreed Areas’ where evacuee 
property could be classified; systems for exchange of 
property outlined.  
06 December 1948 Representatives of India and Pakistan meet in Delhi to 
consider the problem of migration of minorities, 
particularly those in East and West Bengal 
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15 December 1948 Agreement signed between India and Pakistan providing 
for the establishment of a Tribunal to settle boundary 
disputes between East and West Bengal and between East 
Bengal and Assam 
02 February 1949 Indian Parliament ratifies the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs with Pakistan 
25 May 1949 India-Pakistan Trade Agreement finalised 
24- 27 June, 1949 Evacuee Property Conference held in Lahore 
06 January 1950 Nehru disclosed that he had proposed to Pakistan that 
they could ban war as a means of solving their problems 
05 February 1950 Decision by the special tribunal on the boundary 
disputes— partial revision of the Radcliffe Award. 
Tribunal presided over by Justice Bagge of Sweden 
07 February 1950 Government of India White Paper on India-Pakistan trade 
relations published 
02 April 1950 Liaquat Ali Khan arrives in New Delhi for talks with 
Nehru 
02- 08 April 1950 Nehru and Liquat Ali Khan sign the India-Pakistan 
Minorities Agreement (Nehru-Liaquat Pact) in New Delhi 
at the conclusion of talks. 
27 April 1950 Nehru arrives in Karachi for talks with Liaquat Ali Khan 
23 May 1950 India Pakistan Agreement on Exchange of Prisoners 
reached. 
30 May 1950 India Pakistan trade talks begin in Delhi 
28 June 1950 India and Pakistan reach ‘complete agreement’ for the 
settlement of moveable assets abandoned by both Hindus 
and Muslims in 1947 
24 November 1950 Nehru announces that India’s efforts for an India-Pakistan 
‘No War Declaration’ has failed 
25 February 1951 India and Pakistan signed a Trade Agreement in Karachi 
according to which Pakistan would supply raw jute, raw 
cotton and foodgrains, in return for Indian coal, steel, 
textiles and cement 
18 June 1951 India Pakistan Permit conference held in New Delhi 
16 September 1951 Nehru reiterates his offer of a No War declaration to 
Pakistan at a public meeting in Lucknow 
05 August 1952 Trade Agreements between India and Pakistan signed in 
New Delhi 
21 August 1952 West Bengal- East Pakistan boundary agreed upon at a 
joint meeting of the high commissioners of the 
governments of India and Pakistan in New Delhi 
23 August 1952 Passport system between India and Pakistan come into 
force on August 23; official announcement made in New 
Delhi 
24 September 1952 Government of India express concern to government of 
Pakistan regarding the influx of non-Muslim migrants 
from East Bengal into West Bengal 
31 January 1953 India and Pakistan agree to liberalise the passport system: 
agreement concluded in New Delhi 




19 March 1954 Election Results of East Pakistan announced: Muslim 
League defeated by United Front 
27 August 1954 The World Bank suggests fresh proposals for the 
settlement of the Canal Waters dispute between India and 
Pakistan 
15 March 1955 India-Pakistan Joint Communique issued, stating that the 
two Governments had reached full agreement in talks on 
moveable evacuee property and banking arrangements 
17 May 1955 India-Pakistan ministerial level talks in New Delhi: 
agreement reached on the prevention of border incidents 
and preservation of shrines and holy places in both 
countries 
03 November 1955 An ad-hoc transitional agreement concluded between 
India and Pakistan concerning the use of waters of the 
Indus Rivers system 
12 December 1955 Discussions concluded in Lahore between officials of the 
World Bank, Pakistan and India on steps to be taken in 
restoring canals and links in West Pakistan damaged in 
the recent floods.  
11 April 1956 India-Pakistan boundary talks between survey officials of 
both countries on the demarcation of boundary begins in 
New Delhi 
05 August 1956 Prime Ministers Nehru and Muhammad Ali of Pakistan 
discuss bilateral relations in London 
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II. Text of April 1950 Inter-Dominion Agreement on 
Minorities1   
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN REGARDING SECURITY AND RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 
(NEHRU-LIAQUAT AGREEMENT) 
 
New Delhi,   
8 April 1950  
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to 
the minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of 
religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal 
honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, 
speech and worship, subject to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall 
have equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the 
public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their 
country's civil and armed forces.  
Both Governments declare these rights to be fundamental and undertake to enforce 
them effectively. The Prime Minister of India has drawn attention to the fact that 
these rights are guaranteed to all minorities in India by its Constitution. The Prime 
Minister of Pakistan has pointed out that similar provision exists in the Objectives 
Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It is the policy of both 
Governments that the enjoyment of these democratic rights shall be assured to all 
their nationals without distinction. Both Governments wish to emphasise that the 
allegiance and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens, and 
that it is to the Government of their own State that they should look for the redress of 
their grievances.  
B. In respect of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where 
communal disturbances have recently occurred, it is agreed between the two 
Governments:  
(i) That there shall be freedom of movement and protection in transit;  
(ii) That there shall be freedom to remove as much of his moveable personal effects 
and household goods as migrant may wish to take with him. Moveable property shall 
include personal jewellery. The maximum cash allowed to each adult migrant will be 
Rs. 150 and to each migrant child Rs. 75;  
(iii) That a migrant may deposit such of his personal jewellery or cash as he does not 
wish to take with him with a bank. A proper receipt shall be furnished to him by the 
bank for cash or jewellery thus deposited and facilities shall be provided, as and when 
                                                
1 Reprinted from ‘Bilateral Documents’ included in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs 
website, http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=53051785; last visited: 1 September 2012. 
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required for their transfer to him, subject as regards cash to the exchange regulations 
of the Government concerned;  
(iv) That there shall be no harassment by the Customs authorities. At each customs 
post agreed upon by the Governments concerned, liaison officers of the other 
Government shall be posted to ensure this in practice;  
(v) Rights of ownership in or occupancy of the immoveable property of a migrant 
shall not be disturbed. If, during his absence, such property is occupied by another 
person, it shall be returned to him provided that he comes back by the 31st December, 
1950. Where the migrant was a cultivating owner or tenant, the land shall be restored 
to him provided that he returns not later than the 31st December, 1950. In exceptional 
eases, if a Government considers that a migrant's immoveable property cannot be 
returned to him, the matter shall be referred to the appropriate Minority Commission 
for advice. Where restoration of immoveable property to the migrant who returns 
within the specified period is found not possible, the Government concerned shall 
take steps to rehabilitate him.  
(vi) That in the case of a migrant who decides not to return, ownership of all his 
immoveable property shall continue to vest in him and he shall have unrestricted right 
to dispose of it by sale, by exchange with an evacuee in the other country, or 
otherwise. A committee consisting of three representatives of minority and presided 
over by a representative of Government shall act as trustees of the owner. The 
Committee shall be empowered to recover rent for such immoveable property 
according to law. The Governments of East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura 
shall enact the necessary legislation to set up these Committees. The Provincial or 
State Government, as the case may be, will instruct the District or other appropriate 
authority to give all possible assistance for the discharge of the Committee's 
functions. The Provisions of this sub-paragraph shall also apply to migrants who may 
have left East Bengal for any part of India, or West Bengal, Assam or Tripura for any 
part of Pakistan, prior to the recent disturbances but after the 15th August, 1947. The 
arrangement in this sub-paragraph will apply also to migrants who have left Bihar for 
East Bengal owing to communal disturbances or fear thereof.  
C. As regards the Province of East Bengal and each of the States of West Bengal, 
Assam and Tripura respectively the two Governments further agree that they shall:  
(1) Continue their efforts to restore normal conditions and shall take suitable measures 
to prevent recurrence of disorder.  
(2) Punish all those who are found guilty of offences against persons and property and 
of other criminal offences In view of their deterrent effect, collective fines shall be 
imposed, where necessary. Special Courts will, where necessary, be appointed to 
ensure that wrong doers are promptly punished.  
(3) Make every possible effort to recover looted property.  
(4) Set up immediately an agency, with which represen- tatives of the minority shall 
be associated, to assist in the recovery of abducted women. 53 NOT recognise forced 
conversions. Any conversion effected during a period of communal disturbance shall 
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be deemed to be forced conversion. Those found guilty of converting people forcibly 
shall be punished.  
(6) Set up a Commission of Enquiry at once to enquire into and report on the causes 
and extent of the recent disturbances and to make recommendatiors with a view to 
preventing recrudescence of similar trouble in future. The personnel of the 
Commission, which shall be presided over by a Judge of the High Court, shall be such 
as to inspire confidence among the minority.  
(7) Take prompt and effective steps to prevent the dissemination of news and 
mischievous opinion calculated to rouse communal passion by press or radio or by 
any individual or organisation. Those guilty of such activity shall be rigorously dealt 
with.  
(8) Not permit propaganda in either country directed against the territorial integrity of 
the other or purporting to incite war between them and shall take prompt and effective 
action against any individual or organisation guilty of such propaganda.  
D. Sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of C of the Agreement are of 
General scope and applicable according to exigency to any part of India or Pakistan.  
E. In order to help restore confidence, so that refugees may return to their homes, the 
two Governments have decided  
(i) to depute two Ministers, one from each Government, to remain in the affected 
areas for such period as may be necessary;  
(ii) to include in the Cabinets of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam a 
representative of the minority community. In Assam the minority community is 
already represented in the Cabinet. Appointments to the Cabinets of East Bengal and 
West Bengal shall be made immediately.  
F. In order to assist in the implementation of this Agreement, the two Governments 
have decided, apart from the deputation of their Ministers referred to in E, to set up 
Minority Commissions, one for East Bengal, one for West Bengal and one for Assam. 
These Commissions will be constituted and will have the functions described below:  
(i) Each Commission will consist of one Minister of the Provincial or State 
Government concerned, who will be Chairman, and one representative each of the 
majority and minority communities from East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam, 
chosen by and from among their respective representatives in the Provincial or State 
Legislatures, as the case may be.  
(ii) The two Ministers of the Governments of India and Pakistan may attend and 
participate in any meeting of any Commission. A Minority Commission or any two 
Minority Commissions jointly shall meet when so required by either Central Minister 
for the satisfactory implementation of this Agreement.  
(iii) Each Commission shall appoint such staff as it deems necessary for the proper 
discharge of its functions and shall determine its own procedure.  
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(iv) Each Commission shall maintain contact with the minorities in Districts and small 
administrative headquarters through Minority Boards formed in accordance with the 
Inter-Dominion Agreement of Decemeber, 1948.  
(v) The Minority Commissions in East Bengal and West Bengal shall replace the 
Provincial Minorities Boards set up under the Inter-Dominion Agreement of 
Decemeber, 1948.  
(vi) The two Ministers of the Central Governments will from time to time consult 
such persons or organisations as they may consider necessary.  
(vii) The functions of the Minority Commission shall be:  
(a) to observe and to report on the implementation of this Agreement and, for 
this purpose, to take cognizance of breaches or neglect;  
(b) to advise an action to be taken on their reommendations.  
(viii) Each Commission shall submit reports, as and when necessary, to the Provincial 
and State Governments concerned. Copies of such reports will be submitted 
simultaneously to the two Central Ministers during the period referred to in E.  
(ix) The Governments of India and Pakistan and the State and Provincial 
Governments will normally give effect to recommendations that concern them when 
such recommendations are supported by both the Central Ministers. In the event of 
disagreement between the two Central Ministers, the matter shall be referred to the 
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan who shall either resolve it themselves or 
determine the agency and procedure by which it will be resolved.  
(x) In respect of Tripura, the two Central Ministers shall constitute a Commission and 
shall discharge the functions that are assigned under the Agreement to the Minority 
Commissions for East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam. Before the expiration of the 
period referred to in E, the two Central Ministers shall make recommendations for the 
establishment in Tripura of appropriate machinery to discharge the functions of the 
Minority Commissions envisaged in respect of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam.  
G. Except where modified by this Agreement, the Inter-Dominion Agreement of 
December, 1948 shall remain in force.    
